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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The effort to balance coexisting (and often conflicting) institutional objectives is a 
recurring theme throughout the history of American higher education. Colleges and 
universities are spaces that provide academic (and co-curricular) experiences that can 
activate a political consciousness, but are also places that are vulnerable to outside 
influences (indicative of the broader political climate) which may compel the prescription 
of institutional goals that undermine or shift attention away from these nonmaterial aims. 
This project examines the functions of the university in American life and considers how 
institutional development impacts the political socialization of the student body. Previous 
scholarship on student politics has often focused on campus conditions during a specific 
time and location and therefore is not equipped to address how macro-level structural 
changes in the higher education system, the study of which would necessitate a longer 
temporal scope, may influence engagement. A longitudinal periodization analysis is 
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employed to detect longer-term trends and discern critical junctures that can help explain 
variation in political involvement among college students of different historical time and 
to uncover the causal mechanisms that facilitate (or impede) political development on 
campus. By encountering distinct cultural expectations of higher education, we can assess 
how social values conveyed in particular missions may stimulate or inhibit student 
political engagement. The contemporary era is dominated by institutional functions and 
educational aims that have historically not been directed at political socialization and is 
populated by students who do not meet the “preconditions of recruitment” as expressed in 
earlier periods. The significance of formative experiences has been well documented; the 
lessons that are learned (or unlearned) during emerging adulthood will subsequently 
inform political behavior. This investigation of the relationship between student politics, 
national development, and the purposes of higher education in American life 
demonstrates that the institutional medium through which we socialize does a great deal 
to shape how we socialize. 
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Chapter 1: Institutional Locations and Locutions: 
Higher Education and Student Political Socialization 
A definitive study [of the university] calls first of all for a clear description of the  
essential characteristics of our age and an accurate diagnosis of the rising generation. 
José Ortega y Gasset, Mission of the University (1930) 
 
The tendency to focus on the student movements of the 1960s (and thereby 
overlooking other less active periods of engagement) obfuscates the broader mechanisms 
that facilitate (or impede) college youth political involvement in all eras. To understand 
shifts in student politics among cohorts of different historical time, this project takes a 
broader developmental view and examines longitudinally the changing relationship 
between school and society. In analyzing this increasingly central institution in American 
life, we see how particular stages in national development have required colleges and 
universities to espouse different institutional logics (Gumport 2000; Berman 2012) in 
advancing historically-contingent aims. As stakeholders expand and constituencies 
broaden, institutions become more susceptible to the influence of external forces (such as 
government initiatives, patron requests, or consumer demands) and, in the case of higher 
education, previously core socializing missions and curricular emphases may be 
compromised. 
There are underappreciated consequences of these adaptations to changing social 
needs. The contemporary era of college student political engagement (both in kind and 
degree) can best be explained by a confluence of demographic forces, institutional 
dynamics, and historical factors. As students have become more demographically
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representative of the broader polity, their outlook toward the ends of education 
increasingly reflects a more instrumentalist orientation. While politically engaged 
students have always been a minority phenomenon on campus,1 the percentage of 
undergraduates who have been least “biographically available” (McAdam 1986, 1988) to 
recruitment efforts in the past (e.g. non-traditional students2 and students pursuing 
degrees in non-liberal arts fields) is, at present, the highest in American history.  
The benefits of expanded access to higher education cannot be overstated; the 
potential challenges, though, have been less well recognized. The role of the university in 
serving American society has developed over time; the purposes of education, moreover, 
have adjusted to meet specific historical contexts. In the current economic climate, this 
desire to be responsive has resulted in a focus on utilitarian goals, without sufficient 
attention given to the possible longer-term social costs. For example, universities have 
regularly functioned as sites of political participation for emerging adults. The enduring 
political significance of these formative experiences has been well documented (e.g. 
Fendrich 1993; Jennings 2002; Rojas 2011: 21). If universities have deemphasized (or 
redirected)3 their role as agents of political socialization – primarily motivated by 
credentialing and economic imperatives rather than critical thinking and citizenship 
                                                             
1 Levine and Cureton (1998: 6). On the lack of political engagement on college campuses (even) 
during the early 1960s, see Trent and Craise (1967). 
2 This classification typically refers to students (e.g. older, part-time, commuter, or first-
generation attendee status) whose physical presence on campus may be limited due to family or 
work responsibilities. 
3 Socialization still occurs, but because short-term outcomes are prioritized and less market-
driven institutional purposes are often neglected, it is a message that conveys values that are less 
central to character formation and public citizenship. I appreciate Stephen Bird’s comments on an 
earlier version of this chapter which have helped to clarify this point.  
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responsibilities – we should expect to see these characteristics reflected in student 
political engagement (or lack thereof).  
Debates over the role of higher education in the United States are as old as the 
Republic itself. There is a (conflictual) coexistence of objectives and outcomes during all 
historical periods. The resonance of proposed aims varies as institutional stakeholders 
(internal and external) respond to (and in some cases shape) the larger social context. 
Universities cannot be understood, therefore, as sanctuaries detached from the rest of 
society – so-called “ivory towers” – but instead should be viewed as sites that endorse 
(historically-fluid) educational values to carry out national objectives. The shifting 
institutional location of higher education – developing from a site of elite privilege 
(during the nineteenth century and earlier) to a place of emergent opportunity (by the turn 
of the twentieth century) and expansion of democratic rights (in the mid-twentieth 
century) to its current status as necessity for economic advancement (in the twenty-first 
century) – and the socializing functions emphasized in previous historical eras are either 
less present (or less resonant) in today’s political climate. As illuminated by the popular 
adage that public universities have gone from state-funded to state-supported to state-
located, the reordering of budgetary priorities (which trend toward disinvestment in 
higher education) has occurred at the same time as post-secondary training has become a 
prerequisite for social mobility. In a political climate where state appropriations for 
higher education have been curtailed,4 colleges and universities must seek out alternative 
                                                             
4 See e.g. Oliff, Palacios, Johnson, and Leachman (2013). 
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sources of funding and/or adopt maximizing efficiency practices that may undermine 
existing institutional missions. 
Underlying the evolution from right to requirement is the recognition that higher 
education has become culturally accepted as an individual good (serving the private 
interest) rather than a common good (serving the public interest).5 Although colleges 
were not (primarily) publicly funded during the historical period of privilege, the goals of 
higher education during this era were understood to be publicly directed. A nation’s 
priorities, during any historical era, are informed by its prevailing “social ethos.” This 
concept, according to Cohen (2001: 365), is defined as “socially widespread preferences 
and attitudes about the kinds of rewards it is acceptable to insist on, and associated with 
those preferences and attitudes, a sense about the ways of life that are attractive, exciting, 
good, worthy of pursuit.”6 The resulting impact of historical context (i.e. period effects) 
on student politics has not simply been less political engagement (although by some 
measures this has been the case) but political expression that personifies the social ethos 
of the time.  
To maximize leverage over these contemporary areas of inquiry requires a deeper 
understanding of the institution inhabited by the population under examination. Through 
a periodization analysis of American collegiate history, I examine how evolutions in 
                                                             
5 Gurman (2009: 309) summarizes this “four-decade long” development as a “shift from the 
principles of the welfare state toward the ideology of the free market.” 
6 Dorn (2011) applies the social ethos idea to a comparative case study of the founding 
institutional missions of Bowdoin College and Stanford University. The objectives of a Bowdoin 
education, chartered in 1794, spoke to a broader “republican” spirit of the era that “rewarded 
civic virtue and a commitment to the public good” while Stanford University, established in 1885 
during a period of emerging industrialization, “refashioned this ethos into one that emphasized 
citizens’ personal advancement at least as much as the common good” (2011: 1569).    
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institutional purpose are indicative of broader national developments – a reflection of, 
and response to, shifting political climates.7 Informed by “longer time horizons,”8 the 
objective is to historicize the present, while not simplifying the complexities of the past. 
Building upon the core insights of American political development (APD), this project 
reconstructs a contemporary prehistory of higher education in the United States to gain 
theoretical leverage over the present period of institutional development.9 All institutions 
exist in an historical “time and space,” and, therefore, each iterative stage “will display 
all of the tensions and contradictions of prior construction.”10 Examining periodic 
changes in institutional purposes (i.e. what is college for?) and their related impact on 
student politics “illuminates [historical] patterns”11 that can aid in our understanding of 
contemporary historical circumstances.  
Several fine studies have employed higher education as a guide through which to 
gain greater insight into the changes and continuities of American political development. 
Important contributions include Loss (2011) on federal legislation, Nemec (2006) and 
Schrum (2012) on campus presidents, and Barrow (1990, 1992) on business interests and 
state formation. Distinguishing the present study is (1) the situating of student political 
                                                             
7 The periodization scheme is described in detail in Chapter 2 and revisited throughout the text. 
At present, the point is simply to introduce the temporal focus. 
8 Skowronek and Oren (2004: 4). 
9 Bensel (2003: 104-105) defines American political development as “the study of processes 
through which political institutions have been reproduced or changed in the United 
States…American political development involves the longitudinal investigation of such 
institutions, including explanations of their origin, the conditions sustaining their existence (i.e., 
reproducibility), and the reasons for their demise.” 
10 Orren and Skowronek (2004: 20-21). 
11 Orren and Skowronek (2004: 9). These patterns, Orren and Skowronek (2004: 9) contend, serve 
to demonstrate “political movement through time rather than a polity bounded in time and [are 
able to] highlight connections between politics in the past and politics in the present.” 
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socialization and participation at the center of the historical narrative; and (2) an explicit 
commitment to create a “usable past” in order to appreciate the contemporary stage of 
institutional development. (Many scholars rooted within the APD tradition, including 
several of those cited immediately above, do apply historical insights to modern-day 
realities, but mainly by way of conclusion rather than as essential features of the text.) As 
Orren and Skowronek (2004: 4) assert in their historiographical overview, “the absence 
of more comprehensive thinking about the relationship between past and present is 
conspicuous and might well be counted the most serious shortcoming in APD’s recent 
revival.” By design, this study is a response both to criticisms of APD that suggest much 
of the field’s substantive findings lack present relevance and to evaluations of work 
focused on the contemporary university which (rightfully) claim that the analyses 
presented in such books (often written with a popular audience in mind) lack sufficient 
historical perspective.12 Responding to these calls for relevance and rigor, this study uses 
a historical-institutional framework that may aid scholars, (students, and administrators) 
in contextualizing and confronting present challenges. 
To examine the functions of the university in American life and analyze how 
institutional development has impacted the political socialization of the student body, I 
rely upon source materials that reflect the perspectives of both on-campus stakeholders 
and off-campus influencers in order to demonstrate the “shifting political economy of 
                                                             
12 My approach incorporates many of the aims of the burgeoning interdisciplinary field of 
“critical university studies.” See Williams (2012). 
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higher education.”13 Within each historical era, the educational aims of administration 
(and faculty) are represented by presidential announcements, curricular reports, and 
statements of purpose. Student sentiment and changes in demography are explored 
through organizational texts (e.g. position papers, manifestos, speeches, campus 
newspapers), biographical testimonials (e.g. memoirs, personal interviews), and 
descriptive statistics (e.g. survey data from the Higher Education Research Institute, trend 
analyses from the National Center for Education Statistics). Presidential commissions, 
public opinion polling, and legislative actions serve as proxies for national objectives for 
higher education. These efforts provide direction and appropriate funds that “set the 
nation’s agenda.”14 Taken together, these sources allow us to document the views of 
leaders and the led – elite attitudes, student outlooks, and varying cultural expectations 
about the purposes of higher education.     
Consistent with the intentions of APD research, this project does not aim to 
provide a comprehensive account of American higher education15 but rather to employ 
historical analysis for theoretical ends. Through this narrative approach, we can both 
appreciate critical junctures16 (temporal transitions) that signify institutional change 
during a specific period as well as trace how these developments have enduring (path-
                                                             
13 Sapiro (2013: 107). 
14 Hutcheson (2007). 
15 Several one-volume texts are already available that seek to accomplish this ambitious task. See, 
e.g. Brubacher and Rudy (1997); Cohen and Kisker (2010); Lucas (2006); Thelin (2004), all of 
which have informed this project. 
16 On the concept of critical junctures, see Pierson (2003: 188). 
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dependent) effects on institutional functions thereafter.17 Critical junctures will often 
correspond with new publics being served by the institution; the demands and interests of 
these parties (students, legislators, or private industry) will inevitably impact institutional 
behavior.18 Contemporary higher education and its (lack of) commitment to student 
political socialization can be explained in this broader historical context. In short, this 
study explores the formation of political identity and considers how political context 
impacts higher education’s role as an incubator of social conscience (Stevens, 
Armstrong, and Arum 2008). 
 
Student Politics – A Brief Review of the Literature 
Sociologists have conducted much of the research on student politics and have 
often been guided by the question of institutional determinacy: Why do certain colleges 
and universities have political traditions while students at other institutions are largely 
silent and/or quiescent? The limitations of previous scholarship (as they relate to the 
present study) are largely a byproduct of the period-specific analyses by scholars who 
first undertook serious research on student politics. The impact of this initial focus is 
evident in subsequent scholarly attention to campus (institutional) conditions and a dearth 
of consideration to macro-level structural (Institutional) developments, which would 
require a longer temporal scope. The “inevitable comparison” (Rhoads 1998: 35) to 
                                                             
17 As Orren and Skowronek (2004: 11) elaborate, “the different rules, arrangements, and 
timetables put in place by changes negotiated at various points in the past will be found to impose 
themselves on the actors of the present and to affect their efforts to negotiate changes of their 
own.” 
18 The process described is reminiscent of Schattschenider’s (1935: 288) oft-invoked maxim that 
“new policies create new politics.” 
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campus activity during the 1960s is understandable. By using this extreme (non-
representative) case as the benchmark for comparison, however, we neglect less visibly 
“activist” eras and fail to appreciate social and historical trends which may explain the 
same underlying phenomenon – student politics – with more nuance and context than a 
snapshot approach can offer.19 
Despite this important limitation, prior research on student politics points us in 
constructive directions.20 Previous research may be classified according to three 
explanatory categories: size; location; and character type. Lipset (1976) claims that 
political engagement will be present at large universities because students become 
interested in participation as a mechanism by which to find community in an otherwise 
isolating environment. The impersonal nature of the “multiversity” led scholars to 
embrace this social deprivation motivation for campus protest. Within this paradigm, 
Scott and El-Assal (1969) find a statistical correlation between levels of campus 
bureaucracy and student unrest while Blau and Slaughter (1971: 486) contend that the 
                                                             
19 On the consequences of drawing conclusions about the causes of political phenomena based 
upon the study of an outlier case (i.e. selecting on the dependent variable), see Geddes (1990). 
Employing Geddes’ recommendation to “examine a wider range of cases,” Tillery (2011: 4-5), in 
an excellent study on the influences of elite African American political behavior toward foreign 
policy relations with Africa, demonstrates the value of comparative historical case analysis. 
Tillery describes how the dominant theories about decision making processes of African 
American leaders are incomplete (and in some cases simply incorrect) because most influential 
scholarship has focused on one specific historical era in African American political development 
(1963-1986) and experiences during earlier historical periods, which would have challenged 
prevailing explanations, had been neglected because of limited academic attention.  
20 While the “sixties” may, in some meaningful senses, be considered sui generis, it bears 
mentioning that various conditions about that time help to illuminate the phenomenon of student 
politics more generally. As Geddes (1990: 149) explains, “studies of cases selected on the 
dependent variable” are “are ideal for digging into the details of how phenomena come about and 
for developing insights. They identify plausible causal variables. In so doing, they contribute to 
building and revising theories.”  
10 
 
    
 
“routinization of human relations” in large institutions results in anomie and dissent. As 
students become more “structurally separated” from fellow students, faculty, and 
administrators, they feel “neglected, manipulated, and dehumanized to the extent that 
they will engage in protest activities.”21  
The argument that politics serves a solidarity function is compelling, but what 
these scholars failed to acknowledge is that there are other vehicles at large (often public) 
universities that can serve the same purpose of belonging.22 Students do not need to have 
a political investment at these large schools to find shared experiences. Size matters, but 
not for the reasons that Lipset and his colleagues suggest. Institutional size is significant 
simply because, as critical mass theory explains (Granovetter 1978, Marwell and Oliver 
1993), a certain threshold of potential participants must be reached before there will be 
collective action. While a sufficient base – a critical mass – is required, the impact of 
undergraduate enrollment size will eventually plateau; there is not a linear relationship 
between size and political activity.23  
Political scientists have long identified region as a potentially important indicator 
for understanding political attitudes.24 Geographic location also appears to have an 
impact on student political participation; students attending schools in the Eastern United 
                                                             
21 Scott and El-Assal (1969: 703). 
22 For every University of Michigan-Ann Arbor (Sale 1973) or University of Wisconsin-Madison 
(Marannis 2003), there are many more large universities like the University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
(Satterfield and Godfrey 2011) or Ohio State University where sports (Conn 2011; Sperber 2000; 
Toma and Cross 2000) or Greek life (Wilder and McKeegan 1999) serve the same identity 
construction functions that politics may provide in other locales. 
23 Westby (1976: 95) concludes that “in terms of numbers involved, there is a proportional 
decrease as the institutions increases.” 
24 See e.g. Elazar (1966, 1994); Erikson, McIver, and Wright (1987); Lieske (1993). On the 
regional differences of college towns, see Gumprecht (2008: 29-30). 
11 
 
    
 
States are more politically engaged than those in other regions. Kim (2001) claims that 
institutional proximity to the nation’s capital along with the presence of historically black 
colleges and universities (HBCUs) in the sample – whose students are independently 
predisposed to be socially aware because of the distinctive mission of these schools – 
explains this finding. Participants in Freedom Summer, the 1964 voter registration drive 
in Mississippi organized by the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), 
came disproportionately from institutions located in the Northeastern (and Great Lakes) 
regions of the nation.25 Sherkat and Blocker (1994) report that student protests were least 
likely to have occurred in the South during the 1960s. 
Proponents of an institutional character type explanation assert that the context in 
which a school is located determines politics on campus. Scholars have argued that a 
legacy of engagement (i.e. organizational continuity) is strongly associated with campus 
protest.26 The selectivity of a school and the economic resources of its students are 
important (and closely related) factors in explaining the presence of campus politics. As 
Soule (1997) confirms, political activity is often found at schools with the highest 
endowments and/or other wealth indicators. Students who attend these elite schools often 
have both the institutional and personal economic resources to mobilize. Groups will 
often receive the necessary organizational funding from their schools and many students 
at these institutions tend to have the requisite time to participate in political activity rather 
than needing to work to finance their education. Citing the unusually high proportion of 
                                                             
25 See McAdam (1988) 
26 Van Dyke (1998a). 
12 
 
    
 
female politicians and policymakers who attended women’s only colleges, Kim (2001) 
argues that these schools may be conceived as agents of political socialization because of 
their community-oriented and socially-active institutional climates.27  
These factors – size, location, and character type – are valuable in explaining 
youth political engagement, and by doing so, provide an excellent point of departure for 
this study. The early research on student politics, though, was produced by sixties-era 
scholars seeking to explain what had happened on their own campuses and, as a result, 
much (but certainly not all) of the subsequent research building upon the foundational 
work has failed to adequately address the developmental question, which considers the 
changing role of the university in American life.  
The central focus throughout this project is on the relationship between student 
politics, national development, and the role of higher education in American life. As 
such, I embrace a more inclusive conception of political participation and involvement 
than previous scholarship which inclines toward the more bounded label of student 
activism. The term activism connotes a radicalism that is not always present.28 As 
Johnston (2009: 25) explains, 
When we go looking for the sixties of popular imagination on the campus of 
today, we come back empty-handed. When today’s activists seek to recreate that 
mythic sixties, they set themselves an impossible task as well. But as we come to 
see the activism of the past clearly, in all its diversity, and our vision of student 
                                                             
27 To paraphrase a faculty informant who spoke to Hermanowicz (2005: 36) about the influence 
on his own work in being surrounded by especially accomplished scholars, “swimming with 
Olympians improves your strokes.” 
28 My aim throughout is not to “valorize” or “villainize” (Teske 1998: 32) any particular student 
political tradition, but rather to suggest the linguistic baggage and lack of parsimony associated 
with the activist label. 
13 
 
    
 
history becomes more discerning, we find ourselves looking on today’s activism 
with fresh eyes. 
 
Concentrating on the longue durée of history – searching for longer-term 
patterns29 and identifying stages of development – enables us to properly situate the 
experience of any period in a larger context while also providing an opportunity to move 
up the causal ladder (i.e. reach a higher level of generality). Through longitudinal 
analysis, we can observe the transformation of institutions over time to meet the demands 
of the national circumstances in which they operate. To evaluate variation in the 
purpose(s) of higher education and the impact of shifting emphases on student 
socialization and political engagement, moreover, requires close attention to “slow 
moving causal processes.”30 Changes in demography, curriculum, and academic 
professionalization, for example, are all gradual and can be best understood through a 
historical-institutionalist perspective. Our object of study is therefore recast from an 
analysis of student political activity during any time-specific era to a wider consideration 
of the institution where activity (potentially) occurs. In positioning higher education in 
American political development, we detect longer-term trends that may provide insights 
into the contemporary political scene on campus and beyond. 
Some scholars have understood student politics as a cyclical phenomenon 
explained by larger influences. Arthur Levine’s “changing national moods” thesis 
captures this notion that youth participation is a response to the broader political 
                                                             
29 “History…is instrumental to APD’s main object, which is to tell time politically or to tell time 
according to the juxtaposition of patterns old and new and their interactive effects” (Orren and 
Skowronek 2004: 12).  
30 Pierson and Skocpol (2002). 
14 
 
    
 
climate.31 In this interpretation, some eras in American history have been “periods of 
community ascendancy” – reform-minded, change-oriented, and forward-looking – while 
others represent “periods of individual ascendancy” – times where national focus shifts 
from community responsibility to individual rights and when citizens are “present-
oriented.”32 Students are less politically engaged during periods of individual ascendancy 
because like the rest of the nation, they are “weary and want a break”33 from national 
concerns. 
Testing the divergent claims of political opportunity theory, Van Dyke (2003: 
226) utilizes a longitudinal research design to “examine the effect of elites in different 
branches and levels of government on student protest mobilization from 1930-1990.” One 
hypothesis suggests that higher levels of protest will occur in environments that students 
consider to be more responsive to particular grievances. The presence of “allies” – 
operationalized as Democratic leadership in legislative or executive branches at the state 
or federal level – will stimulate campus action because a positive reaction is more likely. 
Conversely, another variant of the political opportunity model, expects to find more 
“protest events”34 on campus when there is a perceived threat to student goals in the form 
of “antagonists” serving in positions of power. Van Dyke finds elite impact to be 
                                                             
31 Levine (1980: 120-127); Levine and Cureton (1998: 146-149). 
32 According to Levine and Cureton (1998: 146), there were three periods of community 
ascendancy in the twentieth century: “the Progressive Era, from the turn of the century through 
World War I; the Roosevelt to Great Depression era, from 1932 through World War II; and the 
1960s, actually from the late 1950s through the Vietnam War.” Periods of individual ascendancy 
follow each period of community ascendancy. 
33 Levine and Cureton (1998: 146). 
34 Van Dyke (2003: 235) defines a protest event as “any action that that collectively expressed a 
grievance and had a goal of causing or resisting social change.” There are 2,496 protest events 
representing 9 colleges and universities over the time period covered in Van Dyke’s dataset. 
15 
 
    
 
dependent upon institutional location. Allies in the state legislature increases the 
likelihood of protest thus offering support for the responsiveness proposition. Providing 
evidence for the threat hypothesis, having allies in the executive branch at either the 
federal or state level makes protest less likely while having an antagonist in the executive 
position may increase protest.    
While these longitudinal approaches are effective in demonstrating how politics 
on campus is conditioned (Levine) and constrained (Van Dyke) by the larger 
environments in which they are located, they do not consider how changes in the 
institution of higher education itself over extended periods of time may impact student 
engagement. Missing from these fine studies is sufficient consideration of how the site 
(university campus) of the outcome being measured (student politics) has itself been 
impacted by national developments which make it more (or less) predisposed to political 
activity. This more proximate causal variable of interest can only be isolated by 
considering the development of the institution where student politics takes place. Smelser 
(2012a) addresses this institutional development in proposing a theory of social change 
that describes the expanding contours and societal expectations of higher education over 
time. “Structural accretion,” Smelser explains, is a “composite form of growth” where an 
institution adds “new functions over time without, however, shedding existing ones or 
splitting into separate organizations.” The most relevant application, of Smelser’s 
intuitive model, at present, is to examine how the evolution of institutional mission has 
influenced curricular efforts at political socialization on campus – what we might term 
“mobilizing ideas.”   
16 
 
    
 
Mobilizing Ideas 
As Sapiro (2004: 4) describes in a fine overview of research on political 
socialization, “[s]urely the questions of how people develop their basic sets of political 
skills, orientations, and practices, and how their experiences shape their politics are as 
pressing as ever.” Political socialization, as first conceptualized by Hyman (1959), is “an 
individual’s learning of social patterns corresponding to his societal positions as mediated 
through various agencies of society.”35 Socialization is an acquired behavioral trait; it can 
remain dormant if it is not stimulated by particular stimuli or triggered by historical 
circumstances.    
This process begins at the earliest stages often due to parental influence and can 
transpire in many different environments throughout one’s life. Political experiences 
during the period of “emerging adulthood,”36 however, have proven to be especially 
significant in shaping subsequent political engagement.37 Jennings’ (2002) panel study of 
sixties-era college students which tracked their political engagement over time reveals 
that those students who had been active during those formative undergraduate years 
“acquir[ed] the habit of political participation”38 that cultivated an enduring commitment 
to civic life (including measures of conventional participation such as voting) relative to 
their non-politically active classmates.     
                                                             
35 As quoted in Sapiro (2004: 3). 
36 Arnett (2004) refers to the years between the late teens through the twenties as a time of 
emerging adulthood. This term draws attention to a post-adolescent stage where certain 
barometers of maturity (e.g. financial independence, marriage, completion of education) that have 
been associated with the transition to adult status have not yet been reached.  
37 Hastie (2007: 262) labels this argument the “impressionable years” hypothesis. 
38 Jennings (2002: 306). 
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A major interest in the present study is to examine how a particular institutional 
location (the university) may play a socializing role and how shifts in institutional design 
(changing curricular focus) impact student political engagement. The primary claim of 
the politicization thesis, as presented by Crossley (2008), may be summarized as follows: 
Through an exposure to critical ideas and the inculcation of certain values, particular 
curricular elements of a university education can awaken student’s latent consciousness 
and motivate them to political participation. Previous research has found that students 
whose major focus of study is in the social sciences and humanities are most prone to 
attitudinal shifts; this is not unexpected given the material covered in these disciplines.39  
Crossley offers three important challenges to the “liberal education” hypothesis 
that merit response. First, Crossley (2008: 24) argues that “disposition towards critique” 
does not equal “disposition towards action.” This is clearly true, but simply because all 
students (or even a large plurality of students) who encounter illuminating ideas do not 
act upon this knowledge does not make the underlying mechanism implausible. The 
politicization hypothesis does not posit that all liberal arts students will be driven to 
action, but rather these fields allow for the possible transmission of specific kinds of 
insight that are not similarly available in other less emancipatory fields of study.40 
Second, Crossley (2008: 24) claims that the politicization explanation is flawed because 
                                                             
39 See e.g. Hillygus (2005), Marsh (1977), Nie and Hillygus (2001), and Westby (1976).  
40 Examples of empirical studies that measure change in attitudes and assess curricular impact on 
behavior include Martin, Tankersley, and Ye (2012) on the role of introductory government 
courses in fostering political participation; Frank, Gilovich, and Regan (1993) on the negative 
influence of rational-choice economics on “moral and civic virtues”; and Stake and Hoffman 
(2001) on the effectiveness of women’s studies courses in nurturing “egalitarian attitudes toward 
women” and cultivating an “intention to engage in social activism.”    
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students “rebel in non-liberal contexts or in support of non-liberal agendas.” The aims of 
liberal education are not as unidirectional as this construction suggests. A liberally 
educated student will be taught how to think, not what to think. Influence is not 
indoctrination. Influence speaks to inclination toward participation, not the espousal of 
particular policy prescriptions. Differential resonance does not signify that the influence 
of curriculum on political behavior is not present; it simply means that the course 
material being conveyed allows for conflicting interpretations.41  
Lastly, Crossley (2008: 25) suspects that “some subjects attract ‘more political’ 
students.” This self-selection effect – who enrolls as opposed to what is taught in these 
courses – is ultimately responsible for subsequent participation. This is a reasonable 
claim, but in a study examining the relationship between higher education and political 
engagement, Hillygus (2005) statistically controls for a preexisting interest in politics to 
test the “civic education” hypothesis and finds that prior political interest is not a 
significant factor in the impact of curriculum on political engagement.42 In search for the 
“the connective mechanisms linking higher education with the various characteristics of 
                                                             
41 Curricular influence can be a positive (empowering) or negative (embittering) force. The 
capacity to inspire political participation is what is relevant. Social change efforts can be 
mobilized for progressive or reactionary ends. Student politics is not always supportive of 
movements of the Left, as Crossley appears to be suggesting. If one has politically strident and 
illiberal reactions to disciplinary aims (e.g. negative responses to women’s studies), we cannot 
say that the field has had no influence (Stake and Hoffman 2001: 430). As advocates of identity 
studies programs have claimed, the content that has not been covered (in terms of readings 
assigned or ideas considered) is often as significant as the substantive material that has been 
taught. (On curricular movements, see e.g. Arthur 2011; Loss 2012: 534-36; Rojas 2007). The 
history of the American college curriculum demonstrates how education can both be, a source of, 
and remedy to, oppression. 
42 Other studies whose findings undermine the self-selection argument include Guimond (1999) 
and Guimond and Palmer (1996). 
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democratic citizenship,”43 Hillygus concludes that the writing and analytical skills 
required of a social science and humanities-based curriculum44 are the leading factors that 
explain the increased political engagement rates she finds among students who 
concentrate in these fields. There are not only benefits to a liberal arts focus, but as 
instructive for the purposes of the present study, there are civic disadvantages to 
increased coursework in the physical sciences or business. As Hillygus explains,  
A computer science course is unlikely to impart the verbal acuity necessary to 
engage in political discourse; a biology course does not typically give cause to 
encourage political attentiveness…In fact, an increase in the number of business 
and science courses is correlated with a statistically significant decrease in 
political participation.45 
 
Westby (1976) explains how the process of political socialization by curriculum 
works. In observing the “structural situation within which political consciousness arises 
and mobilization occurs,”46 the author describes how critical sensibilities and political 
identities are stimulated by curricular experiences. Noting that the majority of student 
participants in the late-sixties political actions majored in the traditional liberal arts (e.g. 
social sciences and humanities), Westby asserts that their engagement had largely been 
facilitated by their coursework in ways inconceivable to students concentrating in more 
                                                             
43 Hillygus (2005: 25). 
44 Nie and Hillygus (2001) identify the positive impacts of the humanities and social sciences on 
political engagement. Hillygus (2005) is focused solely on the social sciences. For an empirical 
demonstration of the beneficial learning outcomes of a liberal arts curriculum including 
“inclination to inquire and lifelong learning” and “leadership,” see Seifert et al. (2008).   
45 Hillygus (2005: 28, 37-38). Astin (1993: 116) also found a “negative residual relationship” 
between number of mathematics (or numerical courses) taken and student politics.  
46 Westby (1976: 30). 
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vocationally-oriented curricula.47 Students in the liberal arts, unlike those in the “practical 
arts,”48 are forced to engage with the ideas of “man and society”49 and while doing so, 
they often consider how their collegiate environment and national culture embodies the 
concepts introduced and themes emphasized in course texts and seminar discussions.  
Broadening his concern to the institutional level, Westby contends that campus 
politics may be best understood by looking at the “core-periphery paradigm” of each 
school, that is, those foundational ideals that define the institutional mission.50 As Figure 
1.1 displays, the interaction between the “value ethos” of a school’s curriculum and its 
“structural coordination” will determine whether there is a sustained political presence on 
campus. The first factor speaks to the amount of undergraduates pursuing a degree of 
study focused on technical or humanistic ideals and the latter condition speaks to the 
“extent to which the academic institutions have entered arrangements with government or 
business that tie them to policies and commitments that are at odds with idealized 
academic values.”51 
                                                             
47 As stated above, much of the previous research on student politics focuses on the sixties 
generation. A major goal of this project is to demonstrate the relationship between course of study 
and political action throughout the history of higher education. Although the claim being 
referenced in this note concerns the sixties cohort, its premise is largely consistent with other 
historical periods. See e.g. Novak (1977) and Rudy (1996: 16-18) on the impact of course 
readings on student views toward the American Revolution. The ways in which contemporary 
students are influenced by curriculum is a major focus of this text.  
48 Brint (2002) 
49 Westby (1976: 252) 
50 Tsui (2000) examines how institutional growth in critical thinking (IGCT) is related to the 
epistemological orientation – how students acquire knowledge skills – of a particular campus 
culture. Her findings suggest a clear relationship between high IGCT scores and a high degree of 
political and social awareness among students. As Tsui explains, institutional commitment to 
IGCT is relatively rare because the development of these skills takes time and effort that colleges 
and universities have increasingly been unable (or unwilling) to dedicate to this functional goal. 
51 Westby (1976: 92) 
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Figure 1.1: Structural Coordination and Value Ethos of U.S. Colleges and 
Universities (Source: Westby 1976: 102) 
 
Dominant 
Values 
Coordinated Uncoordinated 
Technicist (A) Technically-Oriented 
Institutions 
(B) Many State Colleges, Teacher 
Training Colleges, Lesser Technical 
Colleges, Religiously Oriented 
Institutions 
Humanistic (D) “Great” Universities 
with fully developed 
faculties and facilities in 
all disciplines  
(C) Mainly High Quality Liberal Arts 
Colleges  
 
During the period of examination, the most persistent activity occurred at the 
coordinated-humanistic type institutions found in Cell D including Harvard, Colombia, 
University of Wisconsin-Madison, University of California-Berkeley, and the University 
of Michigan-Ann Arbor. Cell D institutions were especially susceptible to community 
unrest because their students found contradictions between the humanistic traditions (as 
represented in the curriculum) and the structural coordination present in their universities 
(e.g. military research contracts, campus administrations inviting pro-Vietnam politicians 
to give speeches on campus). Despite their high degree of coordination, schools in Cell A 
– e.g. MIT, Cal Tech, or flagship state universities that emphasized engineering or 
agriculture/mining – experienced much less political engagement than Cell D schools 
because they were organized around technical values. Cell B schools saw the least 
amount of activity given their lack of humanistic values and lack of coordination. While 
the largest institutions in Cell D produced the most demonstrations, the “per student rates 
of participation” were highest in Cell C (uncoordinated-humanist type) liberal arts 
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colleges such as Williams, Amherst, Oberlin, and Antioch that had “virtually nothing but 
non-vocational students of social sciences and humanities.”52  
If there is a demonstrable positive relationship between education in the liberal 
arts and political participation, we should expect to find less (or different forms of) 
political engagement during eras when the percentage of students majoring in vocational 
studies increases. In addition, we should also expect similar declines (or shifts) in 
participation due to increases in “structural coordination” (which in current parlance 
might be referred to as the corporatization of the university). The present generation – 
where all colleges and universities are arguably converging (some quicker than others) 
toward Cell A – provides us with an opportunity to test these hypotheses. 
 
Climate Change in the American University 
Since the mid-1970s, American higher education has experienced what Yamane 
(2001: 136) refers to as the “vocational revolution.” Formal instruction in the liberal arts 
has been gradually replaced by increased training in the “practical arts.” In his survey of 
curricular developments from 1970-2001, Brint (2002: 232) defines the practical arts as 
“occupational and professional programs (often housed in their own schools and 
colleges) – business, engineering, computer science, nursing, education, and other fields 
oriented to preparing students for careers.” According to Brint et al. (2005: 151), 
“hundreds of institutions now award 80% or more of their degrees” in these occupational 
disciplines. The frontrunner among the practical arts during the past four decades has 
                                                             
52 Westby (1976: 252) 
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been the field of business and management. As Figure 1.2 below shows, more than one-
fifth of all undergraduate degrees in 2009-2010 were bestowed upon students majoring in 
business, up from one-seventh in 1969-1970. As business has prospered, we also see a 
waning in the liberal arts as evidenced by the decline in the social sciences and 
humanities53 – the two disciplinary sectors often associated with student political 
engagement and the inculcation of civic values.54  
Figure 1.2 measures proportionality and therefore the scope of the “changes in the 
core” are perhaps left unapparent without providing absolute numbers. In 1969-1970, a 
little less than 800,000 students graduated with bachelor’s degrees. Over twice that 
number – 1.65 million students – earned degrees in academic year 2009-2010. Within 
this context, it is somewhat difficult for fields to decline in absolute numbers. Despite the 
doubling of the graduating class, the social sciences and history awarded 24,000 fewer 
degrees in 2009-2010 than in 1969-1970.55 Within these dwindling numbers, those 
students who are majoring in the liberal arts are increasingly focusing their attention to 
applied fields as opposed to basic fields of study – more pre-law, less political 
philosophy.56 This increasing vocationalism, as Ferrall (2011: 55-58) illustrates, can be 
                                                             
53 “Humanities” is a proxy measure created by adding the following fields of study (as labeled by 
the Department of Education National Center for Education Statistics): English Language and 
Literature; Philosophy and Religious Studies; Foreign Languages and Literature. 
54 Loeb (1995) is the only source I’ve encountered that entertains the notion that lower levels of 
political activity might be connected to the declining proportion of undergraduates seeking liberal 
arts degrees. No scholar has extended this argument to the contemporary context. 
55 Brint et al. (2005: 159) report that from 1970-1971 to 2000-2001, “almost every field which 
constituted the old liberal arts core of the undergraduate college was in absolute decline as 
measured by numbers of graduates.” 
56 See Frank and Gabler (2006: 63). On the growth of “applied knowledge” fields (e.g. recreation 
studies, criminal justice, and health administration), see Hashem (2002). Labaree (2006) offers an 
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seen even at liberal arts colleges, which have expanded their curricula to accommodate 
market pressures, but in the process may also be diluting their distinctive missions which 
have included political socialization.      
The focus of academic study has shifted along with the demographic composition 
of the student population. During the last several decades the United States has 
experienced what Flacks and Thomas (2007) call the “massification of higher education.” 
This development is due to the increased presence of students seeking college-level 
instruction who would not have pursued higher education in previous generations, either 
due to lack of access or because their career paths did not require post-secondary 
schooling. These students have heard the “college for all rhetoric” (Grubb and Lazerson 
2005) which stresses post-high-school training in order to maximize one’s job prospects. 
As this message helps to guide policy discussions at the highest levels of government – 
the Obama Administration has been a strong advocate of the “education gospel”57 – it is 
important to understand who these students are, in terms of demographic characteristics; 
what their goals are for college attendance; and how the purpose(s) of higher education 
have been recalibrated to meet their particular needs. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
intriguing counterargument to this trend that bears mention. While there has certainly been an 
increase in occupational studies, Labaree contends that these programs have often sought 
academic credibility by adopting norms and customs informed by the liberal arts – a process he 
terms the “liberalizing of professional education.” What may have begun as pure vocational 
training has grown to be serious academic study along with all its attendant trappings (e.g. 
discipline-specific terminology, terminal degree requirements for faculty, growth of national 
associations). By classification these fields may be considered “practical,” but in actuality, 
Labaree asserts, they are more liberal than usually given credit for. Whether this is an effective 
branding effort or something more substantive, for the purpose of this study it is most relevant to 
acknowledge that students who major in these fields remain less politically engaged than students 
in the traditional liberal arts.   
57 Grubb and Lazerson (2004). 
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Figure 1.2: Percentage of Bachelor’s Degrees Conferred by Degree-Granting 
Institutions, Selected Fields of Study (1969-1970 to 2009-2010)58 
 
 
There is, in brief, a more heterogeneous student population – more first generation 
students; more students of non-traditional college age; increased racial, ethnic, and 
economic diversity – that is more credentialist in orientation than previous youth 
cohorts.59 Goyette and Mullen (2006) have demonstrated that socioeconomic class is 
related to choice of major. Students from more financially secure families are more likely 
                                                             
58 Sources: 1969-1994: National Center for Education Statistics, Chartbook of Degrees 
Conferred, 1969-70 to 1993-94. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education, 1998), Table 7, 
79-83. As cited in Yamane (2001: 138); 1994-1995: National Center for Education Statistics, 
“Degrees and Other Awards Conferred by Institutions of Higher Education: 1994-95.” 
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Educational Research and 
Improvement (July 1997), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs97/97415.pdf; 1995-2007: National Center for 
Education Statistics, Higher Education General Information Survey (HEGIS), “Degrees and 
Other Formal Awards Conferred.” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education (September 
2008), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d08/tables/dt08_271.asp; 2008-2010: National Center 
for Education Statistics, Higher Education General Information Survey (HEGIS), “Degrees and 
Other Formal Awards Conferred.” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education (May 2011), 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d11/tables/dt11_286.asp. 
59 For background reading, see e.g., Staklis and Horn (2012); Quinterno (2012); The Almanac of 
Higher Education (Washington, DC: Chronicle of Higher Education, 2012), available at 
http://chronicle.com/section/Almanac-of-Higher-Education-2012/615.  
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to major in the arts and sciences and students whose parents do not hold a college degree 
tend to choose career-driven majors.60 Reviewing data collected by the National Center 
for Education Statistics, Attewell and Lavin (2012: 87) find that less than “one quarter of 
undergraduates [in 2000] were fully traditional” by which they mean full-time students 
directly out of high school who are financially dependent.61 Roughly eighty-percent of 
students work full or part-time to pay for their education, one-third of recent high school 
graduates delay entry to college (usually for financial reasons), and perhaps most 
surprising, fewer than fourteen-percent of undergraduates live on campus.62 This is not 
the undergraduate experience portrayed in popular culture and reinforced by the 
admissions brochures of the nation’s most elite colleges and universities. 
Since 1966, the Higher Education Research Institute (HERI) has conducted 
national surveys asking incoming first-year students about their college aspirations by 
prompting respondents to choose among a list of 15-20 items that best reflect their 
“personal values or life goals.”63 Evidence of an “ethos of utilitarianism”64 among college 
                                                             
60 Mullen (2010: 201-202) references Pierre Bourdieu’s (1984) notion of “distance from 
necessity” to explain the influence of social class on choice of college major: “Those with few 
economic or cultural resources must direct a large part of their energies toward the practicalities 
of making a living. The dominant class’s freedom from material constraints allows it to develop 
tastes for the impractical…This distance from necessity aligns with fields of study, providing 
privileged groups with the freedom to pursue abstractions having little practical application, such 
as theoretical knowledge. Put another way, the most privileged have the luxury of choosing 
liberal arts fields, whereas the least privileged face the necessity of studying something more 
practical.” 
61 For the operational definitions of “nontraditional,” see Choy (2002).  
62 Attewell and Lavin (2012: 87-91). 
63 Astin (1991: 129-131). 
64 Brint (2001: 245) defines this evocative term as “the tendency of students to think of higher 
education primarily as a means to obtain credentials that will be valuable to them in the labor 
market.” 
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students today can be found by contrasting the trends of two values: in 1967, 42% of 
incoming students chose “being very well-off financially” while 86% of the students 
chose “developing a meaningful philosophy of life” as objectives to be furthered by 
attending college. In the Fall 2011 study, 80% endorsed the former option while the latter 
value was chosen by 47% of the student population.65 Figure 1.3 below shows the change 
in values over time. The two most noteworthy aspects of the graph are (1) the percentage 
of students who list “being very well-off financially” as “essential or very important” in 
Fall 2011 is the highest recorded since the survey began; and (2) the two values cross 
paths and change trajectories at the precise time (mid-to late seventies) that the move 
from the liberal to practical arts, as depicted in Figure 1.2 above, was ascending on 
college campuses.66  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
65 Higher Education Research Institute (HERI), “The American Freshman: National Norms for 
Fall 2011.” University of California-Los Angeles (Fall 2012).  
66 Using earlier iterations of HERI data, Astin (1993: 153-156) similarly found that prioritization 
of economic aims was positively correlated with “environmental variables” including commuter 
status and majoring in engineering, while listing philosophical development as a primary goal 
was “significantly associated” with “involvement variables” such as “participating in campus 
demonstrations, attending racial or cultural awareness workshops…and number of writing 
courses taken.”      
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Figure 1.3: Trends in the Life Goals of Freshmen: Objectives Considered Essential 
or Very Important by First-Year College Students, 1966-2011 
 
 
As part of HERI’s College Senior Survey (CSS), a recent initiative that attempts 
to measure the “effects of college,” we can compare student responses at the time of 
college entry with responses at the end of their senior year. From 2005-2009, the post-test 
questionnaires show that, on average, the “developing a meaningful philosophy of life” 
goal increased 10.7% while the “being well-off financially” objective decreased 7.3% 
after four years of exposure (the college experience).67 Even if students see college in 
economic terms at the time of entry does not inevitably mean they are impervious to 
“informational influence” (Hastie 2007) during their time in college.68 
                                                             
67 Franke, et al. (2010). Reports from 2005-2009 are available at 
http://www.heri.ucla.edu/cssPublications.php.  
68 Unfortunately, the publicly available data does not disaggregate the results by major field of 
study and the short temporal scope does not allow for a comparison of contemporary students 
with earlier cohorts who entered college with much different entry numbers. Other values that 
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While there have always been instrumentalist students in higher education,69 now 
there are simply more of them. Universities have responded to their requests because 
institutions of higher learning are what organizational theorists like Scott (2001) call 
“open systems.” As Tuchman (2009: 123) explains, universities “are systems affected by 
and responsive to their environments…university curricula are constantly changing with 
social and demographic changes and the demands of various constituencies.”70 In another 
era, the tool developed by a private consulting firm in collaboration with the Tennessee 
Higher Education Commission to “precisely quantify the [economic] value of a degree” 
would have been considered reductionist. While critics contend that this instrument 
“desiccates and distorts” the purpose of education, the crude measure which simply 
compares “the average first-year wages of the state’s college graduates…to the majors 
they pursued and institutions they attended” seems perfectly suited to the current zeitgeist 
(Berrett 2012). Given an economic climate in which public financing of higher education 
is declining and corporate influence is rising, marketing efforts that promise immediate 
economic returns on investment are to be expected. Recent proposals in favor of a three-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
had similar increases to “developing a meaningful philosophy of life” include “keeping up to date 
with political affairs” and “influencing social values.” 
69 See e.g. Horowitz (1986, 1987). As Cohen and Kisker (2010: 569) state, “students’ 
approaching colleges and universities as consumers is not new; what is changing is higher 
education’s eagerness to treat them as such.” 
70 Tuchman (2009: 41) mourns this development in higher education because this responsiveness 
represents in her view the “de-churching” of universities: “[H]igher education is one of the last 
revered Western institutions to be ‘de-churched’; that is, it is one of the last to have its ideological 
justification recast in terms of corporatization and commodification. Universities are no longer to 
lead the minds of students to grasp truth; to grapple with intellectual possibilities; to appreciate 
the best in art, music, and other forms of culture; and to work toward both enlightened politics 
and public service. Rather they are now to prepare students for jobs. They are not to educate, but 
to train.” 
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year undergraduate degree, for example, will likely gain increased traction,71 but as 
Harvard’s president laments in a New York Times op-ed (Faust 2009), this narrow-
minded view of higher education fails to acknowledge that “human beings need meaning, 
understanding and perspective as well as jobs.”72  
Determined by the social and economic conditions of the time, students have 
curricular preferences and institutional expectations that do not align with efforts at 
political socialization. Because there are now more nontraditional college-age students 
(with off-campus residences, responsibilities, and commitments) and more students 
seeking employment to finance their education, there is simply less time for students to 
participate. Politically active students emerge from disciplinary backgrounds which are 
increasingly rare in the contemporary university with its emphasis on instrumentality and 
career preparation.73 This contemporary reality – less time spent on campus, shifts in 
fields of study, weakening of peer networks – results in a smaller pool of potential 
participants on campus from which student leaders can recruit and limits the possibilities 
for socialization. As the demographic makeup and dispositional orientation of students 
                                                             
71 See e.g., Alexander (2009), Carlson and Lipka (2009). 
72 For a similar point made in response to focus group discussions with first year college students, 
see Humphreys and Davenport (2005: 38). 
73 Astin, Keup, and Lindholm (2002: 153-154; Table 4) find that “higher education’s capacity to 
interest and engage its students in contemporary social issues has declined [from the 1990s to the 
early 2000s].” The authors draw this conclusion by measuring involvement outcomes including 
“social activism, commitment to promoting racial understanding, and growth in accepting other 
races/cultures.” 
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become increasingly representative of the broader society, students’ politics may be less 
determined by student politics than previous generations.74  
The role of the professoriate in shaping the political attitudes of their students 
must also be considered. In contrast to the anti-intellectual polemics that assail professors 
for political indoctrination (see e.g. Horowitz 2006; Kimball 1998; D’Souza 1991), 
systematic empirical evidence – which is sorely lacking in the best-selling populist 
critiques – suggests that professors have tempered their politics since the 1960s and do 
not conceive of themselves as “change agents” as earlier generations of faculty might 
have.75 Astin, Keup, and Lindholm (2002: 157) entertain the idea that faculty moderation 
(as measured by responses to survey prompts about curricular objectives) may be due to 
“the effect of the conservative backlash against ‘liberal’ causes.”76 These changing 
attitudes represent faculty’s unwillingness to politically engage their students (for fear of 
potential reprisal) and arguably an abdication of responsibility to impart critical thinking 
and challenge received wisdom.77 
The underlying premise, though, of the “faculty as agitator” critique, that 
undergraduate instruction is a top priority for faculty, warrants skepticism. Most, if not 
                                                             
74 As Rootes (2007: 4867) asserts, “the status of ‘student’ has…become less determinate as 
students are increasingly integrated into the social and economic mainstream.”  
75 Gross and Simmons (2007). Study summarized in Jaschik (2007). 
76 A counter argument might pose the reasonable question: How do we account for the rise in 
diversity and cultural awareness course requirements during the same time period? These courses 
should be understood in the context of increased student choice rather than (liberal) character 
building. Requiring one course among many pages of possible options listed in the course catalog 
to satisfy an ill-defined requirement hardly seems to be an ideal way to prescribe a set of values. 
On the lack of a guiding focus in contemporary curricula, see Lewis’ Education Without a Soul 
(2007), a fine insider account of the 2005-06 debates surrounding proposed general education 
reforms at Harvard College. 
77 See Smith, Mayer, and Fritschler (2008). 
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all, incentive structures for faculty advancement in the contemporary university devalue 
teaching. Professional, not political, calculations are responsible for the retreat from 
teaching. As Winship (2011: 232) describes, “faculty are rewarded, both in terms of 
status and financially, to a far greater degree for their research than for their teaching. At 
top research universities, it is not unheard of for senior faculty to counsel their junior, 
untenured colleagues to put their effort in research and ignore teaching.” Faculty may be 
offered course releases, for example, if they can secure external funds to cover the cost of 
a required course that would occupy time that could be spent working on their 
scholarship. The university staffs these (mostly large, introductory, and therefore 
undesirable) courses with contingent laborers who cobble together teaching assignments 
at multiple institutions each semester in order to earn a living wage. Graduate students, 
who often begin their teaching careers in these underpaid adjunct positions, quickly learn 
that the path to (conventional forms of) academic success is by not directing too much of 
their time and energy on teaching.  
An emphasis on knowledge production rather than political socialization (or other 
academic or social purposes fostered in the classroom) is not a new development. Cuban 
(1999), for example, describes How Scholars Trumped Teachers throughout the twentieth 
century and Bender (2001) distinguishes between civic versus disciplinary 
professionalism to contemplate how faculty loyalties to their home institutions and other 
public commitments have been supplanted by the growth of academic specialization and 
stronger ties to field-specific associations. What is novel, however, is the intensity with 
which research takes precedence over undergraduate teaching and the range of 
33 
 
    
 
institutions that have adopted this worldview. Tuchman (2011: 217-18) connects this 
transformation – a process she terms “the decentering of teaching” – to a combination of 
state disinvestment in higher education and status conformity ventures by less selective 
schools to emulate more elite colleges and universities.78   
When scholarly productivity is the primary metric for promotion and teaching is 
not deemed a top priority, the resulting system will be a place where student learning is 
(likely) compromised. Recent indicators, most prominently those reported by Arum and 
Roksa (2011a, 2011b), support this claim of “limited learning on college campuses.” 
Drawing their results from student performance on the Collegiate Learning Assessment 
(CLA), an exam that measures “general skills-based competencies such as critical 
thinking, analytical reasoning, and written communication,” the co-authors report that 
36% of students “did not demonstrate any significant improvement in learning” during 
four years of college.79 The least growth was found in students who majored in business, 
while the highest achievements were found in students majoring in the social sciences 
and humanities. Though not without its critics,80 Academically Adrift (and the research 
program launched from its publication) has struck a chord with audiences within and 
beyond academia. 
                                                             
78 Burton Clark (1987), noted scholar of higher education, has remarked that “there is an 
unguided imitative convergence of universities and colleges upon the most prestigious forms.” As 
quoted in Yamane (2001: 9). 
79 Emphasis added. Arum and Roksa (2011b: 204). In a presentation at the University of 
Louisville, Richard Arum acknowledges the limitations of the CLA. Arum concedes that the CLA 
is an imperfect measure that simplifies a more complex process. See 
http://louisville.edu/delphi/programs/featured/academicallyadrift to view the March 30, 2012 
speech.   
80 For reviews that question the methodological underpinnings of Arum and Roksa’s study, see 
Astin (2011) and Haswell (2012). 
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Winship (2011), in a symposium evaluating the potential causal antecedents of 
Arum and Roksa’s descriptive findings, contends there is an unspoken “disengagement 
compact” between students and faculty that helps to explain poor test scores. 
Undergraduate teaching is undervalued by university administrators, Winship asserts, 
because unlike manuscripts published and grant monies procured, teaching quality is 
often perceived to be subjective and therefore difficult to quantify. Accordingly, 
professors expend nominal effort in preparation and instruction because unless they are 
exceptionally deficient in the classroom, faculty will not be held accountable for their 
weaknesses. The implicit promise of a more-than-satisfactory grade with minimal 
academic demands – I will not ask much of you if you do not ask much of me – suits the 
contemporary student customer interested only in a credential. Consequently, both 
signatories to the “low-low contract” (Winship 2011: 232) acquire what is necessary for 
their job prospects (students) and job security (faculty), respectively. 
 
Higher Education in American Society: Changing Roles and Distinct Attributes 
Student expectations for career training and faculty professional structures that 
marginalize teaching can be understood more generally, as responses to, and reflections 
of, the contemporary position of higher education in American life. Universities are 
mirrors of the societies that they serve. The relationship between college and community 
has evolved as the institution has developed. We shouldn’t necessarily expect the 
university to always be a site of political socialization simply because it has been tasked 
with this mission in (some) previous historical eras. Any serious assessment of student 
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engagement in the 1960s, for example, must be properly contextualized to recognize the 
socializing influence played by the university in nurturing student political 
consciousness.81    
The circumstances under which the university acts as a mediating structure 
between individual and state is dependent on the goals of higher education during any 
given time, as understood by the public and their representatives. The spaces occupied by 
the university in American society are redrawn as both beneficiaries and benefactors 
demand particular outcomes from their investment. In an economically-challenged time 
like the present, colleges and universities are most likely to deemphasize aspects of their 
institutional missions (e.g. liberal arts curricula; faculty focus on undergraduate teaching) 
that may appear incompatible with, or tangentially related to, immediate monetization. 
This project examines how competing missions of higher education have been 
implemented on campus and how student political engagement (in both scope and in 
kind) has been influenced by (non)exposure to particular educational values.     
Clark (2008: 210) explains that one of the “difficulties with mass education” – or 
what we might term the democratization of universities – is “how to adapt a singular 
structure to plural needs.” Exploring the paths advocated and the ideals exemplified by 
public and private investors provides insight into the contemporary status of higher 
education. Given its increasingly central role in American society (due to its size, range 
of functions, federal oversight, and prospects for commercial profitability), we also 
                                                             
81 “[T]he student movements of the 1960s,” Talcott (2005: 11) argues “have to be seen as 
standout examples of modern civic participation. How were these movements possible without 
resources for citizenship pre-existing in the institution, or without an existing identification of the 
institution with citizenship?” 
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acquire knowledge about wide-ranging sociopolitical and developmental processes with 
which the institution is interconnected. Higher education, according to Stevens, 
Armstrong, and Arum (2008: 135), therefore, represents a structural hub because it 
“connect[s] some of the most prominent institutional sectors of modern societies: the 
labor market and the larger economy, the professions and the sciences…and the nation-
state.”  
Stevens and his colleagues make fine use of additional metaphors82 – the 
university as sieve, the university as incubator, and the university as temple – to describe 
the intersection of higher education systems with other elements of public life. In the first 
articulation, a college degree represents the acquisition of skills required to enter the 
labor force and signals that an individual has earned symbolic passage to middle-class 
existence. The university is imagined as a sieve, though, rather than a ladder because 
while higher education is a mechanism by which social mobility may occur, the 
vocational opportunities of those who do not obtain certification are constrained. (The 
“dual character of education”83 notion can also be replicated within college. Describing 
contemporary higher education as a system defined by “expansive opportunity and 
inegalitarian differentiation,” Grubb and Lazerson (2005: 11) assert that increased access 
and greater options do nothing to combat the considerable disparities that exist among 
schools.)  
                                                             
82 The co-authors recognize the limitations of these heuristics: “Metaphors, by definition, are 
imaginative interpretations and summaries of reality.” (Stevens, Armstrong, and Arum 2008: 
128). 
83 Max Weber as cited in Stevens, Armstrong, and Arum (2008: 129). 
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The university as incubator refers to the impacts of college attendance in “many 
arenas of life.”84 Given the topical concerns of this project, I focus here on the 
educational effects of the “experiential core of college life”85 on political socialization 
and engagement.86 Much like the role of churches (Greenberg 2000) and other locally-
based institutions, colleges and universities may serve as “mobilizing institutions,” that is 
vehicles for individual and collective participation. Social capital building (Putnam 1995, 
2000) has the opportunity to prosper in these venues and mobilization networks can be 
formed which can lead to further (and deeper) personal involvement in civic and political 
life.87 The university as temple connotes the institution’s sacred status as the “official 
arbiter of status and knowledge.”88 Appropriating the revered role once held by religious 
organizations in pre-modern nation-states, the university represents the “organizational 
instantiation of intellectual progress.”89 Members of the university produce and 
disseminate knowledge and are charged with training emerging citizens be a “distinctive 
kind of social actor.”90 Interestingly, the temple metaphor (given its religious 
undercurrents) suggests a place where character building is an essential part of the 
university, a notion that appears quaint in the contemporary university environment.    
                                                             
84 Stevens, Armstrong, and Arum (2008: 132). 
85 Stevens, Armstrong, and Arum (2008: 131-134). 
86 In their otherwise exemplary review essay, Stevens, Armstrong, and Arum (2008) do not 
mention research on curricular forms of socialization in this context. An important component of 
the incubator metaphor, this line of research is introduced in the mobilizing ideas section above. 
87 Greenberg (2000: 377-378). 
88 Stevens, Armstrong, and Arum (2008: 137). 
89 Stevens, Armstrong, and Arum (2008: 134). 
90 Stevens, Armstrong, and Arum (2008: 134). 
38 
 
    
 
In summarizing selective aspects of the university as metaphors, it is important to 
note the historical specificity and cross-national variability (see comparative discussion 
below) of their relative predominance in a higher education system. Because they are 
linked (and may have competing or overlapping interests), one function can be weakened 
or diluted when other themes are given priority during a specific time period. A primary 
focus on acquiring a necessary credential for social advancement (in a time of economic 
insecurity) coupled with an emphasis on knowledge production (as an alternative revenue 
stream in an era of declining public support) can, for example, potentially override the 
university’s role as an incubator of social conscience. To borrow the idea of a temple, 
when new parishioners start attending services (e.g. demographic shifts in student 
population) and different patrons contribute to the collection boxes (i.e. from public to 
private funding), these changes will inevitably influence the overall mission of the 
congregation (from prophets to profits).    
Taken together, the university can be understood as a hub – serving in capacities 
such as sieve, incubator, and temple. Disparate forces within and beyond the halls of 
academia see this influential and centrally located institution, therefore, as an “object of 
contestation”91 and attempt to use the university for academic, social, and political ends.92 
As a location of politics, the university has served as a battleground for off-campus 
conflicts and as a stage to voice grievances specific to particular campus policies. Rojas 
(2011) distinguishes between insider efforts emerging within the university (e.g. 
                                                             
91 Stevens, Armstrong, and Arum (2008: 137). 
92 On the funding of campus conservative groups by Washington-based foundations and 
organizations, see de Forest (2007). 
39 
 
    
 
curricular proposals; endowment divestiture) and campaigns organized by outsiders who 
seek to utilize the campus for recruitment purposes (e.g. antiwar activism, gay rights 
canvassing) and to influence university policy (e.g. affirmative action, unionization 
rights).93  
Outside groups have focused on the university as a location for recruitment for 
good reason. Students are believed to have the (1) time and resource availability during a 
(2) formative life-cycle period while (3) residing in an academic community where they 
(4) encounter values that challenge them to raise questions and take action. While all of 
these factors naturally fit with political engagement, they are all also historically-
contingent and, therefore, must be reassessed if we are to understand how student politics 
is currently being practiced by college students. Let us first briefly review why these 
factors have proven determinative in previous historical eras. 
To actively participate, one must have the time and resources to dedicate to the 
cause. When writing about youth involvement in the civil rights movement, McAdam 
(1986: 70) explains that college students had the “biographical availability,” or the 
absence of individual responsibilities that might otherwise limit their ability, to contribute 
to black voter registration drives in the South. In addition, young people often had the 
“structural availability” to participate; by virtue of their presence on a college campus, 
students develop interpersonal networks which lead to opportunities for recruitment. 
Further clarifying these concepts in a study of Pro-Life mobilization efforts on university 
                                                             
93 Both insiders and outsiders may have academic or non-academic goals. See Rojas (2011: 4-5; 
Table 1). Rojas presents ideal-types in his typology of “movement-university relations”; in 
practice, though, most mobilizations are not as mutually exclusive as this construction would 
suggest.  
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campuses, Munson (2006) contends that college-age students tend to participate because 
they have reached “transition points” in their lives. During this time period, youth 
experience both a “breakdown and reconstitution of everyday routines coupled with a 
transformation of social networks.”94 It is not simply their lack of obligations that make 
students potentially active, but more broadly that they have reached a developmental 
stage that allows for the cultivation of a political consciousness.  
Spatial relations are also important.95 Along with having an age-graded 
population filled with students of (mostly) common social-class backgrounds, the college 
experience, by its very nature, conditions students to confront authority and form 
dissenting organizational structures. “Universities are institutions,” asserts Altbach (2006: 
330), “[which] stress intellectual values and ideals – theories and values that may call 
into question established social and political norms.”96 In addition to providing the 
analytical tools to frame oppositional views, the protected environment of American 
college campuses and limited consequences for participation allows (most of the time) for 
“fostering relatively low-risk political resistance.”97 These preconditions of recruitment – 
availability, traditional college-age, campus residence, and the university seeing itself as 
a socializing force and supporting curricula that advances this mission – may capture the 
                                                             
94 Munson (2006: 11-12). 
95 As Klatch (1999: 5) explains in a study of college chapters of Students for a Democratic 
Society (SDS) and Young Americans for Freedom (YAF) in the 1960s, “As centers of critical 
thinking, colleges have a crucial role in fostering questions about the social and political policies 
of the times. University life also provides a built-in means of communication and a base for 
organizing, essential ingredients in political mobilization.” 
96 Altbach (2006: 330).   
97 Boren (2001: 176). 
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spirit of previous eras of student politics, but as discussed throughout this project, this 
institutional profile does not fit the present generation of students.  
In addition to a location of recruitment, the university can also be a location of 
experimentation; a site to witness (positive or negative) political possibilities. The 
university, in this context, might serve as a place to model specific goals when other 
institutional venues are non-accommodating or as a place to test policies or management 
strategies and assess how these pilot programs might work in other institutional sectors. 
An example of the former category of prefigurative politics include colleges in the 
American South in the early 1960s acting as “oas[e]s of freedom” (Lowe 2007, 2009) by 
validating interracial dialogue and fellowship in a society which remained closed to such 
expressions. An example of the latter category – institutional policy as a harbinger of 
national policy – the university functions as a location to highlight the costs of state 
disinvestment in public provisions. Higher education has responded to recent cutbacks by 
increasing tuition, pursuing corporate partnerships, advancing “strategic dynamism” 
agendas, and entertaining other “disruptive innovations” that transform institutional 
missions and suggest, more generally, the possible social consequences of imposing 
austerity measures in other institutional areas. 
Whether the example is one of aspiration or admonition, the university in 
American society represents a crystallization of historical time and institutional space. In 
terms of cultural expectations and heterogeneity of college types, the higher education 
system in the United States represents a “special case” (Clark 2008: 207) when compared 
with its institutional counterparts abroad. The institutional makeup is a product of the 
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nation it serves. Skeptical about federal overreach in provincial matters, a decentralized 
system of colleges and universities was originally “organized more by local opportunity 
than by national policy.”98 This concentration of power at the state level resulted in a 
“multiplicity of structures” (Clark 2008: 209) where local conditions (e.g. presence of a 
particular religious denomination or commercial industry) determined the aims of 
education and remained a defining institutional feature well into the twentieth century. 
Despite this range of institutional forms, the image projected to a global audience of the 
“college in American culture” is of an elite four-year university. This symbolic image is 
especially challenged in the current environment in which for-profit colleges and 
universities (FPCUs), most of which only have online platforms, and two-year (open 
admissions) community colleges are the education providers that train the highest 
percentage of students. 
The institutional differentiation and mixture of public-private financing found in 
the U.S. system is novel in comparison to the centrally administered (and subsidized) 
system of higher education in most European nations. This cross-national variation is not 
unexpected given the larger direct presence the state has historically played in European 
life. However, many of the innovations associated with the American university system – 
for example, the British residential undergraduate experience or the German commitment 
to advanced research – were patterned after Continental prototypes. We should anticipate, 
though, that higher education systems will be culturally rooted because as Sapiro (2004: 
5) explains, colleges and universities, like other institutions which may serve a politically 
                                                             
98 Bender (1997: 2). 
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socializing role, “vary in their structures, operating norms, and relationships to people’s 
everyday experience in different countries.” 
Conceived as a highly regulated institution – regulated in a moral rather than 
bureaucratic sense – American colleges sought to create a “total world” for students, 
sheltering them from the outside world and prescribing a religiously-defined form of 
character development that would subsequently shape their public lives. Colleges were 
often incorporated in rural townships so that students would be insulated from the 
“corrupting influences” of the emerging cities. When municipalities and villages soon 
developed, the colleges were instrumental in shaping town-gown relations.99 The cultural 
foundations of American higher education demonstrate that even as the university 
eventually became secularized, the socializing concerns associated with becoming a 
productive citizen remained an important aspect of a higher education. 
Older than their American peers, European universities are often located in capital 
cities (and other population centers) and have crafted a distinct historical tradition 
influenced by their urban surroundings. With the possible exception of Britain, 
socialization has not been a primary mission of European higher education.100 This is not 
to suggest, of course, that university politics is not present (see e.g. Klimke and Scharloth 
2008), but rather to recognize that universities are less responsible for student 
socialization. Other institutional actors (e.g. political parties, trade unions) play a decisive 
                                                             
99 On the history of university life and the geographical differences between the locations of 
American colleges and elsewhere, see Gumprecht (2008: 16-17, 31-39, 41). See also Goodchild 
(1999: 9). 
100 Altbach (2006: 344) concludes that “European universities have not had as strong a network of 
organizations as has been the case in the United States…there are few traditions of campus life.” 
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role in political development and secondary schools (the equivalent of American high 
schools) often provide the general education that has been a feature of coursework in 
American colleges and universities. Because of the presence of these powerful socializing 
agents, civic forms of education are not necessarily required of European universities, 
unlike in the United States (during specific historical eras). 
Cultural context largely determines the purposes of higher education. As an 
institution, the role of the university in public life is governed by a nation’s stage of 
political development. For this reason, student politics has been most immediately 
significant in developing nations where the university is often centrally located – 
structurally and spatially.101 Under these volatile circumstances, the university may be 
one of a relatively few established institutions (i.e. an engine of civil society) and as a 
result, actors organizing within its gates – most of who come from elite social classes – 
will have disproportionate political influence (Altbach 2006). Students in developing 
nations, in addition, are often able to benefit from the close proximity of their campus to 
the locus of power and have taken advantage of campus grounds as a launching pad for 
political engagement.102 
This comparative aside is merely to illustrate the malleability of higher education. 
The role(s) of the university are subject to national priorities at particular historical 
moments in specific sociopolitical climates. Students are accorded greater political status 
in the developing world than in (most) western nations because of the location the 
                                                             
101 For both historical and contemporary overviews of student politics in many of these countries, 
see the edited volumes by Emmerson (1968) and Weiss and Aspinall (2012), respectively. 
102 On how campus ecology facilitated Chinese student participation in the 1989 Tiananmen 
Square movement, see Zhao (2001: 240).    
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university inhabits in these less institutionally-settled contexts. Returning to our primary 
case of interest, we next consider several possible functions of American higher 
education and examine how specific aims of higher education gain prominence during 
certain periods in American history and may result in the abandoning or scaling back of 
competing ends of education. 
 
Why Go to College? The Missions and Objectives of Higher Education 
University missions, as institutional expressions of a nation’s values, signify the 
“most general level of hopes and expectations”103 that societies hold for higher education. 
These aspirations are not determined by a national plebiscite, but rather through what 
Smelser (2012a) characterizes as “compacts of mutual opportunism” between 
constituencies of interest (governmental, commercial, or philanthropic) and a “real and 
imagined public.” What “society ask[s] of higher education” will fluctuate due to the 
market value ascribed to its product at any given time. Value, it must be noted, is an asset 
which can be defined by its financial, civic, intellectual, and/or intrinsic worth (among 
other ideals). Increased financial and cultural investment in higher education during 
particular historical periods (e.g. post-World War II or late-nineteenth century) may serve 
overlapping public and private interests.104 In an historical era like the present, where 
post-secondary training is a prerequisite for economic advancement, there also exists a 
                                                             
103 Fenske (1980: 178-179) as quoted in Scott (2006: 2). 
104 Stevens, Armstrong, and Arum (2008: 136) describe how “[c]orporate and civic leaders 
viewed the expansion of higher education as a useful means of seeding economic development, 
rationalizing labor markets, absorbing excess workers during economic recessions, expanding 
middle-class consumer markets, and even tempering race relations.” 
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social ethos that accepts declining public involvement in higher education. Advocates 
within academia for less vocationally-driven goals of higher education (like citizenship 
and socialization) struggle, therefore, to find support for the “inessential” functions they 
promote.105  
The university’s service to society covaries with motivations for college 
attendance. Institutional development, in this way, can be seen as a form of political 
agenda setting. Higher education serves to reinforce (or challenge) a specific social ethos. 
The lessons that are learned (or unlearned) will subsequently inform an individual’s 
political life. By surveying the “vistas that inform our current horizon,” (Williams 2005: 
59) we encounter distinct expectations of the university and can examine how each 
institutional vision may stimulate or inhibit student political engagement. Each of the 
four leading institutional identities to be discussed – higher education as a site for (1) 
liberal arts education; (2) citizenship preparation; (3) occupational training; or (4) 
advanced research – is designed to elicit specific outcomes. The first two identities, in 
general, aim for “democratic utility” while the latter two are primarily concerned with 
“vocational utility.”106 There is significant overlap both within and between these two 
categories; moreover, elements of each identity are emphasized throughout the history of 
American higher education, but their individual status shifts with the political and 
socioeconomic conditions of any given time. These four ideal-types, though, represent 
                                                             
105 Lagemann and Lewis (2012: 10) claim that “higher education’s commitment to the common 
good” has been “crowded out by a flourishing multiplicity of worthy but uncoordinated agendas.”  
106 Veysey (1965: 60-64). 
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different conceptions of relevance and practicality and as expressions of competing core 
educational values their goals can often appear to be irreconcilable.  
The objectives of a liberal arts education are all directed toward the personal 
development of the student. A liberally educated person will have been taught “how to 
think and how to choose”107 and, therefore, will be well-positioned to meaningfully 
contribute to public life. Through the acquisition of critical thinking skills and curricular 
opportunities for self-examination, students groomed in the liberal arts tradition, its 
proponents contend, will graduate as intellectually curious citizens with social 
consciences. The liberal arts have “democratic utility,” not simply because graduates may 
become active participants; the substantive content judged to have enduring value – 
readings in the arts, sciences, and humanities – speaks as much about the culture in which 
such an education is respected and supported as it does about the students who seek it 
out. In a spirited defense, John Cardinal Newman, in The Idea of a University (1852), 
explains the lofty ambitions of the liberal arts: 
University training…aims at raising the intellectual tone of society, at cultivating 
the public mind, at purifying the national taste, at supplying principles to popular 
enthusiasm and fixed aims to popular aspiration, at giving enlargement and 
sobriety to the ideas of the age, at facilitating the exercise of political power, and 
refining the intercourse of private life.108  
 
The liberal arts, like all institutional designs, gained prominence in a particular 
historical and social context. Because of its dominance during the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, a time when students only from elite backgrounds had access to 
                                                             
107 Delbanco (2012: 15). 
108 For contemporary arguments on behalf of the liberal arts, see Delbanco (2012) and Nussbaum 
(1998, 2010).  
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higher education, liberal arts has always been burdened by a reputation of exclusivity and 
impracticality, despite its universal applicability. In the contemporary context, liberal arts 
education continues to be maligned because its holistic benefits are (perceived to be) 
difficult to quantify.109 As discussed earlier in the chapter, students at small liberal arts 
colleges (and undergraduate colleges located within the most selective research 
universities) have historically been disproportionately politically engaged, due in part to 
curricular experiences that potentially awaken political consciousness. In an era when the 
appeal of a liberal arts education is low and tuitions are unsustainably high, though, 
liberal arts colleges have responded by broadening their aims,110 and in the process may 
endanger their core missions of character development and social responsibility. 
Citizenship preparation is the second institutional identity that strives to impart 
“democratic utility,” but unlike liberal arts education which has often been portrayed as 
academia for the privileged few (who have been called by a sense of noblesse oblige to 
contribute), the purposes of citizenship preparation have always been framed by its 
advocates in communitarian terms where higher education is seen a social good to be 
supported by public resources.111 In proposing a publicly-funded state university, Thomas 
Jefferson, as lead author of the Report of the Rockfish Gap Commission (1818) to the 
Virginia Legislature, presents the idea of higher education as a location to educate 
students to be productive members of society. The university would be responsible for 
                                                             
109 Gilbertson and Hurley (2008). This is a misguided conclusion, asserts Elaine Tuttle Hansen, 
former president of Bates College, by pithily observing that “learning to think has many practical 
applications” (Lagemann and Lewis 2012: 76). 
110 See Baker, Baldwin, and Makker (2012). 
111 While the democratic outcomes of these two institutional identities intersect, their starting 
points are dissimilar (i.e. individual development or community well-being). 
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providing student instruction that would “rende[r] them examples of virtue to others.” 
Among other democratic functions, a matriculating student would “improve, by reading, 
his morals and faculties”; “understand his duties to his neighbors and country”; and 
“observe with intelligence and faithfulness all the social relations under which he shall be 
placed.”  
In this conception of higher education, the university functions as a preparatory 
school for public engagement, a space where students follow a general course of study 
and begin to contemplate (and act upon) their civic commitments. Higher education 
serves the public good by producing citizens capable of making informed choices about 
the direction of the nation. While the Jeffersonian vision stipulates acting in the public 
interest, the manner by which one chooses to participate (e.g. seeking elected office, 
sponsoring a library) or the content one wishes to espouse (e.g. nationalist support or 
systemic critique) is not restricted. Arguably the most significant component of an 
education that focuses on citizenship preparation is the responsibility to voice dissent 
when circumstances warrant. In defining the institutional role of higher education in an 
era of increasing access, the Truman Commission on Higher Education (1947) recognizes 
the university as the democratic conscience of the nation, declaring that   
[t]he first and most essential charge upon higher education is that at all its levels 
and in all its fields of specialization it shall be the carrier of democratic values, 
ideals, and processes…Its role in a democratic society is that of critic and leader 
as well as servant; its task is not merely to meet the demands of the present but to 
alter those demands if necessary, so as to keep them always suited to democratic 
ideals.  
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These dual aspects of democratic citizenship – servant and critic – are the cornerstones of 
the citizenship preparation institutional mission. The formal title of the Truman report, 
Higher Education for American Democracy, signifies the public expectations of higher 
education and underscores the gradual social shift from higher education being regarded 
as a privilege to recognition of educational opportunity as a right.   
The civic responsibilities of higher education have been emphasized in diverse 
settings and stressed during specific historical periods. In their mission statements and 
other rhetorical gestures, state universities, for example, may reference civic purposes in 
the context of improving local economies; military service academies connect citizenship 
to national defense; and progressive liberal arts colleges (and some religiously-affiliated 
schools) will interpret public interest to mean social justice and the duties of global 
citizenship. The popular appeal of any institutional identity, including citizenship 
preparation, is shaped by temporal conditions. Drawing upon civic sensibilities in an 
historical context where notions of the common good are not especially valued, like the 
present, is usually not a recipe for institutional prospering. Colleges and universities have 
responded to these market pressures by prioritizing institutional goals that fit the private 
social ethic of the era.112 Consequently, students, who increasingly view higher education 
in careerist rather than developmental terms, may not receive exposure to curricular ideas 
and institutional values that have spurred political socialization in previous historical 
eras.   
                                                             
112 In reinforcing this vision, universities may be serving public demand, but Jeffersonians would 
claim they are not serving the public interest. In chapter 5, I discuss contemporary efforts by the 
civic engagement/citizenship studies movement within academia that seeks to counter this 
mentality. 
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For supporters of citizenship preparation, the chief purpose of higher education is 
to provide the civic tools required for service in the public interest. Advocates of a third 
model of institutional identity – the university as a site for occupational training – claim 
that post-secondary education is primarily responsible for providing job-related skills 
necessary for private economic advancement. While there may be democratic effects of 
individual economic prosperity, this type of higher education aims for “vocational 
utility.” Similar to liberal arts education in its principal focus on personal development, 
occupational training is much narrower in its scope; students may be equipped for the 
market, but not the marketplace of ideas.     
The occupational vision understands higher education as an institutional location 
to train workers and support the growth of industry. While recent iterations are likely to 
highlight the individual economic incentives for college attendance, the occupational 
perspective has its roots in legislative efforts that sought to bolster both private and public 
economic competitiveness. Through the Morrill Land Grant Act (1862), Congress 
allocated funds for the establishment (or maintenance) of state universities  
where the leading object shall be, without excluding other scientific and classical 
studies and including military tactics, to teach such branches of learning as are 
related to agriculture and the mechanic arts, in such manner as the legislatures of 
the States may respectively prescribe, in order to promote the liberal and practical 
education of the industrial classes on the several pursuits and professions in life. 
 
Occupational training, as suggested by the legislation, would be a useful addition 
to the university curriculum, not a replacement for the liberal arts education that still 
predominated. This balance would soon shift as advocates for occupational training 
became increasingly effective in pressing their claim that vocational instruction was not 
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simply a value-added component of higher education, but rather should be the 
institution’s chief concern. The liberal arts were not only deemed irrelevant for 
practically-oriented students, but to some business leaders, general education was 
believed to be potentially harmful to optimal worker efficiency. Charles W. Eliot (1869), 
then-future president of Harvard and a leading voice for the course elective system, 
explains how the goals of occupational training and liberal education are in conflict, and 
therefore, should not be concurrently taught for fear of “spoiling” each institutional 
mission.   
The student in a polytechnic school has a practical end constantly in view; he is 
studying the processes of nature, in order afterwards to turn them to human uses 
and his own profit…This practical end should never be lost sight of by student or 
teacher in a polytechnic school, and it should very seldom be thought of or 
alluded to in a college. The practical spirit and the literary or scholastic spirit are 
both good, but they are incompatible. If commingled, they are both spoiled. 
 
Higher education, according to the occupational training ideal, is a site for 
credentialization and practical usefulness, a mass institution that can “convert the boy of 
fair abilities and intentions into an observant, judicious man.”113 An emphasis on purely 
technical (pre-professional) education has a significant negative impact on student 
political engagement. By virtue of its narrow focus, occupational education forecloses the 
serendipitous moments of political awakening available from a liberal arts education and 
fails to cultivate a sense of mutual social obligation or broad commitment to the public 
interest that are fundamental to education for citizenship preparation.  
                                                             
113 Eliot (1869). 
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In its most streamlined form, applied education neither encourages critical 
thinking nor aims for political development. In a caustically-phrased, yet remarkably 
forthcoming, view of the university as a place for occupational training, John Sperling, 
founder of the University of Phoenix, the nation’s leading for-profit predominantly-
online educational service-provider, acknowledges that his school “is a corporation, not a 
social entity…Coming here is not a rite of passage. We are not trying to develop their 
value systems or go in for that ‘expands their minds’ bullshit.”114 While most colleges 
and universities would not use such a dismissive tone in their appeals to potential 
students, the underlying attitude – higher education is a place for certification, not 
socialization – is increasingly common. Institutional missions (and major fields of study) 
that emphasize their “vocational utility” will thrive in historical eras when utilitarian aims 
for higher education (as measured by student goals) are high and political leaders insist 
that economic prospects will be constrained without some post-secondary training. 
Student politics, like all features of the institutional landscape, will be shaped by shifts in 
student aims and cultural expectations of higher education. 
The university as a location for advanced research is the final institutional 
identity to be considered at present. Its proponents claim that higher education should 
primarily be engaged with the creation and transmission of new knowledge. The 
advanced research model seeks a combination of vocational and democratic utility, but 
except as funding sources, undergraduate students play a peripheral role to this 
institutional mission. Rewarded with promotion and disciplinary prestige for their 
                                                             
114 Quoted in Cox (2003: 19). 
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scholarly contributions, members of the faculty are the occupational beneficiaries of a 
focus on knowledge production. Scientific innovation and expert analysis may also be 
democratically useful. Increases in federal funding for university research during the 
initial stages of the Cold War, most notably in the National Defense Education Act 
(1958), suggests how the promise of advanced research has been employed as a tool of 
statecraft.115   
Based on his own experience studying in Germany, Daniel Coit Gilman, founding 
president of Johns Hopkins University in 1876, sought to replicate a similar institutional 
identity in the United States. It is imperative to note that Gilman intended the university 
as a supplement, not a substitute, for college. Gilman proposed an advanced research 
institution (a stand-alone graduate school) without undergraduate students. In his 
memoirs, Gilman (1906) recounts that he asked the trustees to    
give emphasis to the word ‘university’ and endeavor to build up an institution 
quite different from a college, thus making an addition to American education, not 
introducing a rival. Young men who had already gone through that period of 
mental discipline which commonly leads to the baccalaureate degree, were invited 
to come and pursue those advanced studies for which they might have been 
prepared.116  
 
Character development and socialization were clearly outside of the purview of 
this new institution, not because Gilman thought that these functions were unimportant, 
but rather, they would be attended to by colleges dedicated to undergraduate instruction. 
Central to Gilman’s undertaking was that professors, unconstrained by formal teaching 
                                                             
115 See also Science the Endless Frontier: A Report to the President by Vannevar Bush, Director 
of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, (Washington: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1945). 
116 Gilman (1906), as excerpted in Hofstadter and Smith (1961: 599-600). 
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responsibilities, would have the time and resources to pursue their scholarly work without 
interruption.117 As he told attendees to the twentieth-fifth anniversary of the founding of 
Johns Hopkins, 
when the university began, it was a common complaint…that the ablest teachers 
were absorbed in routine and were forced to spend their strength in the discipline 
of tyros, so that they had no time for carrying forward their studies or for adding 
to human knowledge. Here the position was taken at the outset that…professors 
should have ample time to carry on the higher work for which they had shown 
themselves qualified.118 
 
The institutional identity – the university as a site of advanced research – is 
predicated entirely on the absence of an undergraduate population. Gilman, though, never 
had the opportunity to implement this vision. When Johns Hopkins opened in 1876, the 
trustees recognized the university’s need for revenue and chose to admit undergraduates 
as part of the incoming class. While his approach was considered untenable at the time, 
the underlying motivation of Gilman (and other champions of the advanced research 
mission), that faculty are expected to prioritize their scholarship above all other possible 
functions, would gradually become the leading institutional identity for faculty at the 
most select universities in the United States (and at colleges which aspire to those ranks). 
Given that the advanced research mission was envisioned as a place without 
undergraduate students, any impact it may have on student development should be 
considered tangential. Students may intellectually benefit from their access to scholars 
                                                             
117 As founding director of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton in 1930, Abraham 
Flexner, one of Johns Hopkins most famous early alums (Class of 1886), helped to establish a 
research-focused center similar to the place of study that his mentor had imagined for the 
fledgling university in Baltimore. On Flexner’s influential role in the development of American 
higher education, see Bonner (2002) and Kerr (1994).  
118 Gilman (1902), as excerpted in Hofstadter and Smith (1961: 646). 
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who produce pioneering research and use their classrooms to disseminate these ideas. 
This positive externality, though, is often limited because of faculty incentive structures 
that convey that undergraduate learning is not a top priority for career advancement. 
Increased expectations for research productivity have steered faculty away from other 
functions (e.g. student socialization) that have become less central to this institutional 
mission. To reiterate, it was not Gilman’s intent for colleges to relinquish their less 
research-driven commitments, but rather for graduate universities to act as sanctuaries for 
advanced research and, therefore, enhance the existing higher education landscape. 
Gilman’s objectives have largely been realized, but not in the institutional design that he 
proposed. As a consequence, those who weren’t even expected to be present – 
undergraduate students – may have been the institutional actors most affected by the shift 
in institutional mindset.  
In recent times, especially in an historical period like the present where public 
support for higher education has declined, universities are likely to stray from 
institutional identities that do not offer potential economic payoffs and/or for which 
constituents do not seem to be clamoring – e.g. liberal arts education and citizenship 
preparation – and instead, heighten their support for institutional functions where 
pecuniary interests may be served – e.g. occupational training and advanced research. 
Each of the four institutional identities described provide different answers to the same 
question: what is college for? The identities are ideal-types and not representations of 
reality; moreover, university missions often embody a mixture of several ideal-types. The 
prominence of any individual identity (institutional logic) at any given time is determined 
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by the present societal expectations for higher education (Institutional dynamics). Higher 
education, in general, will have a more significant role to play in political socialization 
during historical eras when liberal arts education and citizenship preparation are 
ascendant and will have less influence on student political development when 
institutional purposes concentrate on occupational training and advanced research.119    
There have always been competing aims of higher education in the United States; 
the value accorded to any purpose, though, is determined by how the nation measures 
worth and relevance at a particular historical moment. Ultimately, some institutional 
missions recede because (powerful) advocates are lacking that can make a compelling 
case for their “usefulness.” As the cultural perception of higher education has gradually 
moved from one of elite privilege to expanded opportunity to democratic right toward its 
current position as a requirement for social mobility, institutional missions that 
emphasize the possibility of improved (short-term) economic prospects will prove most 
appealing to increasingly diverse student populations.  
Demography, though, is not destiny. The increased focus on instrumental 
concerns is also related to attitudinal shifts regarding the proper role of government in 
American life. Critics of the “post-welfare state university” (Williams 2006) argue, in 
                                                             
119 I am not suggesting that political socialization will not take place for students in colleges and 
universities that focus on vocational utility, but rather, if it is to occur, political consciousness will 
either be delayed or developed elsewhere. Socialization, in effect, will be “outsourced” to other 
institutional sectors which may not emphasize the virtues of political engagement. In minimizing 
its commitment to socialization, higher education is still modeling (by omission) the values it 
believes are important for students to learn. As Giroux (2002: 441) remarks, “[e]ducation is a 
moral and political practice and always presupposes an introduction to and preparation for 
particular forms of social life, a particular rendering of what community is, and what the future 
might hold.” 
58 
 
    
 
brief, that we are not merely seeing a change in investors, but a change in the values that 
are underwriting the investment. According to these voices of alarm, privatization (Fryar 
2012) and corporatization (Washburn 2006) have transformed the university into a place 
where business interests (e.g. customer service and product development), not 
educational values (e.g. critical thinking and political socialization), are primary to its 
institutional identity.120 The institutional purposes that are most closely associated with 
the cultivation of political consciousness (liberal arts education, citizenship preparation) 
are also the identities whose outcomes are least amenable to measurement (in economic 
terms). The institutional objectives that students encounter at the “post-welfare state” 
university, though, are not intended to create productive citizens (because this goal does 
not explicitly further private interests), but rather to create usable knowledge (i.e. 
quantifiable returns on investment).  
The social and political environments in which the university operates have 
certainly changed, but the conflict between commercial and academic values is not a new 
development, nor is the language of crisis that accompanies discussions about the “state 
of the university.”121 In 1918, Thorstein Veblen wrote in Higher Learning in America 
about the corrupting presence of business education: 
A college of commerce is designed to serve an emulative purpose only – 
individual gain regardless of, or at the cost of, the community at large – and it is, 
therefore, peculiarly incompatible with the collective cultural purpose of the 
                                                             
120 The ideals personified by for-profit (Traub 1997); remote (online); and competency-based 
educational models (Kolowich 2011), which have entered the higher education market to cater to 
consumer demands, have begun to shape the practices at traditional brick and mortar colleges and 
universities.  
121 On the use (and misuse) of crisis talk in higher education, see Donaghue (2004: 93-95), 
Smelser (2012a), and Tierney (2012). 
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university. It belongs in the corporation of learning no more than a department of 
athletics.122 
 
The university is a temperamentally conservative institution; there is often a 
romanticization of the past by parties resistant to change.123 Despite this qualification, 
there is a reasonable case to be made for the distinctiveness of the present historical era. 
Adapting to meet cultural demands is not unique to the contemporary university, but due 
to its increased size and central location, the scope of the institutional challenges placed 
upon the current system is novel. There are many consequences to this multi-functional 
institution of increasing complexity.124  
As the responsibilities and influence of higher education as an institution have 
increased, colleges and universities have become more politically vulnerable and more 
responsive to stakeholders with disparate goals. In an era of declining state support for 
higher education, the institutional missions that hold the most appeal to both legislators 
and commercial interests are aimed at occupational training for students and research “for 
the sake of corporately definable, useful, and profitable goals”125 for faculty. External 
funding forces – e.g. federal appropriators, corporate partners, alumni patrons – do not 
assign the same value to all possible institutional missions. This view of higher education 
has inevitably lead to the downsizing or eliminating of non-revenue generating academic 
departments (almost always in the humanities and social sciences) and other curricular 
                                                             
122 One can only imagine Veblen’s response to the ubiquitous corporate sponsorship of 
contemporary college athletics (e.g. The Allstate Sugar Bowl). 
123 In The Uses of the University (1963: 211), Clark Kerr observes how opponents of university 
policy throughout his chancellorship at the University of California, Berkeley always made 
reference to “to a glorious past and to a fearsome future.”        
124 Smelser (2012a). 
125 Williams (2005: 64). 
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efforts that do not have measurable (economic) impact, but have historically been the 
stimuli for political socialization and democratic engagement. 
Student political engagement is shaped by the institutional purposes of higher 
education during a particular historical era. Societal expectations for higher education 
determine who seeks post-secondary study. As this chapter has suggested, the 
“undergraduate student” as a distinct status – in terms of age of entry, socio-economic 
class, and goals for attendance – has experienced democratizing changes over the last few 
decades. While many students have always sought higher education for vocational ends, 
these motivations (which are stronger than in previous eras) are being reinforced to an 
unprecedented extent by instrumentalist curricula they encounter on campus.  
What is potentially lost with a view of higher education that emphasizes narrow 
job preparation and is driven by private good rather than public commitments? Are there 
potential long-term consequences of non-liberal arts education on political futures? 
Implicit in these questions is that the time (stage of life-cycle) and place (institutional 
location) that political socialization is introduced matters. Both when and where are 
influenced by historical context. This period effects argument stipulates that the social 
conditions in which students are present will facilitate or encumber the development of a 
political consciousness and structure subsequent participation.126 In a recent op-ed, Gross 
(2012) ponders how can we reconcile the long-held social science axiom that there is a 
positive relationship between higher education and political participation with the 
                                                             
126 Braungart and Braungart (1990: 82). On the path dependency aspect of “first impressions,” 
(Pierson 2000a: 260) see the classic discussion of the “problem of generations” in Mannheim 
(1952). 
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evidence that “rates of college attendance have risen drastically over the past 40 years, 
while participation [and political knowledge] in politics has declined.” Missing from 
Gross’ fine analysis is the possibility that the underlying mechanisms that initially made 
the association seem self-evident – an institutional emphasis on student political 
socialization and civic engagement – are now less present on campus. This study tells 
that story. 
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Chapter 2: Past as Prologue: The Evolving Relationship of College to Society 
 
Institutions must advance and keep pace with the times. We may as well require a man to 
wear still the coat that fitted him when a boy as civilized society to remain ever under the 
regimen of their barbarous ancestors.  
Thomas Jefferson (1816)127  
 
I wouldn’t dream of attempting to study a contemporary phenomenon without studying 
its historical antecedents. Rom Harré (2012) 
 
Shifts in political engagement among college students of different eras can be best 
explained by examining the educational institution that has historically been responsible 
for nurturing their political development. Investigating the changing purposes and 
competing missions of the university over time provides us with an institutional path to 
contextualize the present role of higher education in American life. By “placing politics 
in time,” Pierson (2000b: 72) asserts, we can “systematically situat[e] particular moments 
(including the present) in a temporal sequence of events and processes.”128  
In (re)tracing the development of higher education, we can appreciate how 
changes in institutional mission represent broader shifts in opinion about the proper role 
of colleges and universities in serving national priorities. Institutional stakeholders, with 
their historically-imbued views about the scale and scope of the American state, help to 
shape societal expectations for higher education in any historical era.129 Institutions, as 
Orren and Skowronek (2004: 81-82) nicely summarize, have purposes; establish norms 
and rules; assign roles; and operate within boundaries. These components are not static; 
as described in chapter 1, institutional purposes can be modified; curricular norms can be 
                                                             
127 As quoted in Skowronek and Orren (2006: 78). 
128 See Pierson (2004) for the book-length treatment of this subject. 
129 Loss (2011: chapter 1). 
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broadened; new political actors can be empowered; and parameters of responsibility can 
expand. The institutional position of higher education is determined by exogenous 
processes – changes in the social context – that create new constituencies who may 
choose to “harness existing organizational forms in the service of new ends.”130  
Changes in stakeholders, as is the case with higher education (due to, for example, 
demographic democratization and increased commercial involvement), will often result 
in changes in institutional preferences. The increased political salience of certain 
outcomes often results in the abandoning (or rebranding) of institutional objectives that 
were once seen as fundamental to constituents (in different social contexts). There is no 
fixed date that we can isolate as the exact moment when political socialization as an 
institutional mission receded in importance. Instead, the primary aim of longitudinal 
(time-series) analysis is to locate broader period effects that can help in discerning the 
shifting of institutional dynamics and priorities. Grzymala-Busse (2011: 1278) refers to 
this “aspect of temporality” as duration because it “demarcates the unfolding of 
mechanisms and processes.”131 Changes in student demography and variation in cultural 
expectations of higher education, for example, are incremental developments that have 
gradually impacted institutional identities.132 The consequences of slow-moving 
                                                             
130 Thelen (2000: 105). 
131 “Some mechanisms,” Grzymala-Busse (2011: 1278) continues, “can be observed only given 
enough time elapsed…Other mechanisms have their effect only given enough time.” Emphasis in 
original. 
132 “Institutional survival,” Thelen (2003: 211) explains, is “strongly laced with elements of 
institutional transformation.” Emphasis in original. 
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processes – such as shifts in student political engagement – may become increasingly 
apparent because of historically-specific social contexts (i.e. temporal conditions).133  
There are different forms of institutional change that “highlight the processes 
through which institutional arrangements are renegotiated.”134 Thelen (2000: 107) coins 
the term “functional conversion” to describe the adaptive process whereby “institutions 
created for one set of purposes…come to be turned to wholly new ends.” Functional 
conversion is an analytical concept that gauges long-term trends rather than a precise 
measure that quantifies the short-term impact of an individual public policy. Borrowing 
from Schickler’s (2001) research on innovations in the U.S. Congress, Thelen (2003: 
226) employs the notion of institutional “layering” to describe the effects of adding “new 
arrangements on top of preexisting structures.”135 To illustrate its conceptual utility, she 
discusses how the layering of an “alternative private system onto an existing public 
system” will have consequences – in terms of groups served and functions prioritized – 
that determine the trajectory of an entire institutional field.136 While they both represent 
institutional “context shift[ing] and new challenges emerg[ing],” Thelen (2003: 232) 
                                                             
133 Grzymala-Busse (2011: 1288). On temporal boundary conditions, see also Pierson and 
Skocpol (2002: 7-10) and Pierson (2002b: 83). Zelizer (2004: 131-132) offers a laudatory 
overview of Pierson’s work and suggests lessons that can be learned from historical-
institutionalism by his fellow academic historians. 
134 Thelen (2003: 213). 
135 Thelen’s description of institutional layering is quite similar to Smelser’s applied theory of 
structural accretion. As discussed in chapter 1 of this text, Smelser (2012a: 7) presents a “history 
of cumulative accretion” in higher education and considers the potential consequences of 
increased institutional responsibilities.  
136 Thelen (2003: 227). Applied to higher education in the United States, the concept of layering 
finds current resonance in the influence of streamlined post-secondary educational options – e.g. 
for-profit colleges and universities (FPCUs) and massive open online courses (MOOCs) – and 
how established schools have responded to these external threats and, in so doing, potentially 
alter the purposes of the institution. 
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suggests that conversion and layering are distinctive because the former occurs with the 
“incorporation of new or previously excluded groups” unlike the latter process where key 
constituencies remain mostly similar. In the case of higher education in the United States, 
however, I find the relationship between layering and conversion to be more tenuous and 
difficult to disaggregate; institutional conversion, moreover, has often been the inevitable 
outcome of institutional layering.  
Despite this difference of interpretation, Thelen’s observations on the processes of 
institutional change are valuable in understanding functional developments in American 
higher education. As institutional responses to societal needs and economic 
circumstances, conversion and layering are useful when considering how colleges and 
universities pursue their mission “to administer the present.”137 The malleability of 
institutions to meet market demands and political pressures is not unexpected; significant 
for our present purposes is Thelen’s entreaty to consider “what aspects of institutions are 
negotiable and under what conditions.”138 Because of its numerous system 
transformations, higher education is an empirically rich case to explore these questions 
and examine how “expanding [an institution’s] ‘reach’ might well open up conflict over 
[its] goals and purposes.”139  
While institutional adaptations to sociodemographic conditions are not unique to 
its present stage of historical development, the kinds of changes we are witnessing in 
                                                             
137 As highlighted by Schrum (2012), this phrase was part of Clark Kerr’s working draft of his 
famous Godkin Lectures at Harvard (1963), which were later published as The Uses of the 
University. We will return to Kerr, the prominent chancellor of the University of California 
during the mid-20th century, throughout the text.  
138 Thelen (2003: 222). Emphasis in original. 
139 Thelen (2003: 231). 
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American higher education are significant to explaining the role that colleges and 
university may play in political socialization. (Colleges in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, for example, prioritized character formation because their institutional 
beneficiaries and patrons demanded such education.) In their compelling research on 
student conservatism, Binder and Wood (2013: 270) examine how “campuses matter for 
political development” and describe how particular campus cultures produce distinct 
styles of political expression. Implicit in their claim that “political actors…are made, not 
born, as colleges nurture and enhance particular [ideological commitments]” is the 
presupposition that one of the core functions of higher education is to “provid[e] the 
cultural tools for constructing political selves.”140  
This socialization function of higher education, though, requires a specific type of 
campus setting, what King and Sen (2013: 85) call “high-touch” environments, because 
of their small class sizes, close interaction between faculty and students, and commitment 
to residence-based education.141 Binder and Wood (2013) show conservative students at 
“low touch” schools (i.e. larger class size, less time spent on campus) to be more 
ideologically rigid in their political discourse than students at high touch universities.142 
For a variety of reasons, most of which could be subsumed under the rubric of changing 
institutional “inputs,” access to (and demand for) high-touch experiences are rare in 
contemporary higher education. The challenges of democratization and state 
                                                             
140 Binder and Wood (2013: 9, 13). Emphases in original. 
141 On the positive learning outcomes of small class size, see Benton and Pallett (2013). 
142 Students at low touch colleges learn how to be politically engaged from other institutional 
agents of socialization (e.g. mass media, partisan organizations). The negative impact on 
collegiality is unmistakable in Binder and Wood’s case studies. 
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disinvestment have led well-intentioned critics like Shirky (2012) to herald the arrival of 
“no touch” online services like Coursera and Udacity that operate outside of (but 
increasingly with the support and collaboration of) traditional campus structures to 
provide “efficient” learning opportunities. Shirky welcomes these technological 
developments because of their potential to “unbundle” education, that is, provide students 
with a mechanism to gain the necessary skills to advance without being, in his words, 
“held hostage [by the] ransom of the current system.” In promoting this outcome-oriented 
approach that the purpose of higher education is solely to deliver credentials, Shirky (and 
others) overlook more process-oriented institutional functions including those relating to 
pedagogical aims and developmental objectives.143 
We will return to the consequences of these developments throughout the text, but 
at present, this example principally serves to demonstrate the process of institutional 
priority shifting. Seeking to be responsive to the presence of new actors, institutions 
broaden their focus to accommodate these groups and will assume greater responsibilities 
(institutional layering).144 Constituencies representing particular aims and interests 
compete for prominence, and inevitably some functions gain status with others becoming 
less central to institutional mission (institutional conversion). This chapter situates these 
                                                             
143 Due to its absence in virtually all of the commentary, it is unclear whether proponents of 
automated forms of education see political socialization as a positive externality, but not 
essential; an unnecessary luxury (and an incalculable one at that) that drives up costs; or simply 
outside the purview of post-secondary education in the twenty-first century and therefore, does 
not need to be addressed as part of this discussion. 
144 In examining the impact of the twentieth-century baby boom on higher education, Smelser 
(2012b) describes how “adaptive changes” implemented in response to particular generational 
features outlasted the specific cohort they were intended to accommodate. The unintended 
“ramifications” (i.e. educational consequences) of any institutional development are not often 
recognized until after the changes have solidified.     
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transformations of the contemporary era within a broader periodized history in order to 
chart the increased presence and significance of higher education in American life and to 
examine the effects of this centrality on institutional purpose(s). 
 
The Users of the University145 
During any historical period, the role of higher education in the United States 
signifies cultural expectations about institutional aims and objectives. Attitudinal shifts in 
the value of higher education – often driven by changing publics being served by the 
institution – lead to the adjustment of institutional prerogatives to meet stakeholder 
demands. These antecedent conditions (distal causes) produce distinct learning contexts 
that may result in the reordering of educational priorities and thereby imperil a sustained 
emphasis on preexisting institutional missions. The case of higher education may be seen, 
more generally, as a conduit to examine institutional transformation and American 
political development. 
The Inputs–Environment–Outcomes (I-E-O) model, developed by Astin (1993), is 
instructive in helping to conceptualize the socialization process this study seeks to 
explain.146 This intuitive approach to college impact theorizes that a range of student 
outcomes (e.g. changes in academic knowledge, social views, or political attitudes) are 
shaped by a combination of pre-college characteristics (inputs) and “contact” influences 
                                                             
145 The title of this section, a nod to Clark Kerr’s work cited above, is appropriated from Fraade 
(2013).  
146 For the sake of parsimony and clarity, I have appropriated Astin’s terms in this section, but it 
should not be assumed by the reader that all components of the I-E-O model are being assessed in 
this study or that any subsequent usage of these (common) words will be references to Astin’s 
work. For further discussion of Astin’s model, see Renn and Reason (2012: ix-xiii, chapter 9). 
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on campus (environment). As inputs shift (including the demographic composition of the 
student body and the motivations for college attendance) and environmental settings 
evolve (as measured, for example, by factors like curricular emphases and institutional 
goals), it is expected that outcomes will also change in the process. Regarding the 
specific relationship between higher education and political socialization, contemporary 
inputs (“predispositions to influence”147) such as enrollment figures, and environmental 
variables including the values conveyed in the most popular courses of study, would 
suggest a decreased influence on student political participation (as explained by extant 
scholarship).148 The claim is not that college students are politically disengaged, but 
rather that the idea of the university as an institutional venue for developing such civic 
capacities is both less present and less resonant in current political and economic 
circumstances.  
As Astin (1984: 298) postulates, student outcomes are “directly proportional to 
[the] quality and quantity of involvement.” In an historical era when students spend less 
time on campus (due to off-site responsibilities) and there are fewer demands for colleges 
and universities to promote curricula that foster specific kinds of socialization goals, 
limited gains in critical thinking and other developmental measures should be 
                                                             
147 Weidman (2006: 256-257). 
148 Political engagement among college students has historically been most negatively associated 
with the following characteristics: part-time matriculation; commuter status; non-traditional 
college-age (older); pursuit of degrees in STEM fields and practical arts programs (i.e. narrowly-
focused non-humanities and social sciences career paths). All of these (often overlapping) 
categories are increasingly represented in today’s college cohort. For a summary of relevant 
demographic data of contemporary students, see Center for Postsecondary and Economic Success 
(2011) and Renn and Reason (2012). 
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anticipated.149 Variation in the functional mechanisms that have been historically 
responsible for political socialization (proximate causes) helps, therefore, to explain 
student politics over time (in terms of style, substance, and overall presence). Figure 2.1 
summarizes the causal relationship being described in simple schematic form.  
Figure 2.1: Variation in Student Political Socialization  
 
Antecedent Factor (A)       Causal Factor (X) 
 
    Cultural Expectations for Higher Education    Institutional Mission and Curricular 
    Motivations for Attendance and the     Emphasis (Shifts in Each Historical Era as a 
    Boundaries of Population      Response to Institutional Context) 
 
    Changes in Inputs: Background and     Environmental Factors: External Influences on  
    Scope Conditions       Educational Aims and Objectives 
 
Causal Mechanism (M)        Outcome (Y) 
 
   Values Conveyed by Higher Education and    Student Political Participation (Distinct Styles, 
    Efforts at Political Learning/Socialization        Content of Issues, and Overall Presence) 
 
   How X generates Y       Relationship between Political Phenomenon  
   and Historical Time 
 
The national objectives for higher education vary due to the perceived (short-
term) needs of society during any given era. The rationale for higher education has 
transformed over time as the institution has gradually become more centrally positioned 
in American life. Changes in the expectations of higher education result in shifting 
institutional purposes. This project focuses on the consequences of these adaptations (in 
terms of institutional functions that may be lost or underserved in the process of 
transition). Cohen and Kisker (2010: 32) describe how  
 
                                                             
149 The deep engagement required for such learning to occur is simply less possible in particular 
educational settings (e.g. increased class size; non-residential and distance education) where close 
access to students is limited.  
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the curriculum responds to society and in turn shapes society. Curriculum is 
directed toward acculturating young people – their character formation, 
preparation for careers, access to society, language, and manners. Over time and 
among institutions the emphasis on one or a combination of these purposes shifts.  
 
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 depict this transformation in institutional growth through an 
increase of student enrollment and the number of degree-granting colleges and 
universities from 1800–2010. Figure 2.2 conveys changes in the scale of higher education 
by presenting enrollment as a proportion of total student-age population. Beginning in 
1800, we see how colleges (and universities upon their arrival in the latter third of the 
nineteenth century) have served an increasingly diverse and larger population over time. 
The first moment in American higher education where more than 2% of the traditional 
student-age population was attending college was at the turn of the twentieth century. As 
student enrollments increased – 4.7% in 1920, 7.2% in 1930 – the development of a self-
aware student body became visible.150 An exponential growth in enrollment rates 
occurred throughout the twentieth century as access to higher education widened (15% in 
1950) and motivations for college attendance broadened (51.4% in 1990). By 2010, 
66.5% of the student age population was pursuing some form of higher education 
instruction.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
150 This is not to suggest, though, that earlier students did not conceive of themselves as part of a 
generational cohort on their own campuses, but rather that a threshold of student enrollment had 
not yet been reached that would result in a distinct status. This issue is taken up in more detail in 
Chapter 3 of this text. 
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Figure 2.2: Student Enrollment, 1800–2010 
(As Percentage of Traditional Student-Age Population)151 
 
 
 
From 1800-1860, “traditional student-age” is measured as percent of white males, ages 15–20 (Burke 
1982). From 1860-2010, “traditional student-age” is measured as percent of population, ages 18-24 
(National Center for Education Statistics).      
 
Due to rapid growth in the total population during specific historical periods, 
presenting enrollment in ratio form is often more illustrative than simply providing raw 
numbers of college enrollment. From 1840–1870, for example, total enrollment grew 
from 8,328 students to 62,839 students, an increase of approximately 650 percent in only 
thirty years, but as a proportion of student-age population the enrollment only rose from 
1.1% to 1.3%. In the twentieth century, increases in raw totals more closely correspond to 
                                                             
151 National education statistics were not collected until 1869-70 with the creation of a federal 
office of education. Sources: 1800–1860: Burke (1982: 14, 18, 54); 1870–1990: National Center 
for Education Statistics, “Historical Summary of Higher Education Statistics.” In 120 Years of 
American Education: A Statistical Portrait. Thomas D. Snyder, ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Education, 1993), 75-77; 1999–2010: National Center for Education Statistics, 
“Historical Summary of Faculty, Enrollment, Degrees, and Finances in Degree-Granting 
Institutions: Selected Years, 1869–70 through 2009–10.” Digest of Education Statistics 2011. 
Thomas D. Snyder and Sally A. Dillow, eds. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education, 
2012), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d11/tables/dt11_197.asp; National Center for 
Education Statistics, “Enrollment Rates of 18- to 24-year-olds in Degree-Granting Institutions: 
1967–2010.” Digest of Education Statistics 2011. Thomas D. Snyder and Sally A. Dillow, eds. 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education, 2012), 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d11/tables/dt11_213.asp. 
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the changes in proportion to total student age population – from 238,000 in 1900 (2.3%) 
to 1.5 million in 1940 (9.1%) to 11.6 million in 1980 (38.8%) to 20.4 million in 2010 
(66.5%). While useful as a tool of data aggregation, employing a traditional-age measure 
(even a less restrictive one like the 18-24 utilized by the National Center for Education 
Statistics) is increasingly misleading (and will soon be outmoded) given the large 
increase in older “non-traditional” age students. While 66.5% of the 18-24 age 
demographic were enrolled in college in 2010, the largest number to date, 36% of all 
college students in 2010 were over the age of 25.152 
Figure 2.3 Number of Degree-Granting Institutions (1800–2010)153 
 
 
 
Illustrating changes in scope, Figure 2.3 shows an increase from approximately 
1,000 colleges at the beginning of the twentieth century to over 4,000 degree-granting 
institutions of higher education one-hundred years later. As higher education has trended 
                                                             
152 Center for Postsecondary and Economic Success (2011). Snyder and Dillow (2011: 292) 
predict that this number will rise to approximately 44% by 2020. 
153 See footnote 151 above for data sources. 
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toward (but not reached) demographic representativeness, this “pluralistic institution”154 
has been required to respond to many competing publics and altered cultural 
expectations. Increased demands and expanded audiences unsurprisingly led to a wider-
ranging institutional mandate. As Rudolph (1977: 247) pithily summarizes in his classic 
study of curricular developments in American higher education, “if in the nineteenth 
century the curriculum defined the market for higher learning, in the twentieth the market 
defined the curriculum.”  
Although the heterogeneity of the higher education system is not captured in 
Figure 2.3, distinctive characteristics may at times be overstated. Regarding institutional 
control, there has been a continuing trend toward secularization (from private to public) 
from the mid-twentieth century onward. In 1947, the earliest date that the National Center 
for Education Statistics calculates enrollment data by institutional control, 49% of 
students were enrolled in public colleges and universities. This proportion progressively 
increased and stabilized in the high seventy-percent range from 1980–2000, plateauing at 
almost 80% in 1990.155 Public enrollment declined to 72% by 2010, though not as a result 
of the reemergence of the non-profit private sector, but largely due to the increased 
market share being occupied by for-profit private universities.156 The distinction between 
private and public should not be downplayed (e.g. tuition costs); it can be overdrawn, 
                                                             
154 Kerr (2001: 103). 
155 Snyder and Dillow (2011: 290). 
156 The rise of for-profit education and the corporate business model that it represents is a 
significant institutional development and is an important aspect of any serious discussion about 
the present and future status of higher education in the United States. The system-wide diffusion 
of values and ideals associated with FPCUs is a theme to be revisited often throughout this 
project.   
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however, especially in a political and economic climate where both sectors face similar 
external forces looking to influence institutional missions.  
Being the recipients of public funds and accommodations (in the form, for 
example, of federal research grants, student loan payments, non-profit tax status), private 
colleges and universities are public in many senses; public institutions, as a result of 
declining state support, have increasingly relied upon the support of private funders 
(alumni, corporate patrons) whose own interests may or may not align with existing 
functional priorities. While private institutions may be more immune than their public 
counterparts to the perambulations of legislator’s threats to cut off funds because of 
curricular choices or institutional-sponsorship of “controversial” events, the rigid 
classification can often obscure rather than illuminate when the overarching concern – 
degree of institutional autonomy – applies to both non-profit private and public colleges 
and universities.157 One of the early critiques by the Free Speech Movement (at Berkeley) 
of higher education in the 1960s, which brought students and faculty together, was a 
concern over the increasingly permeable boundaries of higher education (which have 
become exponentially greater since then). The university, according to this view, must be 
sufficiently detached from the wider society so as not to compromise one of the nobler 
aims of higher education which is to offer informed social critique free of external 
pressures.158 Increased vulnerability, moreover, will often result in the abandonment of 
                                                             
157 It should be noted that institutional autonomy is not a new concern, although in type and 
emphasis it is period-specific. On college-state relations in the Early Republic and the influence 
of sectarian leaders at religiously-affiliated schools and politicians on governing boards, see 
Robson (1985: 236-250).  
158 Jewett (2012). 
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educational objectives that are not “directly impactful” being supplanted by institutional 
outcomes primarily driven by economic motivations.159  
While the dates in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 begin in 1800, our analysis throughout will 
also reference student experiences and institutional missions at the twenty colleges in 
operation before this date. The policy legacies of these early colleges and their continued 
influence today are inarguable. Despite the disproportionately small subset of students 
that are actually educated at the HYPs of higher education (Harvard, Yale, Princeton, et 
al.) relative to the entire system, these universities, for better and worse, shape general 
principles about the aims of higher education.160 In surveying longitudinal trends, choices 
must be made to present a narrative synthesis; the objective is to find a balance between 
lumping and splitting. Even though we find a coexistence of competing goals and 
proposed outcomes in every historical period, institutional perspectives (i.e. primary 
sources that serve as proxies for outcome preferences) have been chosen that represent 
the most influential voices while not overlooking less dominant visions (that have proven 
                                                             
159 The decline of liberal arts education may be understood as a symptom of the loss of autonomy, 
that is, a casualty of systemic growth. Approximately two-thirds of all college students were 
enrolled in liberal arts colleges and universities at the beginning of the 20th century. By mid-
century, this number declined to one-quarter, eight-percent by 1975, to its present status of less 
than one-percent. These numbers overstate the decline because of definitional imprecision – the 
Carnegie Classification system reaches their <1% calculation by looking at colleges that meet 
certain restrictive criteria (that were only implemented in 2005 and therefore make cross-
generational comparisons more difficult). Most students who receive liberal arts education attend 
colleges and universities not purely defined as such. The larger point remains that the 
contributions of the liberal arts are less central to the primary functions of higher education, 
increasingly viewed as an anachronism of a bygone era. 
160 As Delbanco (2012: 6) describes: “These institutions have established curricular norms, 
admissions procedures, financial aid principles, and even the rites and ceremonies of college 
life…it remains the case that it is these institutions through which the long arc of educational 
history can best be discerned. And if they have peculiar salience for understanding the past, they 
wield considerable influence in the present debate over which educational principles should be 
sustained, adapted, or abandoned in the future.” 
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to be increasingly noteworthy in retrospect). As a result, there is an understandable yet 
disproportionate focus on elite private colleges. These select schools (along with several 
public universities) guide our historical discussion because they have developed 
standards for which other schools strive and serve an agenda-setting function in 
contemporary debates. 
This project should not be considered, however, a study of elite colleges, but 
rather an examination of the institutional field in which these schools play an important 
signaling role to colleges and universities on lower tiers of the prestige hierarchy.161 This 
recognition, though, is not meant to diminish the significance of between-college effects 
(variation of student outcomes across different types of colleges) and/or within-college 
effects (variation of student outcomes across categories within specific colleges), but 
instead to help us both appreciate longer-term institutional developments and to highlight 
system-wide responses to changing cultural expectations. Indeed, local character and 
context matter. Binder and Wood (2013), for example, distinguish between the “civilized 
discourse” of campus conservatives at Eastern Elite (Harvard) versus the “provocative 
style” of their peers at Western Public (University of Colorado) and Einwohner and 
Spencer (2005) explain how “local culture” determined the framing of anti-sweatshop 
campaigns at two large Midwestern Universities.162 In research that explores, in part, the 
                                                             
161 See, for example, the 1907 letter by Wellesley College president Caroline Hazard to Harvard’s 
Charles Eliot where she asserts that “everyone in college work looks to you as the ultimate 
authority” As quoted in Nemec (2006: 15-16). 
162 In their recent movement to establish a living wage for campus workers, students at Baylor 
University (TX), the largest Baptist-affiliated university in the world, have employed culturally 
resonant frames to gain support for their cause. Naming their campus group the “1 John 3 
Campaign” – a reference to a biblical passage which instructs believers to aid the poor – leaders 
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relationship between institutional characteristics and curricular emphasis over the last 
three decades, Brint et al. (2005: 169-170) show that education in the liberal arts and 
sciences – seen by many scholars to be a predictor of political engagement and civic 
participation – is much greater in older colleges, single-sex colleges, and schools located 
in ideologically liberal regions of the United States while degree attainment in 
occupational fields is higher at public universities, evangelical colleges, and schools 
located in the “heartland regions” (e.g. industrial Midwest and the Southeast).        
Though institutional culture remains a distinctive factor in certain (non-
representative) campus environments, a strong case can be made that as higher education 
has democratized and broadened its target audience, the ends of education have become 
increasingly similar at all levels of higher education. At the formative stage of 
institutional development, differentiation was initially shaped by a lack of federal 
involvement and restrictive admission policies (toward potential students who were not 
white males). The colleges and universities that were created when minority access was 
limited have been neither monolithic nor static in their missions, embodying different 
aims during specific periods of institutional history.163 These minority-serving 
institutions164 were established to educate underserved demographic groups in higher 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
have structured their grievance in language that appeals to their (largely) Christian audience. 
(Graham-Felsen 2006). The classic statement on institutional character in higher education 
remains Clark’s 1972 research on sagas and organizational self-belief. Reprinted in Clark (2008: 
53-64). 
163 On the hybrid focus of most contemporary HBCUs, see Gasman and McMickens (2010). For a 
comparative analysis of curricular content at HBCUs and tribal colleges and universities (TCUs), 
see Cole (2006). 
164 It should be clarified that just because the greatest number of African Americans may 
currently attend the University of Phoenix does not make it “minority serving,” except in the most 
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education and because of this founding mission, many of these colleges regard social 
justice and political socialization as part of their institutional mandates.165  
Due to the countervailing forces of status emulation and popular demand, 
institutional growth has resulted in increased homogenization, not differentiation, of 
purpose in American higher education. Colleges have sought to pattern themselves after 
the most elite universities in terms of range of functions, despite the result usually being 
“not a replication…so much as a pale imitation.”166 Brubacher and Rudy (1997: 100) 
describe this phenomenon as a combination of horizontal expansion (more subjects 
covered, greater breadth of focus) and vertical expansion (graduate training, further depth 
of study). Concurrent with these aspirational efforts, colleges and universities, beginning 
with less prestigious schools but gradually permeating all institutional strata, have been 
infused with a vocational spirit spurred on by constituent request for “practicality” such 
that the overall purpose of higher education is now commonly identified by its “exchange 
value…rather than its use value.”167  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
literal sense. As evidenced by President John Sperling’s statements quoted above in chapter 1, the 
self-conception of Phoenix is one of credentialization, not socialization. 
165 Examples include women’s colleges (Bank and Yelon (2003); Geiger (2000); and Miller-
Bernal and Poulson (2007)); historically black colleges and universities (Allen, Jewell, Griffin, 
and Wolf (2007); Brown and Freedman (2004); Drewry and Doermann (2003); and Roebuck and 
Murty (1993)); and religiously-affiliated institutions (Benne (2001); Dovre (2002); Litfin (2004); 
and Riley (2004)). 
166 Labaree (2006: 11). 
167 Labaree (2006: 14). In summary form: institutional dynamics produced a system of unequal 
paths to a convergence of desired outcomes. 
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What are the impacts of these systemic developments on student learning, and 
how have trends in institutional mission influenced student political socialization?168 
What accounts for the important differences we find between similar groups (students) in 
different political and cultural contexts? A temporal focus, which situates the 
contemporary era within a longer institutional history, is required to examine these 
questions across time and to determine the critical junctures that have had enduring 
consequences. Through this historical periodization approach, we can gain greater 
empirical purchase over the mechanisms that facilitate (or impede) college youth political 
involvement while considering the evolving institutional objectives of higher education in 
American life.  
 
From a “Land of Colleges” to a World of MOOCs:  
Paradigm Adjustments in Higher Education 
An instructive way to analyze the directionality of changes is through 
periodization, which Polsky (2005: 523) defines as the “division of historical time into 
discrete units.” Periodization schemes are best understood as heuristic devices used to 
synthesize historical trends.169 The objective is to explain long-term shifts while avoiding 
                                                             
168 As Trow (2005: 36) ponders, “[h]ow successfully… does a system continue to perform elite 
functions, when the emphasis of the system has shifted to the forms and functions of mass higher 
education?” 
169 In their excellent single-volume history of American higher education, Cohen and Kisker 
(2010: 3) delineate between a trend (“a long-term movement that points in a consistent 
direction”), an event (“a specific occurrence that marks the progression of a trend”), a topic (“a 
cluster of trends and events”), and an era (“a chronological distinction marked by a number of 
events”).  
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“foreground myopia,”170 that is, promising too much. The most useful periodization 
schemes avoid both over-generalization and lack of cohesion in an effort to “call 
attention to significant historical transitions.”171 “Temporal partitions,”172 which 
demarcate the beginning and end points of each “self-aware”173 historical period, are 
determined by the presence of critical junctures that trace the process of institutional 
development.174 At the most general level, critical junctures can be understood as 
representations of institutional status that inform the construction of a temporal typology. 
Signifying a range of responses to changes in scope conditions, critical junctures may 
depict, for example, institutional shifts in focus, reaffirmations of jeopardized principles, 
consolidations of functional responsibilities, or broadenings of priorities. Critical 
junctures, therefore, demonstrate the variability of institutional logics (i.e. reasons for 
being) triggered by the arrival of stakeholders promoting agendas that were less dominant 
in prior historical periods.  
                                                             
170 Polsky (2005: 528). 
171 Polsky (2005: 523). One must acknowledge the imperfect precision of all efforts at periodicity. 
Attempting to measure the mood of an historical era (esprit du siècle) is an ambitious aim, and 
while gauging the influence of contemporary testimonies (that serve as proxy measures for 
institutional outcome preferences) may be an inexact undertaking, there are many fine examples 
of longitudinal research – including several studies that focus on higher education – that provide 
causal insights that are inaccessible in less mechanismic research designs. The reader will 
ultimately determine whether the advantages of this approach outweigh any methodological 
shortcomings. 
172 Polsky (2005: 523). 
173 Polsky (2005: 524) employs this evocative term to describe the tendency of political actors to 
comprehend their own role in history, an “appreciat[ion] that they were in the midst of profound 
changes.” 
174 Without using the terminology, Cohen and Kisker (2010: 6) describe the conceptual intentions 
of “critical junctures” when they reference “major events cluster[ing] around the cleavage lines 
separating the eras.” 
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Specific to the periodization of higher education, critical junctures relate to 
institutional expectations for each historical era and can be communicated through 
campus voices and off-campus influencers.175 The former refers to the dissemination of 
documents (e.g. presidential speeches, curricular reports, and position papers) by 
administrators, faculty, and students while the latter speaks to legislative actions, national 
commissions, and views advanced by intervening actors (including foundations, 
corporations, and mass public opinion).176 Through their words and deeds, both sets of 
groups seek to advance a particular institutional conception (what are colleges and 
universities for?) and support a curricular mission that promotes this vision. During all 
eras, the competing aims for higher education reflect a constellation of particular values 
and historical circumstances. Higher education, similar to other centrally-located 
institutions, is an “expression of the age”177 and, accordingly, the institutional priorities 
identified will illuminate historical patterns and provide thematic insights about the 
period in which the institution is situated. 
The study of discrete historical periods requires the use of distinctive kinds of 
textual evidence. For example, student politics was less organizationally embedded prior 
to the early 20th century because there was not yet a critical mass of students to 
                                                             
175 The periodization of higher education aids scholars in “understanding the processes of change 
and aggregating such changes to discern fundamental transformations in the entire system of 
higher education” (Geiger 1999: 38).   
176 Capoccia and Kelemen (2007: 354, 357) assert that “we can consider the analysis of critical 
junctures as the analysis of decision making under conditions of uncertainty…Aspects 
[considered salient] include the main actors, their goals, preferences, decisions, and the events 
that directly influenced them.”  
177 Abraham Flexner, as quoted in Kerr (1994: 45). As Remnick (2013) remarks in a New Yorker 
article on the Bolshoi Ballet, “an institution has an uncanny way of embodying the society to 
which it belongs.”  
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participate.178 Scholars have often referred to the antiwar mobilizations of the 1930s as 
the “first student movement” (Brax 1981). The smaller size and scope of the college in 
American life during earlier eras, however, does not mean that civic engagement was 
missing on campus, but rather the ways in which students documented their participation 
as well as their class origins and social commitments were different than in later 
periods.179 Until the second half of the twentieth century when it garnered a reputation as 
a bastion of liberalism,180 colleges and universities had traditionally been perceived by 
the broader public as conservative places, both dispositionally and attitudinally.181 
Character formation and citizenship training may not necessarily be intended for 
progressive outcomes; student socialization, as demonstrated throughout this study, 
remains subject to the influence of period effects on institutional purpose.182  
                                                             
178 There are historical exceptions, several of which will be explored in subsequent chapters. For 
example, see McLachlan’s (1974a) landmark study on the organizational capacities and cultural 
impact of student literary and debate societies during the early nineteenth century.  
179 Concerning documentation of the student experience, it is important to note that many possible 
objects of scholarly interest were lost over time. Writings and other cultural artifacts from early 
historical eras must therefore be considered illustrative rather than comprehensive as most non-
elite colleges lacked resources (or interest) to archive student records. In addition, student 
documents were not deemed worthy of serious academic study until the burgeoning study of 
social history and material culture in the late 1960s. See Gordon (1986: 132-133) and Swain 
(2005: 113-114).   
180 Some scholars (e.g. Schrecker 2010; Messer-Davidow 1993) have argued that changes in 
public perceptions are mainly due to the effectiveness of a decades-long “manufactured 
campaign” against the academy by right-wing moneyed elites. 
181 Sugrue (2000) offers an especially vivid example of reactionary education in the ante-bellum 
south. At South Carolina College (current-day University of South Carolina), the college’s aim 
was to raise “honorable gentlemen leaders” by imparting the justifications for segregationist 
politics. See also Reuben’s more general comments in Rorty, Marsden, and Reuben (2000) on 
institutional conservatism in higher education. 
182 Liberal arts education can both inspire an anti-imperialist manifesto like the Port Huron 
Statement and serve useful as “democratic propaganda,” a term employed by Allardyce (1982: 
706) to describe the interventionist goals of the Contemporary civilization course at Columbia 
during the buildup to World War I.   
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National involvement in higher education (in the form of presidential 
commissions and legislative actions) gradually increases over time. Although there was 
considerable debate during the Early Republic regarding the desirability of what James 
Madison termed a national “seminary of learning”183 – indeed, the first six presidents 
proposed creation of such a school for purposes of unity and reputation184 – the system of 
post-secondary education remained decentralized, loosely coupled, and primarily 
dedicated to the preparation of the elite until the establishment of the land-grant system in 
the mid to late nineteenth century. By becoming less demographically homogenous and 
through the broadening of institutional missions, universities soon would play a more 
significant role in American life. As enrollments grew and the institution began to 
democratize, access became an important principle of higher education. Largely due to 
the efforts of campus presidents, who were instrumental in promoting university 
expansion, national leadership understood that the emergent institution fell within the 
jurisdictional oversight of the federal government. The role of the university presidency 
transformed with this institutional growth; occupants of the office evolved (as the adage 
goes) from “thinkers in chief to fundraisers in chief.” There have been many 
consequences to an increased role of higher education in society, including an apparent 
reluctance by campus executives to provide vocal leadership on public issues out of 
                                                             
183 “James Madison on a National University, 1810.” In Hofstadter and Smith (1961: 177). See 
also Brubacher and Rudy (1997: 219-222); Robson (1985: 228-236). 
184 Throughout institutional history, there have been intermittent demands for a national 
university, including the appeal by Edwin Anderson Alderman, the first president of the 
University of Virginia, who used his 1905 installation ceremony address to proclaim that “the 
building of a national university of modern type [located] in the South is the great opportunity to 
benefit the Republic now offered to the wisdom of the States and imagination of far reaching 
men.” As quoted in Nemec (2006: 35). 
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concern over alienating current (or potential) institutional patrons. As articulated by Rev. 
Theodore M. Hesburgh (2001), president emeritus of Notre Dame, this is a regrettable 
development largely because of the example it sets and the lesson it teaches to the 
institution’s chief constituency: 
Today’s college presidents appear to have taken Voltaire’s advice to cultivate 
their own gardens – and…they are doing that very well…We cannot urge 
students, [though], to have the courage to speak out unless we are willing to do so 
ourselves.185 
 
Institutional expansion will always raise broader questions of institutional 
purpose. In the case of higher education, how do colleges and universities conceive of 
their role as shapers of public citizenship and how has this task of democratic cultivation 
shifted as institutional functions and prospective stakeholders have increased over 
time?186 The blurring of the lines between school and society results in debates about 
mission and disagreements over relevance (both within and beyond the college gates).187 
Institutional priorities will vary depending upon how the notion of relevance is defined 
during any historical period; moreover, a particular view of relevance – purely in tangible 
economic terms or understood by more civic and democratic measures of influence – is 
                                                             
185 In this spirit, Sherman (2013) shares a telling anecdote about institutional priorities based on 
an interview with Stanley Katz, an eminent higher education scholar at Princeton. Katz recounts 
the story of a recent presidential search committee for a “major Southern university” on which he 
was asked to serve. When a top candidate, who eventually received the job, was asked, “what is 
your educational vision?” the interviewee, without hesitation, responded, “I don’t have an 
educational vision. That’s the job of a provost.”   
186 On citizenship aims and the changing social compact throughout the history of American 
higher education, see Talcott (2005) and Loss (2011).    
187 “Taking the campus to the state,” Kerr (2001: 20) explains, “brings the state to the campus.” 
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linked to expectations of higher education.188 We encounter competing demands for 
distinct types of relevance throughout the history of American higher education, and 
while trends suggest an increasing preponderance of demands for economic relevance 
among publics in recent decades, there have always been “punctuated counter 
statements”189 endorsed by advocates of more socially-engaged perspectives. This 
resistance can be traditionalist in outlook and speak to the preservation of possibly-
threatened ideals,190 or less nostalgically, the counter-movement can seek to make use of 
the institution’s “permanent position of social influence” (as per the goals of the Port 
Huron Statement) to critically pursue yet unrealized ideals.     
It can be said that the objective of both the Yale College Report of 1828, which 
was a collection of curricular reports that were written in defense of a classical liberal arts 
education,191 and the Bayh and Dole Patent and Trademark Amendments of 1980, which 
granted universities proprietary rights for government-funded research, was to clarify 
higher education’s role in “knowledge transfer.” The specific historical context and 
                                                             
188 The contrasting curricular choices made by students during the Great Depression to students 
facing economic insecurities in the present historical era demonstrate the influence of period 
effects on institutional relevance. As Rudolph (1977: 248) explains, the “collapse of the job 
market in the 1930s directed students away from specialized education of limited use to courses 
of a more general nature.” Among contemporary student cohorts, we do not find a commitment to 
the liberal arts nor do we see political elites in these times of uncertainty proposing policies to 
support non-vocational forms of higher education. 
189 Smelser (2012a: 14). 
190 Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia University for four decades beginning at the 
turn of the twentieth century, was a strong conservative voice of opposition declaring in 1918 that 
“the more men and women who are being trained up to twenty-one years of age without any 
reference whatever to a particular vocation or occupation, the better for the citizenship, the 
intelligence, and the moral and spiritual life of the nation.” Quoted in Allardyce (1982: 703). See 
Reuben (1996) for a thoughtful examination of the era’s institutional developments. 
191 See Potts (2010). 
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particular stage of development, however, produced not only entirely different 
connotations of the term, but also distinctive institutional purposes. If student politics are 
influenced by institutional purpose, during historical eras when missions are less publicly 
directed – e.g. a lack of emphasis on character formation, critical thinking, and civic 
development – we should expect to see the consequences of this functional conversion on 
student political socialization. Institutional mission may not always be the most relevant 
factor shaping student politics, but the intent of the historical analysis is to demonstrate 
the (previously under-recognized) plausibility of its significant impact in a given context. 
Indeed, an historical narrative of institutional evolution is required to carefully appraise 
the contemporary politics of higher education. The objective, therefore, is to evaluate 
how student political engagement has been influenced by variations in institutional 
mission and conditioned by periodic shifts in national context (i.e. institutional status and 
societal expectations of higher education).192  
Previous scholarship has endeavored to periodize higher education; this present 
study is notable, however, for its combination of interdisciplinary foundations, theoretical 
ambitions, and empirical aims. There is an overlap of substantive interests with both 
historians and sociologists who specialize in the study of higher education. However, the 
primary historical focus on thick description (as an end in itself)193 and the chief 
                                                             
192 Teske (1997: 50) reminds us of the simple yet noteworthy point that “understanding the 
background or context in which some action or series of actions takes place is crucial to 
understanding that action or series of actions.” 
193 Historical research on higher education should not be confused with textbook coverage of the 
topic. Textbooks are also works of historical synthesis; the best among them (for example, 
Brubacher and Rudy (1997), Lucas (2006), and Thelin (2004) are excellent introductions to the 
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sociological concern over stratification and class inequality, while both essential to any 
longitudinal approach to higher education, remain somewhat parallel – distinctive yet 
complementary – to scholars working within the framework of American political 
development. As evident by the copious references to historical and sociological work 
throughout the text, research within these disciplines deeply inform the analysis, but APD 
research utilizes temporal traditions and structural perspectives for the more general 
purpose of examining institutional evolution in the context of state development.   
The historical scheme constructed incorporates components of several systemic 
characterizations which are beneficial to the understanding of student political 
socialization. Particularly valuable for our present purposes are Geiger’s (1999, 2010) 
historical research that stresses experiential and generational factors,194 Trow’s (2005) 
ideal-types model which focuses on sequential stages of institutional development 
(determined by growth of enrollment data),195 and Williams’ (2006) exploration of shifts 
in government involvement and external interests from the era of the “sectarian college” 
to the “post-welfare state” university, what the author terms institutional “moments 
punctuating the plot.”196 While situating his study within APD scholarship, Loss’ (2011) 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
relevant literature and quite useful for background reading, but are often intended for a broader 
(non-scholarly) audience. 
194 “Between origins and destinations,” Geiger (1999: 39) writes, “lies the college experience 
itself.”  
195 The three conceptions of higher education that Trow (2005) proposes – elite, mass, and 
universal – can coexist in most Western contexts, but institutional functions associated with the 
first two stages become less possible (and desirable) in a system motivated by universal 
participation. See Trow (2005: 36-37) and Brennan (2004: 23). 
196 Williams (2006: 190). 
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excellent book is oriented toward an explanation of twentieth century institutional 
developments and pays comparatively little attention to student political socialization.    
Attitudes about the purpose(s) of higher education are temporally contingent. 
Historical eras cultivate constituent demands placed-upon, and services offered by, 
institutions, which reveal period-specific contexts. To determine the influence of 
institutional development on student politics, I analyze contemporary documentary 
accounts and observe how discourses of higher education embody a spectrum of outcome 
preferences that differ in their emphasis on the aim of political socialization.197 Presented 
in chapter 1, this continuum of institutional identities – liberal arts education; citizenship 
preparation; occupational training; and advanced research – is not mutually exclusive. 
The prevalence of each educational vision, though, does vary across time. Ranging from 
cultural expectations, demographic shifts, and major fields of study to the role of faculty 
and responses to external pressures, institutional trends (reflected in the movement away 
from the liberal arts and citizenship preparation models and directed toward the 
occupational training and advanced research types) indicate a decline in those factors 
previously associated with student political engagement. As higher education has 
transitioned from an elite-serving to a mass-public to a universal-access institution, “there 
is less emphasis on the ‘developmental growth of the individual student.’”198  
                                                             
197 While a clear association, for example, has been found between liberal arts education and 
political engagement (the causal pathway being the link between curiosity, critique, and action), 
this relationship is eminently reasonable but not certain. On the possibility of liberal education 
leading to civic disengagement, see Marks (2013).  
198 Kerr (2001: 144). Labaree (2006: 3) claims, moreover, that institutional entrepreneurs in the 
United States created three distinctive forms of higher education – the land grant college; the 
normal school (for elementary and secondary-school teachers); and the junior/community college 
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We can now introduce the historical periods of institutional development and 
preview some of the conceptual and empirical concerns that are examined at length in 
chapters three–five. Proceeding from institutional origins to the present, I identify five 
temporal eras – elite (colonial period to civil war); expansion (1862–1900); emergent 
(1900–1944); egalitarian (1944–1980); and economic necessity (1980–contemporary) – 
that depict change and continuity in U.S. higher education. Within each historical period, 
I analyze how colleges and universities have served as agents of political socialization in 
specific sociopolitical and curricular contexts and consider how institutional trends help 
to explain variation in student politics over time. Representing various motivations and 
competing institutional preferences, we find a range of perspectives about the purpose(s) 
of higher education. As its status has periodically shifted from the colonial era to the 
contemporary era and its location has become increasingly central, higher education, in 
each iterative stage of institutional development, has advanced in conception from a 
privilege for a small-subset of American society, to an opportunity for demographic 
groups previously excluded to discover a greater set of life-options, to a democratic right 
for any student wishing to pursue post-secondary instruction, to an obligation for all who 
seek social and economic mobility. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
– all of which were designed as institutional spaces for vocational training. Over time, the values 
stressed by these American “inventions” migrated to other sectors of higher education and helped 
to transmogrify the purpose of the entire system of higher education. In broad strokes, we might 
say that vocational tools expanded at the social cost of civic tools. 
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The elite era of higher education is our institutional point of departure.199 Despite 
serving few students, colleges from the colonial to antebellum eras are fundamental to an 
understanding of the higher education system, past and present.200 The “organizational 
imprints” (Johnson 2007) of this formative period endure. Educating less than one-
percent of the traditional student-age population throughout much of the elite era, higher 
education may have been peripheral as measured by institutional size, yet not in terms of 
cultural influence or social aims.201 Beginning with the founding of Harvard College in 
1636, higher education in colonial America was considered vital to societal formation 
and political development. While the earliest colleges established were affiliated with 
religious denominations, their purpose was not simply to train clergy, but rather to 
promote a tradition of serious contemplation and study, of which faith was but one 
significant component.202 Higher education was thought to be especially important for 
                                                             
199 A brief comment on nomenclature and objectives is in order: In Trow’s (2005) typology, elite 
education is defined by college enrollment of 0-15% of the relevant age group. By this criterion, 
American higher education would be considered elite from its founding period until around 1950, 
a mass institution (serving 16-50%) from 1950-1985, and a universal access institution (over 
50%) for less than 30 years. Notwithstanding its efficiency, Trow’s classification is somewhat 
reductive and therefore not as useful for our present purposes. Conversely, the specificity of 
Geiger’s (1999, 2010) thirty-year generational intervals are immensely informative, but in 
prioritizing comprehensiveness, the model lacks synthesis. (The era of elite education posited in 
this project, for example, comprises five distinct temporal eras – Reformation Beginnings; 
Colonial Colleges; Republican Education; Passing of Republican Education; Classical 
Denominational – in Geiger’s (1999) taxonomy.) The objective here, therefore, is to be more 
systematic than Trow (2005), but also more integrative than Geiger (1999, 2010). 
200 On historical antecedents of the U.S. system, see Lucas (2006: 3-100) on higher education 
during antiquity, the medieval, and post-medieval eras. See also Van Engen (2000).  
201 In 1800, 1,156 students (.59% of student-age population) were enrolled in twenty colleges. By 
1860, there were 16,600 students (1.18% of student-age population) enrolled in two-hundred 
seventeen colleges. See Figures 2.2 and 2.3 above for a visual illustration of these historical 
trends. 
202 In 1633, John Eliot, a Christian missionary and future member of the Board of Overseers at 
Harvard, encouraged the establishment of a “college among us,” a “place for the exercise of 
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youth from affluent backgrounds; it was the duty of the upper classes not to take their 
rarefied circumstances for granted and to be properly educated to participate in civic 
life.203  
Student politicization, as detailed in Chapter 3 below, was stimulated by course 
readings during the revolutionary era and then thwarted through curricular choices made 
by administrators at the turn of the nineteenth century in response to “unruly” student 
behavior. Course curricula during the elite era are characterized by Geiger (1999: 43) as 
personifying “republican Christian enlightenment.” The political principles embodied in 
this “harmonious joining of disparate elements” helped to foster insubordination and 
criticism of existing norms among students, first (with faculty) against the British 
crown,204 and then against college authorities during the Early Republic in the form of 
student protests against compulsory chapel attendance and objectionable dining hall 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Learning…not only in divinity: but in other arts and sciences, and in law also; for that would be 
very material for the welfare of our common wealth…If we [nourish] not Learning, both church 
and commonwealth will sink.” “A College First Proposed for Massachusetts Bay, 1633.” In 
Hofstadter and Smith (1961: 5-6) 
203 As John Witherspoon (1772), then-president of the College of New Jersey (now Princeton 
University) and later signatory to the Declaration of Independence, claims in a speech to wealthy 
Englishmen in the West Indies, it was necessary for “the children of persons in the higher ranks 
of life” to receive a “well conducted education” so that they can be useful contributors to society. 
Witherspoon elaborates that “the station in which they enter upon life, requires such duties, as 
those of the finest talents can scarcely be supposed capable of, unless they have been improved 
and cultivated with the utmost care. [Liberal education] is generally a preservative from 
vices….It is also of acknowledged necessity to those who do not wish to live for themselves 
alone, but would apply their talents to the service of the public and the good of mankind.” “John 
Witherspoon’s Account of the College of New Jersey, 1772.” In Hofstadter and Smith (1961: 
137-138). See Delbanco (2012: 134, 138) on the concept of noblesse oblige and its decline in 
modern American life. 
204 On the role that colleges played in the nation’s founding, Rudy (1996: 47) contends that “men 
of academe (students, instructors, college presidents) comprised an influential elite that led the 
way in formulating colonial demands and eventually in crafting proposals for a new political 
entity in North America.” 
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conditions (e.g. Rotten Cabbage Rebellion of 1807).205 Student resistance was especially 
prominent at colleges associated with the republican learning tradition. Recognizing the 
role of the curriculum in inspiring student engagement (of a kind inimical to campus 
authority), some colleges began to revert back to strict instruction of classical languages 
which were seen as a “bulwark of dangerous ideas.”206 Within this historical context, the 
Yale College Report of 1828 – “the most important educational document written in 
America before the Civil War”207 – was published. Noteworthy for its energetic defense 
of a classical curriculum, the report sought to counteract burgeoning calls for a more 
practical (or advanced) type of college education and to provide a clear (and 
uncompromising) statement of institutional mission. The aim of higher education in the 
United States was “not to teach that which is peculiar to any one of the professions, but to 
lay the foundation which is common to them all.”208 
Those sympathetic to the principles espoused in the Yale Report were stewards of 
an institutional purpose whose appeal would decline as higher education expanded. To 
get a sense of the growing institutional parameters in the mid-nineteenth century, one can 
simply contrast the notion of college outlined in the Yale Report with Ezra Cornell’s 
motto for his eponymous university: “I would found an institution where any person can 
find instruction in any study.” Founded in 1865, near the beginning of what I am calling 
                                                             
205 Novak (1977: 56) argues that these “campus rebellions offered students a form of surrogate 
political activity, with even ostensibly nonpolitical disorders being unmistakably political in 
function.” 
206 Novak (1977: 166). 
207 Hofstadter and Smith (1961: viii). 
208 “Original Papers in Relation to a Course of Liberal Education.” American Journal of Science 
and Arts 15 (January 1829), 303. 
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the era of expansion, Cornell University was chartered as the first land-grant state 
university in New York209 during a historical period when the federal government had 
begun to express an interest in higher education participating in the economic 
development of the rapidly industrializing nation.210  
Expansion can be understood both in numerical and functional terms. Based on 
the data compiled in Figures 2.2 and 2.3, we find an increase from 16,600 students and 
217 degree-granting colleges and universities in 1860 to almost 238,000 students and 977 
degree-granting colleges and universities by 1900. Despite this institutional growth, some 
scholars have suggested that college communities were both less vocal and politically 
influential during the civil war and reconstruction periods compared to the revolutionary 
war period because there was “less openly voiced opposition on the campuses to the 
dominant sectional orthodoxy.”211 There were, however, some political efforts in mid-
nineteenth century higher education that will be discussed in Chapter 3; for example, 
following the lead of coeducational and racially integrated Oberlin College in Ohio (the 
                                                             
209 Because of its hybrid public-private model, Cornell University is unique among its peers in the 
Ivy League. The three college units that were part of the original New York State land grant 
(Agriculture and Life Sciences, Human Ecology, and Industrial and Labor Relations) maintain 
their public status while four other undergraduate schools (Arts and Sciences, Engineering, Hotel 
Administration, and Engineering) are considered units of a private research university. 
210 The United States Bureau of Education (USBE), the first federal agency tasked with 
education, was established in 1867. In a nation skeptical of state power, the USBE had minimal 
responsibilities and virtually no power. Barrow (1992: 433) explains that the organization was 
expected only to “administer the disbursement of federal lands to the newly established land-
grant colleges; create and administer a common school system for Alaskan natives; and to collect 
and distribute statistics on education.” 
211 Rudy (1996: 96). 
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college with the largest enrollment in 1850), students and faculty at progressively-minded 
colleges throughout the Midwest campaigned for abolition during the antebellum era.212  
While the increase in student enrollment from the 1862 passage of the Morrill 
Land Grant Act (the critical juncture that bookends the era of expansion) to 1900 only 
represents a small percentage among the total-student age population,213 growth is also 
suggested by changing discursive environments – that is, how the purpose of higher 
education is communicated by institutional and political leaders. In its emphasis on 
industrial and agricultural skill acquisition, the Morrill Act expanded the mission of 
higher education and laid the basis for future utilitarian aims.214 The idea of the institution 
as knowledge generator and economic contributor to society was underscored by the 
passage of the Hatch Act (1887), which funded agricultural experiments at land-grant 
colleges and universities. The Hatch Act was a harbinger of the significant role that 
sponsored research would play at later stages of institutional development. The beginning 
of the state university system in the mid to late nineteenth century coincided with a 
                                                             
212 See e.g., “J.H. Fairchild on the Antislavery Commitment of Oberlin, 1833-34” and 
“Antislavery Sentiment at Illinois College, 1837.” In Hofstadter and Smith (1961: 419-433, 433-
434); Rudy (1996: 52-53). On slavery apologism on Southern campuses, see Sugrue (2000). For 
more about student curricular and co-curricular experiences during this era, see the review of 
student memoirs and novels by Geiger and Bibloz (2000). 
213 Some of this numerical growth may be a byproduct of the rise of compulsory schooling laws 
during the same historical period. Greater numbers of students were completing secondary forms 
of education and were therefore potential aspirants to higher education. 
214 The Morrill Act was initially opposed by members of Congress, mostly from the South, out of 
fears of federal overreach. Senator Clement Clay (D-AL) called the bill “one of the most 
monstrous, iniquitous and dangerous measures which have ever been submitted to Congress.” It 
is not a coincidence that the legislation, which was originally proposed by Justin Morrill (R-VT) 
in 1856, did not pass until 1862 during the Civil War when representatives from the Confederate 
states were no longer serving in the U.S. Congress. See Staley (2013). 
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gradual institutional drift away from religious sectarianism.215 Reuben (1996) describes 
this institutional turning point well in her book on “intellectual transformation and the 
marginalization of morality” and explains how the search for scientific knowledge 
resulted in a deemphasis of received religious truths.216 
The next historical period, which I term the era of emergence, begins at the turn 
of the twentieth century and ends with the passage of the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act 
of 1944 (GI Bill). This transitional era, which will be detailed in Chapter 4, both 
solidifies institutional developments of the multipurpose era of expansion such as the 
increased focus on faculty specialization and the greater curricular choice for students 
and portends many of the challenges faced in later periods due to the expanded federal 
role in higher education and the onset of mass enrollment. Despite these institutional 
trends, there remained thoughtful advocates during the era of emergence committed to 
the preservation, promotion, (and modernization) of a social and civic mission for higher 
education. 
Reflecting on these developments, Woodrow Wilson (1896) cautioned his peers 
against abandoning the democratic functions embodied in the past claiming that “not all 
                                                             
215 As Andrew D. White, the co-founder and first president of Cornell University professed, “my 
university should be under control of no single religious organization; it should be free from all 
sectarian or party trammels; in electing its trustees and professors no questions should be asked as 
to their belief or their attachment to this or that sect or party.” “The ‘Cornell Idea’ Forms in 
White’s Mind, 1860-65,” and “Organizing Cornell.” In Hofstadter and Smith (1961: 550). 
216 Colleges and universities would continue to allude to their religiously informed background, 
but increasingly often as a historical reference point rather than a day-to-day guide to institutional 
practices. In a more contemporary context, Duane Litfin (2004), former president of Wheaton 
College (IL), speaks of the difference between “religious colleges that are ‘umbrella institutions’ 
(where a sponsoring faith may be more visible, but other faiths are welcome to be visible as well) 
and ‘systemic institutions’ like Wheaton, where a single faith is omnipresent in the entire 
institution.” Quoted in Jaschik (2010).  
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change is progress, not all growth is the manifestation of life.”217 Wilson, professor of 
jurisprudence at Princeton at the time, affirms that  
It is plain that it is the duty of an institution of learning set in the midst of a free 
population and amidst signs of social change, not merely to implant a sense of 
duty, but to illuminate duty by every lesson that can be drawn out of the past.218 
 
To those skeptical of institutional change, higher education, in addition to being 
democratically useful, should also pursue liberal aims, what Alexander Meiklejohn, 
pioneer of the Experimental College at the University of Wisconsin in the early 1930s, 
called the process of “making minds.”219 Reacting to the growth of the elective system 
and the specter of increased vocationalism, Meiklejohn, and other proponents of General 
Education including Robert Hutchins at the University of Chicago and Nicholas Murray 
Butler at Columbia University, sought a return to the common core curriculum (albeit one 
with more contemporary resonance).220 
The rise of the General Education counter-movement is one of many longer-term 
effects of the Morrill Act (1862) and the applied mission for higher education it 
embraced. Enacted during the Civil War, the impacts of the land grant act were still being 
felt during the era of emergence, in both anticipated and unexpected ways. There were 
                                                             
217 “Woodrow Wilson on ‘Princeton in the Nation’s Service,’ 1896.” In Hofstadter and Smith 
(1961: 689). 
218 Hofstadter and Smith (1961: 689). On a social utilitarian mission for the nation’s state 
universities, President Edmund J. James of the University of Illinois in 1905 desired that his 
university would serve as “great civil service academy, preparing the young men and women of 
the state for the civil service of the state, the county, the municipality, and the township.” Quoted 
in (Lucas 2006: 182).   
219 See Goodchild (1999: 7-10, 20); Nelson (2001). 
220 As Woodrow Wilson (1904) remarked while serving as president of Princeton, the university 
should be “not a place of special but general education, not a place where a lad finds his 
profession, but a place where he find himself.” Quoted in Lucas (2006: 220). 
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greater opportunities for students from backgrounds not traditionally served by private 
colleges to now pursue higher education at public state universities. This development 
ultimately led to larger and more economically and politically diverse student body, a 
broader social base of young adults who could potentially organize collectively around 
domestic issues and foreign affairs.221 A less studied influence of the Morrill Act is how a 
brief clause in the legislation (which enumerated that state funds would be used not only 
for agricultural and mechanic arts, but also “including military tactics”) linked the 
university with military training and was indirectly responsible for triggering the largest 
student political mobilizations on campus to date. While the policy initially applied to 
land-grant colleges only, military “preparedness” was encouraged during the buildup to 
World War I at private universities through the establishment of the Reserve Officers’ 
Training Corps (ROTC) and campus drills.222 Groups like the College Anti-Militarism 
League formed in the World War I era and the Oxford Pledge movement in the 1930s 
captivated attention on campuses to oppose these policies, the details of which are 
discussed in Chapter 4.223 Student claims were not simply antiwar, but often addressed 
institutional purpose and the proper role that higher education should serve in relation to 
American society. Colleges, according to a group of Princeton students in 1916, should 
“study the causes of war,” not train their students to fight wars.224        
                                                             
221 From 1900-1940, student enrollment increased from 2.3% (238,000) to 9.1% (1.5 million) of 
total student-age population.  
222 Rudy (1996: 105-106). 
223 On the student movements of the 1930s, see Cohen (1993). 
224 Rudy (1996: 111-112). 
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The soldiers returning from World War II, an intervention that many students 
were originally reluctant to support, shaped the goals of the next era of institutional 
development. The scope of their impact cannot be overestimated when evaluating what I 
am calling the egalitarian era. In 1940, there were approximately 1.5 million total 
students enrolled in higher education; by 1947, three years after the passage of the GI 
Bill, there were 1.1 million veterans pursuing degrees.225 A federal entitlement 
transferable to any accredited college, the GI Bill was initially proposed largely as a way 
to avoid a recurrence of the Depression-Era “Bonus March” when unemployed World 
War I veterans had marched on Washington to demand additional compensation for their 
military service.226 In addition to the surprisingly large number of retired service-
members who made use of the education benefits, another significant consequence of the 
GI Bill was increased support among government officials for the values represented by 
the legislation being made available to other constituencies. Most prominently in the 
Truman Commission Report of 1947, access to higher education was proposed as a 
governing principle in a democratic society. Higher Education for American Democracy, 
as the report was formally titled, laid the groundwork for expanded federal investment in 
the system and regarded the pursuit of higher education as a public good, mindfully 
framed for the early Cold War Era climate.  
Due to the unprecedented state support, the steady rise in college enrollments, and 
the sense of public purpose, this era has often been referred to as the “golden age of 
                                                             
225 Geiger (1999: 61). From 1940-1950, student enrollment increased from 9.1% (1.5 million) to 
15.2% (2.4 million) of total student-age population. 
226 See Mettler (2005). 
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higher education.” The system of mass higher education, though, was predicated on 
federal funding for scientific research that would demonstrate technological supremacy 
against the Soviet Union, especially in the wake of the Sputnik satellite launch.227 This 
relationship between university and state would soon create tensions on campus. One of 
the major institutional critiques by the Free Speech Movement (and later antiwar 
movement) was that the liberal mission of the university had been corrupted by the 
“warfare” state. The student movements of the 1960s were rooted in concerns over what 
was perceived as the abandonment of moral engagement by higher education. As 
examined in Chapter 4, student leaders objected to institutional claims of scientific 
objectivity and neutrality asserting that the university through its research collaborations 
and business partnerships were actually serving interests and engaging in practices that 
were incompatible with the educational functions of open and critical inquiry, hallmarks 
of higher education.  
Consistent with a primary theme of this project, this storied era of student political 
engagement took place in a curricular environment where almost half of all bachelor’s 
degrees earned were in the arts and sciences; students in these fields of study formed the 
core of the student movement.228 Student enrollment continued to rise throughout the 
egalitarian era – there were almost 11.6 million students (38.8% of total student-age 
population) by the end of the period – but largely as a consequence of national 
developments related to proposed responses to the economic downturn of the late 1970s, 
                                                             
227 As Williams (2006: 194) explains, “[t]hough the postwar university represents the democratic 
dream of equal opportunity, it was also built on the specter of perpetual war.” 
228 Geiger (1999: 62). 
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the notion of higher education as a democratic right would become less persuasive 
throughout the Reagan era.  
In the contemporary historical era of economic necessity, higher education is 
understood as an obligation, a private good required for individual social mobility. The 
public social interest of higher education is downplayed in this market-driven climate. 
From state disinvestment and exponential increases in tuition to greater reliance on 
private grants and corporate support, the moves toward privatization in this era represent 
what Williams (2006: 198) provocatively calls the “post-welfare state” model of higher 
education: 
Without the fiscal cushion of the state, the university has more fully adopted and 
internalized the protocols of the free market, selling goods, serving consumers, 
and downsizing labor. Like most other social institutions over the past two 
decades, the university has seen the erasure of the legacy of the New Deal. The 
post-welfare state university more accurately represents the privatized model of 
the university after the rollback of the welfare state. 
 
Indicative of this change is the civic mission of the Truman Commission Report 
referenced above compared with the economic goals outlined in A Test for Leadership 
(2006), the Bush-appointed Presidential Commission Report chaired by Secretary of 
Education Margaret Spellings. While the Truman Report focused on the social benefits of 
higher education, the Spellings Report (2006: ix) called on colleges and universities to 
address “how academic programs and institutions must be transformed to serve the 
changing educational needs of a knowledge economy.” 
In the context of the long trajectory of institutional development, the curricular 
consequences of these more recent trends in higher education and their influence on 
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contemporary student politics are explored in Chapter 5. We will consider the impact of 
the market university on student learning and political socialization and examine how 
disruptive innovations like MOOCs and for-profit ventures are reshaping the purpose(s) 
of higher education. There are forces within higher education trying to counter the 
predominance of this private good mentality including faculty associated with the 
“community engagement” movement and students pushing back at tuition hikes with 
declarations like “we are students, not customers.”229 (I draw upon personal interviews, 
observation, and a detailed study of organizational documents to get a better sense of 
student concerns and political values in the era of economic necessity).       
To understand the role of contemporary higher education in student political 
socialization, this study examines the institutional factors that have been most impactful 
for socialization in previous historical periods and considers their presence (or appeal) in 
the current cultural environment. Higher education has evolved across time from being 
understood as a privilege to an opportunity to a right to an obligation. One wonders given 
the current path of decreasing access to higher education (because of tuition costs) 
combined with an increased emphasis on higher education as occupational training 
whether we are in the process of returning to higher education as a privilege – yet one 
that embodies the worst elements of that historical era (exclusivity) and lacks its best 
components (a focus on character development).   
 
 
                                                             
229 Sign held by student leaders at August 2012 national student convergence in Columbus, Ohio. 
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Chapter 3: Institutional Origins and Intentions:  
Higher Education and American National Development 
A university is not outside, but inside the general social fabric of a given era…It is not 
something apart, something historic, something that yields as little as possible to forces 
and influences that are more or less new. It is on the contrary…an expression of the age, 
as well as an influence operating upon both present and future. 
Abraham Flexner (1930: 3) 
 
One acquired a taste for philosophy. One acquired a skeptical attitude that opened the 
way for other points of view... [Students] learned to fight, in the world of the mind. Their 
intellectual life was filled with zest. In a word, the students learned to think. 
Van Wyck Brooks, “Harvard College, 1815”230 
 
As its culturally prescribed role has expanded and its institutional status has 
grown, the system of higher education in the United States has embodied principles and 
advanced aims that attempt to resonate with constituencies in historically-contingent 
settings. The relationship between American society and higher education has been 
frequently renegotiated in response to the presence of new stakeholders with varied 
expectations for institutional functions. The unsettled terms of this relationship has at 
times led to operational changes that have altered the central significance of formerly 
essential responsibilities. To reiterate what has been established in earlier chapters, the 
primary objective of this project is to demonstrate how institutional purpose may shape 
certain kinds of political socialization and thereby help to explain variation in student 
political engagement across time. To properly situate the contemporary stage of 
institutional development requires us to temporally contextualize higher education and 
                                                             
230 Excerpted from A Chilmark Miscellany (1948) in Spectorsky (1958: 56). 
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consider how colleges and universities have responded to challenges and taken advantage 
of opportunities during similar and more ideologically distant pasts.231  
Distinct conceptions of the “public good” predominate in specific historical 
circumstances. These prevailing attitudes will be reflected in the imperatives of mediating 
institutions in society, such as higher education. Charting the transformation of higher 
education in the United States provides us with an opportunity to encounter various (and 
often competing) formulations of the institution’s role in serving the public interest, as 
informed by the sociopolitical climate during an historical period.232 Scholars working at 
the intersection of history, organizational science, and political philosophy have proposed 
conceptual frameworks to examine notions of the public good and their related impact on 
institutional intentions and curricular emphases. Cultural expectations for higher 
education may be instructively explored through the (complementary) concepts of 
mission, legitimating idea, and institutional charter.  
Each of these cognate terms speaks to the construction and strategic recalibration 
of core values during different phases of institutional development. Mission, according to 
Fenske (1980: 178-179), addresses “the aspirations, often unstated, that society has for 
institutions of higher education…[and] represents the most general level of hopes and 
expectations people in general hold for colleges and universities.”233 The shifting balance 
                                                             
231 The goal, as Eisenmann (2004: 14) succinctly states, is to “see implications of the past for the 
present.”    
232 Powell and Clemens (1998: 4) claim that the public good will always be “unsettled and 
contested and is part of the unsettled and contested nature of politics itself.” As quoted in Kezar 
(2004: 433). 
233 As quoted in Scott (2006: 2). 
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of emphasis among a range of (“coexisting, interlocking, or contradictory”234) missions is 
driven by demands of concerned publics – e.g. state legislators, commercial interests, 
denominational affiliates, alumni supporters, and potential students – to whom the 
institution wishes to accommodate.235 Since service is often paramount, institutional 
leaders must determine the suitability of particular missions to the socio-historical 
context in which they are operating.236  
The appeal of particular missions at a given time is centered upon a broader 
societal understanding of the purpose of higher education, what Gumport (2000: 70) 
labels a “legitimating idea.”237 Legitimating ideas are informed by rival philosophical 
models that guide institutional practices. Kezar (2004) clarifies how communitarianism, 
neoliberalism, and utilitarianism each provide an intellectual foundation for a well-
defined belief-system and thus provide the ethical and ideological underpinnings of an 
“institutional charter” for higher education in the United States. Because of its attention 
to “educating citizens for democratic engagement” and “developing leaders, serving the 
needs of regional and local communities, or acting as a social critic,”238 communitarian 
thought exemplifies a “traditional” public charter. Higher education, for communitarians, 
                                                             
234 Scott (2006: 3). 
235 On stakeholder requests, see Gumport (2000: 78). 
236 Institutional prerogatives will vary at the level of individual schools. For some colleges and 
universities, for example, being responsive to the broader political environment may entail 
embracing a counter-mission to the dominant cultural narrative (“going against the grain”) as a 
way to distinguish itself from its peers. 
237 Gumport (2000: 70) explains that “there are taken-for-granted understandings that constitute 
parameters for what is legitimate – that is, what is expected, appropriate, and sacred, as well as 
the converse.” 
238 Kezar (2004: 430, 435). 
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is understood as a social institution that is responsible for cultural preservation and “the 
socialization and cultivation of citizens and political loyalties.”239 
In contrast to the civic-minded nature of communitarianism, neoliberalism is 
characterized by personal rather than collective benefits and immediate economic aims, 
not longer-term social goods. Premised upon the idea that “economic rationality 
supersedes all other forms of logic,”240 neoliberalism embodies an individual or 
“industrial” charter and a preference for private enterprise over state investment. Higher 
education, for neoliberals, is understood as a sector of the economy, and as such must be 
primarily concerned with efficiency and relevance, as measured by market forces. 
Appreciating the perspectives of the public interest expressed in both communitarian and 
neoliberal approaches (among other influences), utilitarians “embrace a changing 
charter”241 that is adapted for the desired policy outcomes at the present historical 
moment.242 
Our chief concern is to examine the effects of this changing institutional charter 
on contemporary higher education and understand the impact of different learning 
environments on student political socialization. As we observe the historical landscape 
across several historical eras of American higher education, it becomes evident that 
institutional charters fluctuate due to broader social and political dynamics. This is not 
simply a linear process being proposed (from communitarianism to neoliberalism, for 
                                                             
239 Gumport (2000: 74). 
240 Kezar (2004: 435). 
241 Kezar (2004: 433). 
242 Public and private goods are not always mutually exclusive. On the notion of hybrid goods, 
see Kezar (2004: 455). 
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example), nor am I implying a narrative of retreat and decline; rather chapters 3 and 4 
focus on historical conditions that influence institutional trajectories and shape student 
development in particular contexts.243  
When scholarly claims are made that the present-era of higher education is 
dominated by neoliberal thinking, analysts are referring to features of institutional life 
that are increasingly “aligned with individual consumers rather than societal goals.”244 
Gumport (2000) explores this gradual process as the convergence of “three interrelated 
mechanisms” – academic management, academic consumerism, and academic 
stratification – which have been adopted to maximize economic growth and serve 
customer demand. Institutional functions and personnel that have higher perceived 
“exchange-value in certain markets”245 are prioritized over less monetizable 
organizational resources. It is not being suggested by critics of neoliberalism that 
institutional decisions have until recently not been influenced by market concerns, but 
instead that the current era is distinctive because “market forces have never been allowed 
to operate unfettered.”246 
                                                             
243 On the contested interpretations of character-based citizenship education at different stages of 
American national development, see Schneider (2000). 
244 Kezar (2004: 450). In an astute review of Neil Gross’ Why Are Professors Liberal and Why 
Do Conservatives Care? (Harvard University Press, 2013), Williams (2013) argues that the 
author should have focused more attention on the “neoliberal bias” of higher education, rather 
than an empirically hazy “liberal bias” that is often mentioned in partisan (non-academic) outlets.  
245 Gumport (2000: 81). 
246 Kezar (2004: 455). For a useful summary of higher education’s sensitivity to earlier market 
forces, see Kezar (2004: 436-437) on institutional restructuring and Roper and Hirth (2005) on 
public outreach. On the evolution from a “reciprocal” (public) to “rights-based” (private) 
conception of higher education during the second-half of the twentieth century, see Loss (2011: 
Part III). 
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The overlapping concepts of mission, legitimating idea, and charter are semantic 
and symbolic expressions of institutional core values at specific historical moments. The 
distinct forms of socialization are communicated through institutional functions that are 
associated with the propagation of such temporally-conditioned values.247 In The Making 
of the Modern University, Reuben (1996) expertly describes the shifting status of 
scientific and moral discourse within the academy during the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries and the impact of this evolution of thought on higher education’s role 
in character development and citizenship education. While Reuben’s study is 
indispensable, the analysis is often restricted to within the campus gates; the broader 
institutional context, to echo Talcott (2005: 7), should be “expanded…to include 
sociopolitical patterns beyond the university.” The present study extends this critique to 
the contemporary era and demonstrates how the relationship between higher education 
and society (the social compact) does not occur in an historical vacuum and examines 
how the societal developments to some extent missing from Reuben’s work are important 
in shaping institutional approaches to socialization in higher education.248 
The prevailing norms and customs in higher education will largely reflect the 
historical era in which the institution is currently situated, but the significance of the 
institution’s founding period and principles should not be underestimated. To begin to 
                                                             
247 For a brief sketch of the episodic nature of civic education in higher education, see Sax (2004: 
65-66). 
248 Gumport (2000: 74) posits that “shifts in societal imperatives reshap[e] expectations for higher 
education and redefin[e] what activities are or are not recognized as ‘higher education’…It is 
entirely possible that, with the decline of public trust in social (and particularly public) 
institutions, there is a corresponding redefinition of expectations for public higher education as a 
social institution; the expected socialization functions may be receding, while economic functions 
may come to dominate the foreground.” 
109 
 
    
 
gain greater traction on the present era of institutional development, this chapter focuses 
on what I have labeled the elite and expansion historical eras of higher education and 
considers institutional origins, intentions, and the challenges of continuity and change. 
The cultural and policy legacies of early institutional stages of development are never far 
from the surface of contemporary societal discussions about the proper aims of higher 
education. In her empirical work on the founding of the Paris Opera, Johnson (2007: 98) 
employs the idea of organizational imprinting to describe the “process by which 
technological, economic, political, and cultural elements of the founding context shape 
the characteristics of a new organization” and how “these founding characteristics are 
reproduced during the organization’s subsequent history.” Longer-term analyses of 
contemporary institutions allow for the identification of founding imprints (i.e. self-
reinforcing processes249) present throughout their history and offer a variety of temporal 
contexts for assessing shifts in institutional purpose, advantages that are less readily 
available in non-longitudinal research approaches.250  
A developmental treatment of American higher education lets us trace the 
unbundling of certain elements from other institutional objectives, and provides an 
opportunity to evaluate the broader social consequences of this process of disaggregation. 
If political socialization, for example, was embedded in the original mission of higher 
education, does the task of socialization simply get “redistributed among other social 
                                                             
249 Pierson and Skocpol (2002). 
250 On imprint survival and reproduction, see Johnson (2007: 103-104). 
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institutions”251 when the original provider of this social function moves away from this 
goal? More generally, what are the prospects for institutions that make decisions “without 
regard to their accumulated heritage as particular types of social institutions?”252 We will 
return to these provocative questions later, but before considering the future of the 
university, though, we must revisit its past. 
 
Pedagogy to Politics: The Elite Era of Higher Education  
(Colonial to Antebellum America) 
The idea of what is true merit, should…be often presented to youth, explained and 
impressed on their minds, as consisting in an inclination joined with an ability to serve 
mankind, one’s country friends, and family… 
which ability should be the great Aim and end of all learning. 
Benjamin Franklin (1749)253 
 
The founding era of higher education is delineated as elite due to the small 
number of students (relative to the relevant age-group)254 and an institutional purpose 
aimed at the cultivation of leaders whose public behavior would serve as a model for 
their fellow citizens. Regarding the demographic composition of students during this era, 
elite does not mean students only from affluent family backgrounds enrolled in colleges. 
It would be foolish not to acknowledge the exclusionary practices of the time which 
precluded entire groups because of their race, gender, or religion from college attendance, 
but the broader point here is that the socioeconomic status of students was more diverse 
                                                             
251 Gumport (2000: 88). 
252 Gumport (2000: 88). 
253 As quoted in Delbanco (2012: 65). 
254 See Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2 for numerical details. 
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than most traditional accounts of this historical period suggest.255 Based on more recent 
empirical research, this interpretation is part of a (largely settled) historiographical debate 
between traditionalist scholars who speculate that “colleges perpetuated a narrow social 
order” and were “irrelevant to the ‘mainstream’ of American social and cultural 
development”256 during this era and revisionists who assert that “colleges did reflect 
American society and to a considerable degree provided what it actually demanded and 
could afford.”257 
The now standard lens through which higher education in colonial and antebellum 
America is understood, the revisionist critique highlights the baselessness of the 
“irrelevance” claim when we examine the disproportionate public influence of college 
graduates (and matriculating students) during this elite time period. Consider two brief 
examples: 31 of the 55 members at the 1787 constitutional convention had attended 
college258 and in a survey of 250 abolitionist leaders, nearly eighty percent had 
“graduated, or spent some time” in college; both of these cases, as has been noted, 
occurred at a time when approximately one percent of the population had personally 
                                                             
255 On the heterogeneous social origins of students – the “invasion of the poor” – in early 
nineteenth-century New England colleges, see Allmendinger (1971, 1975) and, more generally, in 
antebellum colleges, see Brubacher and Rudy (1997: 39-41) and Burke (1982: 90-136). In 
addition, particular academic admissions requirements, like proficiency in Latin and Greek, 
limited the student population. 
256 McLachlan (1978: 289). Hofstadter and Metzger (1955) is the classic text outlining this 
perspective. 
257 Geiger (2000: 3). Additional traditionalist assumptions that have been dispelled include the 
decline in number of colleges during the antebellum era and the apparent role of intra-Protestant 
conflict in the founding of new colleges. See McLachlan (1978: 291-292) and Geiger (2000: 2-8) 
for a fine review of these issues.        
258 McLachlan (1978: 292). McLachlan (1978: 293) also notes that 63% (N = 96) of the higher-
level civil service positions occupied during the John Adam’s presidency (1797-1801) went to 
college-educated appointees.  
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experienced higher education.259 While there are meaningful differences between 
governing elites and anti-slavery organizational elites, what was taught (and/or learned) 
in college clearly groomed the burgeoning political engagements of each group.  
The purpose of higher education during the elite era was shaped, as in all historical 
periods, by the sociopolitical conditions of the time. American colleges were initially 
envisioned as vital structural components in the creation of a new (colonially 
administered) society and soon thereafter in the development of an independent nation. 
Despite their sectarian differences, the founders of the nine colonial colleges were all 
guided by a civic theory of education that predominated at Oxford and Cambridge.260 
Importing these participatory aims from their English heritage, President Samuel Davies 
of the College of New Jersey (now Princeton), for example, maintained that mid-
eighteenth century students would be encouraged to “display public spirit…[and] always 
combine their abilities, with a dedication to the common good so that they would serve 
their fellow men.”261 The public objective of the institutional endeavor, along with the 
curricular focus which could best achieve this goal, is evident in the 1764 founding 
charter of the College of Rhode Island (now Brown): 
Institutions for liberal education are highly beneficial to society, by forming the 
rising generation to virtue, knowledge, and useful literature and thus preserving in 
                                                             
259 Survey referenced by Delbanco (2012: 71) as described in McPherson (1975: 7).   
260 In their current form, these nine colleges include seven members of the Ivy League (Harvard, 
Yale, Princeton, University of Pennsylvania, Columbia, Brown, and Dartmouth) and two public 
schools (College of William and Mary, Rutgers University). On this “humanist philosophy of 
education,” see Robson (1985: 9-12). 
261 Robson (1985: 59). 
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the community a succession of men duly qualified for discharging the offices of 
life with usefulness and reputation.262 
 
The emphasis on public service (informed by the study of the liberal arts) in this 
founding statement leads us to further examine the less occupational motivations for 
higher learning. The rationale for this institutional design can be usefully explained 
through the idea of age and the concept of in loco parentis. The elite era was defined by 
youth, both in the adolescence of the students and the emerging political status of the 
colonies. College acted in the place of the parent, an institutional mechanism for student 
socialization and societal validation.263 Because boys would often begin their college 
studies during their mid-teenage years, student social development was a central 
institutional function. Intended as a paternalistic institution, college was a place where 
male youth (away from their families) would be provided a course of study “suited to 
inculcate virtue and promote social sponsorship.”264 As discussed below, the system was 
not without student dissension in response to disciplinary measures; the status accorded 
                                                             
262 As quoted in Lucas (1996: 53). At the University of Georgia (1785), the first public (state-
chartered) college, the social aspect of higher education was also central to the school’s mission. 
Its founders declared that “[a free government] can only be happy where the public principles and 
opinions are properly directed, and their manners regulated…[We] should conspire to make us 
feel ourselves under the strongest obligation to form the youth, the rising hope of our land, to 
render the like glorious and essential services to our country.” In Hofstadter and Smith (1961: 
150-151).  
263 Regarding validation from colonial overseers, Cohen and Kisker (2010: 55) assert that the 
founding of colleges during this historical era “distinguished a civilized community from an 
unlettered settlement in the wilderness.” 
264 Vine (1976: 409). See also Moore (1976: 650) on Harvard College as an eighteenth century 
case study of an organization “whose responses to age-old problems are inevitably and critically 
keyed to the ecology of their time and place.” 
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to students – should they be treated as children or citizens-in-training? – remained a point 
of contention throughout the era.265  
The institutional character of the elite era was also marked by the age of the 
nation. Colonists sought cultural autonomy yet not outright self-determination (at the 
outset), and as such, colleges founded during this historical time nurtured a distinctly 
American educational tradition that was “inspired by…republican values yet rooted in 
locally resonant priorities.”266 These colleges hold an important place in any 
developmental narrative about higher education. For the purposes of this historical 
inquiry, though, they are significant because their experience sets an institutional 
standard upon which all later iterations are compared, and in our attempt to understand 
the role of contemporary higher education in student political socialization, we may glean 
insights from their example as a “temporally constructed engagement by actors of 
different structural environments.”267  
                                                             
265 In a notable 1789 correspondence between Eliphalet Pearson, the first principal of the Phillips 
Andover Academy preparatory school (1778-1786) and later professor (1786-1806) and acting 
president of Harvard (1804-1806) and Edward Holyoke, his father-in-law and predecessor as 
Harvard president (1739-1769), Pearson struggles with the proper role for the college in 
American life, which according to his experience, lacked clarity and purpose: “I do not recollect a 
writer who tells us what species of society a university, college, academy, or school is…[I]t may 
be a question, yet to be decided, whether such societies ought to be denominated domestic, or 
civil, or sui generis, or mixed. If domestic, then it seems most proper that parental government 
should obtain in them; if civil, then such laws and such modes of executing them should be 
adopted, as would be most consonant to the particular form of civil polity established in them. 
But, if [these] societies be sui generis their system of jurisprudence ought to be constructed 
accordingly; or, if they be of a mixed nature, so also should their laws and the administration of 
them be.” Eliphalet Pearson to Edward Holyoke, April 18, 1789. Park Family Papers, Manuscript 
and Yale Memorabilia Room, Sterling Library, Yale University. Quoted in McLachlan (1974a: 
462-463). 
266 Mattingly (1997: 74). 
267 Emirbayer and Mische (1998: 970) as quoted in (Johnson 2007: 117). 
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The youthfulness of higher education during the elite era resulted in particular 
institutional stakeholders. Colleges, in an effort at being responsive to these 
constituencies, promoted curricular ambitions that spoke to these historical 
circumstances. College curricula during the elite era emphasized liberal arts education 
and citizenship preparation, two of the four institutional identities that were introduced in 
chapter 1. This does not mean that occupational training was inconsequential; indeed, 
many students attended college for ministerial training. While we should, therefore, not 
neglect the vocational aspects of higher education during this historical period (and also 
grant that religious instruction was an important feature of all undergraduate programs), 
the cultural expectations of higher education were more closely associated with the 
further reaching (less career-specific) objectives of liberal arts and citizenship 
preparation, which are concerned with the “moral ends and social purposes of 
knowledge.”268 (The fourth ideal-type, advanced research, would later become 
fundamental to higher education, but for educators during the elite era, teaching and 
service were the primary responsibilities). 
Institutional ideals during the elite era are reflected in statements of curricular 
purpose and descriptions of course content. Colleges devised a course of study that 
transmitted the values of the liberal arts and conveyed the principles of citizenship 
                                                             
268 Sloan (1971: 222). There is often overlap among institutional categories, and during the elite 
era, the specific type of occupational training was largely complementary to the ideals of liberal 
arts and citizenship preparation. More generally, though, this project is focused on how the 
individual status of each institutional identity shifts with the political and socioeconomic 
conditions of any given time. As Jencks and Riesman (1968: 199) succinctly put it, “the question 
has always been how an institution mixed the academic with the vocational, not whether it did 
so.”  
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preparation, so that students upon graduation would be closer to both reaching “a vital 
connection with the basic emotional and experiential dimensions of individual life” and 
to identifying their potential contributions to the social “welfare of society as they 
conceived it.”269 As President Noah Porter of Yale explained, the curriculum was 
“preeminent[ly] designed to give power to acquire and to think, rather than impart special 
knowledge.”270 To achieve this aim, a core curriculum was employed which required the 
close study of Latin and Greek language and literature during the first two years of 
enrollment, and in a sign that classical education was more well-rounded during this era 
than often assumed, students in their junior and senior years took courses in other 
academic subjects including basic science, philosophy, political economy, and 
mathematics.271 Students, in their senior year, took a capstone seminar in moral 
philosophy and ethics, a course usually taught by the college president, which attempted 
to synthesize previous material and to compel students to ponder their personal 
responsibilities and civic obligations.272 
Advocates claimed that general education was the proper curricular form for the 
historical time because students acquired “logical and rhetorical skills” that would be 
useful regardless of their post-graduate plans; benefited from the discipline required to 
absorb the classics, an effort which made “possible a civilized style of life”; and profited 
from the substance of course readings, ideas considered to be “treasured resources for the 
                                                             
269 Sloan (1971: 227). 
270 Quoted in Lucas (1996: 53). 
271 See Rudolph (1977: 25-53) and Sloan (1971). 
272 Rudolph (1977: 40). On the political content of the moral philosophy course at Princeton 
during the late eighteenth century, for example, see Robson (1985: 64-65). 
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formation of individual character, the ennobling and enriching of life, and the shaping of 
the body politic.”273 This final objective – knowledge inspiring behavior – addresses the 
importance of college curricula in youth socialization and political development.  
Student attitudes were influenced during the elite era by a combination of in-class contact 
and co-curricular exposure to civic ideals, philosophical commitments, and moral 
obligations that, when seriously engaged and reflected upon, could potentially activate 
one’s political consciousness.274 For students, this learning process might occur through 
direct observation of college presidents (and faculty) acting as community leaders and 
articulators of social values; through internalization of lessons embedded within course 
readings, lectures, and other class assignments; or through involvement in co-curricular 
organizations, especially student-led literary and debate societies, which provided a site 
and structure for social capital building and political awakening. The overlap of these 
instructional elements and the interplay of these institutional paths to socialization are 
clearly evident in the case of higher education from the American revolutionary era (of 
the late-eighteenth century) to the antebellum period (of the mid-nineteenth century). 
Given the dearth of established institutions in revolutionary America, college leaders 
understood the agenda setting capacity of higher education. The cultural significance 
accorded to this formative institution led colleges to become settings for intellectual 
                                                             
273 Sloan (1971: 241). 
274 Readers should note the qualified language (could potentially) in this sentence. As 
acknowledged throughout the manuscript, influence is conditional, not guaranteed. Robson 
(1985: 66) admits that “obviously, not all [students absorbed the lessons their elders sought to 
impress upon them]…Some students were immature and derived little from college…Some were 
not interested in politics; some were more interested in play than study.”    
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debate, elite mobilization, and youth political development.275 There was unanimous 
support for the Patriot cause among the president and faculty at four colleges – College of 
Rhode Island (Brown), Dartmouth, Queen’s College (Rutgers), and the College of New 
Jersey (Princeton) – while the most vocal Loyalists were (unsurprisingly) found at the 
College of William and Mary and King’s College (Columbia), the only colleges in 
colonial America that were affiliated with the Anglican Church.276 
College presidents and faculty during this era were effective in inspiring students 
to model their own emerging political attitudes and behavior based upon the precepts 
personified and examples set by their mentors. Embodying this commitment to theory 
and practice, John Winthrop, professor of mathematics and natural philosophy at Harvard 
(and great-grandson of the founder of the Massachusetts Bay Colony), made known to his 
students his sympathies for the anti-authoritarianism of Thomas Paine’s Common Sense 
and served in the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, the colonial precursor to the 
                                                             
275 It bears repeating that institutional efforts at student socialization have occurred throughout the 
history of American higher education. This project does not seek to examine all cases, but rather 
to demonstrate the validity of the overarching socialization claim and explore the historical 
conditions under which student political development is a central institutional function. Within 
the elite era, for example, in addition to revolutionary period republicanism, one may also 
consider how changes in curricular offerings at “old colleges in the new republic” in the late-
eighteenth century (e.g. an increased reliance on texts that emphasized virtue and patriotism) 
represented specific perspectives in political debates over the proposed American constitution, the 
French Revolution, or Hamiltonian economics. See Robson (1985: 143-177, esp. Table 5-1 on 
167-168). 
276 In a content analysis of the political allegiances of the forty-six professors and presidents 
“active in the dozen years before the Revolution and during the first part of the war,” Peckham 
(1971: 70) finds that twenty-eight of the educators were in support of the rebellion, ten were loyal 
to the Crown and eight were “either neutral or [their political inclinations were] unknown.” On 
Whig vs. Tory sentiment on college campuses throughout the revolutionary period, see Rudy 
(1996: 12-16) and Robson (1985: 35-50). 
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General Court (State Legislature).277 At the College of Rhode Island, President James 
Manning led a campaign to express concern over the rights of religious minorities in the 
colonies, specifically the Baptists, the college’s founding denomination, who were being 
persecuted for their beliefs in a manner he claimed was reminiscent of the ongoing 
British mistreatment of all Americans.278 Using his pulpit as President of the College of 
New Jersey, Rev. John Witherspoon, the only clergyman to be a signer of the Declaration 
of Independence, introduced his students to the virtues of Scottish Common Sense 
philosophy and “discoursed on natural rights, the sanctity of private property, and the 
right of rebellion.”279 
In appropriating the style and rhetoric of these role models, students reinforced 
the resonance of their political messages. From wearing clothing manufactured in 
America (“plain coarse republican dress”) in opposition of the 1765 Stamp Act and 
observing boycotts of British imports (and colonial printers who were perceived to be 
Loyalist or insufficiently insurrectionist) to proposing thesis questions and 
commencement orations on politically relevant themes, students participated in a variety 
of ways that “revealed an understanding of the values motivating colonial protest.”280 In 
the context of the recently-imposed Townshend Acts, students at the 1768 Princeton 
commencement, for example, debated whether ‘‘it is in the Interest of any nation, to have 
the Trade, of its new Countries, as free from Embarrassments as possible.” Graduating 
senior James Witherspoon invoked the principles learned from his father’s lectures to 
                                                             
277 Rudy (1996: 16). 
278 Robson (1985: 48). 
279 Robson (1985: 64). 
280 Robson (1985: 68). On student patriots, see also Rudy (1996: 4-8). 
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argue that the law of nature required a resistance to tyrannical rulers and their intolerable 
regulations.281 In preparation for the 1771 Harvard commencement, students had their 
senior theses printed by the Patriot Massachusetts Spy rather than the Tory Boston News-
Letter.282 In addition to more symbolic campus demonstrations, some students engaged in 
direct forms of action, including those at King’s College (Columbia) in May 1775 who, 
stirred on by a local newspaper threat, had plans to confront President Myles Cooper, an 
opponent of the imminent revolution. As a crowd of several hundred advanced toward 
Cooper’s campus residence, a student named Alexander Hamilton warned the president 
to flee, and as apocryphal as the story might sound, Hamilton was apparently able to 
convince the overzealous conspirators that their potentially violent plans would be 
harmful to the Patriot cause and a violation of the principles upon which they claimed to 
represent.283 
Students were often moved to participate after being introduced to the intellectual 
sources of the revolutionary ideology during lectures and classroom instruction.284 
Course readings were regularly assigned that provided historical analogues to 
contemporary colonial circumstances. The Republican Commonwealth (or Country 
Whig) belief system may be characterized, according to Robson (1985: 70-72), as the 
                                                             
281 Robson (1985: 68). At the 1765 Harvard commencement, a similar address was given by the 
graduating Elbridge Gerry, future Vice-President of the United States, who answered in the 
affirmative to the proposition on “whether the new prohibitory duties, which make it useless for 
the people to engage in commerce, can be evaded by them as faithful subjects?’” As quoted in 
Peckham (1971: 55).  
282 Peckham (1971: 55). 
283 Peckham (1971: 64-65). 
284 For revolutionary era library holdings at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, see Robson (1985: 73-
74) and for curricular reading lists at eight (of the nine) colleges during this period, see Robson 
(1985: 81-82). 
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intersection of several traditions: classical histories that focus on the rise and fall of the 
Greek and Roman republics; philosophical writings by Enlightenment rationalist social 
theorists and Common law thinkers whose insights offer a “modern complement to the 
classical treatises”285; and theological guidance from New England Puritanism, which 
provided an indigenous component and doctrinal framework.286        
For the colonial collegians, the Ancients imparted historical lessons on 
republicanism, civic virtue, and imperial overreach and decline. Among the Greeks, for 
example, students read Xenophon’s Cyropaedia on public duty and proper leadership, 
and recited Demosthenes’ speeches on Athenian politics, autonomy, and the “dangers of 
colonial existence.”287 From the Romans, the young Americans studied Livy’s History of 
Rome on the promise of the republic form and the cyclical nature of history and 
encountered Cicero’s contributions to rhetoric and moral philosophy (Orations, De 
Oratore, and De Officiis) which, among other themes, addressed the style and content of 
public performance.288 Though considerably less pervasive than the classics, colleges 
increasingly assigned students the work of authors associated with Enlightenment 
rationalism such as Locke (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding and Two 
Treatises of Government) on natural rights and social compacts and Montesquieu (The 
Spirit of the Laws) on liberty and constitutional arrangements. The writings of Common 
                                                             
285 Robson (1985: 83). 
286 Robson (1985: 71) credits the interpretations of Daniel Neal’s History of the Puritans (1732-
1738, 4 vols.) and Thomas Prince’s A Chronological History of New England (1736) as being 
instrumental to the creation of a colonial (divinely-ordered) self-conception.  
287 Robson (1985: 64). 
288 In Three Centuries of Harvard, 1636-1936, historian Samuel Eliot Morrison (1964: 136) 
boldly contends that “it was the classics [of the ancient world] that made Harvard men of that day 
effective in politics and statesmanship.” As quoted in Rudolph (1977: 37). 
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law scholars like Blackstone (Commentaries on the Laws of England) and Edward Coke 
(Reports) also proved useful to colonists seeking legal justification for rights and equity 
claims.  
By becoming acquainted with the disparate ideological strands of the republican 
worldview, however superficial some of the knowledge acquisition may have initially 
been, students could appreciate the relevance of the ideas being discussed to the political 
conditions beyond the classroom. Student political beliefs were also affected by their 
educational experiences outside of the formal curriculum, particularly within the literary 
societies, the co-curricular study groups that were created, organized, and governed by 
students.289 An often overlooked yet central part of campus life during the elite era of 
higher education, student literary societies, as summarized by their most astute scholarly 
observer,  
constructed – and taught – their own curricula, granted their own diplomas, 
selected and bought their own books, operated their own libraries, developed and 
enforced elaborate codes of conduct among their members, and set the personal 
goals and ideological tone for a majority of the student body.290 
 
Reconstructing the records of the American Whig Society and Cliosophic Society 
at Princeton early in the nineteenth century, McLachlan (1974a) describes the academic 
and social aims of these groups, surveys the contents of their library collections and how 
                                                             
289 As parallel to – rather than completely independent from – the formal curriculum, I prefer the 
term co-curricular to extra-curricular when describing the role of the student literary societies. As 
Rudolph (1977: 98) explains, “the literary societies were as curricular as the chapel, and the 
American college curriculum in the first half of the nineteenth century could not have dispensed 
with either of them.”  
290 McLachlan (1974a: 472). For a list of student literary societies in American colleges (1750–
1814), see McLachlan (1974a: 485-487, fn71). On Yale’s Brothers in Unity and the Linonian 
Society, see Robson (1985: 151-152). 
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specific titles inspired student composition topics and debate propositions, and considers 
the complementarity of the groups’ purpose in relation to the college’s required course of 
study.291 There was a distinctive utility to each of the two primary intellectual activities 
sponsored by the literary societies. Composition assignments, which included personal 
ruminations ‘on luxury,’ ‘on reason and revelation,’ and ‘on the love of liberty,’ intended 
for the student author to be “dr[awn]…into the interior world of the vita contemplativa.” 
Debate performances, whose explorations ranged from personally germane questions 
(“Ought the Latin and Greek languages to be made part of a liberal education?”) to social 
policy concerns (“Ought the right of suffrage be extended to women?”) to existential 
inquiries (“Is there in human nature a principle of disinterested benevolence?”), aimed at 
“push[ing] [the student] outward, upon the public stage of the vita activa.”292  
In the view of most college administrators, students took the ideological lessons learned 
during the revolutionary era too far, namely the perceived righteousness of challenging 
authority and the legitimacy of demanding rights, when applied to their own social status. 
Foretelling later struggles on campus, Rev. Andrew Eliot, a member of the Harvard 
Corporation (i.e. Board of Trustees), in a December 1796 letter to a college benefactor, 
expressed concern over organized student opposition to changes in class recitation rules 
that had been recently implemented. “The young gentlemen,” Eliot remarks, 
                                                             
291 McLachlan (1974a: 477) provides a list of the books borrowed by undergraduate members 
from the library of the American Whig Society at Princeton from August 1813–September 1817. 
The top three categories that garnered student interest included works classified as “poetry and 
fiction”; “history, historical biography, memoirs, letters”; and “literary biography, criticism, 
letter, and memoirs.”     
292 McLachlan (1974a: 483-484). On the student debates about slavery, nullification, and 
secession at South Carolina College’s Clariosophic Society and Euphradian Society, see Sugrue 
(2000: 108-110). 
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are already taken up with politics. They have caught the spirit of the times. Their 
declamations and forensic disputes breathe the spirit of Liberty. This has always 
been encouraged, but they have sometimes wrought themselves up to such a pitch 
of enthusiasm that it has been difficult to keep them within due bounds.293  
 
To similarly-minded college leaders in the post-Revolutionary political climate, 
students were still citizens-in-training (pupils), not yet fully prepared to contribute to 
society. Students were often admonished for their “democratic excesses” because youth, 
according to their elders, could not yet appreciate the “behavioral constraints” that were 
an important element of republican philosophy.294 We must acknowledge the tensions 
(inconsistencies?) in this interpretation of republicanism. College leaders, as we have 
seen, clearly understood their cultural role as one of social and civic development. 
Political engagement was encouraged, moreover, when students, responding to the 
republican prompts transmitted during class instruction, participated in the college-
sanctioned cause of independence. When students were similarly driven, however, to 
contest campus authority over local grievances, college officials claimed that a 
commitment to republicanism required deterring such behavior because students were not 
full citizens295 and their disturbances threatened a tenuous status-quo.   
While students would claim (and not without merit) that college leaders were 
offering a disingenuous reading of republican principles to suit a mission of social 
                                                             
293 Andrew Eliot to Thomas Hollis, Dec. 25, 1769, “Letters from Andrew Eliot to Thomas 
Hollis.” Massachusetts Historical Society, Collections, 4th ser., Iv (1858), 447. Quoted in Cohen 
(1974: 582-583). 
294 Robson (1985: 162). 
295 Jackson (2000: 50) explains that most students would not have been accepted as citizens 
during this era because “only the economically independent were safe enough from bribery and 
corruption to be considered full citizens of the polis.” 
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control, not a nuanced treatment that sought to balance conflicting philosophical goals, 
the broader point remains that students were often motivated to act by ideas they 
encountered in curricular (and additional co-curricular) readings. Referred to by a leading 
scholar of the era as “the first major wave of student revolt in American history,”296 
colleges in the Early Republic (1798–1815) faced student dissension over a variety of 
issues including poor dining hall conditions, curricular rigidity, uninspired teaching, 
disciplinary regulations, and an overall “repressive spirit” of the time.297 Reflecting a 
range of collective responses, Jackson (2000: 57) identifies four types of disturbance – 
rowdiness, acts of sabotage, material appropriation, and rules violations – that students 
employed to gain attention for their objections. Although the proximate causes of unrest 
were not insignificant to the student protestors, leaders readily admitted in their own 
pamphlets and manifestos that the specific issues of contention were often “pretexts for 
venting a general malaise,” that is, symbols which could provide an opening to confront 
(what they regarded) as more fundamental problems on campus.298 As Harvard student 
Willard Phillips explains in Anti-Don Quixotism (1807), his defense of the Rotten 
Cabbage Rebellion – a confrontation ignited over inadequate food preparation, but more 
accurately seen as the breaking point after previous student petitions had not been acted 
                                                             
296 Novak (1977: 1).   
297 Jackson (2000: 56); Novak (1977: 48). 
298 Novak (1977: 28). Examples of student publications during this era include [William Austin], 
Strictures on Harvard College, By a Senior (Boston: John W. Folsom, 1798) and [Willard 
Phillips], Anti-Don Quixotism, or, A Vindication of the Students with Respect to the Late 
Occurrences at Harvard. By Bartholomew Bystander (1807). Unpaginated Manuscript, Harvard 
University Archives. 
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upon by campus authorities299 – the events were not due to “youth, inexperience, and 
want of consideration,” but because “a general uneasiness prevails among the subjects 
[that] all things are not right with the government.”300 
The student unruliness we find at Harvard College during this historical period, 
for example, both reflects this structural opportunism and demonstrates a strategic 
framing of student dissent within the themes of republicanism. Student dissidents 
practiced an artisanal form of republicanism, meaning that they rebranded core elements 
of the ideological tradition in fashioning an “egalitarian, populist, rights-based 
radicalism” which differed from the more doctrinally conservative interpretation 
espoused by college administrators.301 Examples of language appropriation included the 
proclaiming of campus disciplinary rules as “unconstitutional,” holding student meetings 
beneath the “Liberty Tree,” and communicating their objections as reasonable grounds 
for “rebellion.”302 In his Strictures on Harvard College (1798), senior William Austin, a 
native of Boston and “among the most distinguished belles-lettrists…of his class,”303 
captures this posture when pondering the appropriate student response to injustice:    
Where a manly independence is construed into insolence and contempt of 
authority; and a meek spirit of passive obedience and non-resistance the only road 
to College honor….what are the State to expect? Courtiers or Republicans? 
Creatures or men?304  
 
                                                             
299 See Novak (1977: 26-31). 
300 Phillips (1807). Quoted in Jackson (2000: 49). 
301 Jackson (2000: 68, 69). 
302 Jackson (2000: 68). 
303 Novak (1977: 48). 
304 Austin (1798: 8). As quoted in Jackson (2000: 67). See Novak (1977: 47-49) on Austin’s 
personal background.  
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In their disobedience, students were propagating republican ideals that should 
have been familiar to campus authorities. The contrast posed between courtiers and 
republicans by Austin further illustrates his assertion that students were not selfish or 
impulsive, but rather thoughtful stewards of republican virtue, who determined that the 
common good required adherence to certain values, not acquiesence to unfair policy. 
Austin deftly situates the student experience at Harvard within a broader reaching 
discussion of college’s role in citizen development and American state-building. 
Representing a “progression from pedagogy to politics,” he contends that political 
engagement should have been lauded, not condemned, because not only did student 
behavior demonstrate an awareness to curricular emphases (e.g. states fail due to 
tyrannical rule and any signs of despotism must therefore be resisted), but it also gave 
voice to the perils of treating college students as boys, not men. Continuing to embrace 
this institutional approach would endanger the fledgling nation, because it would result in 
a “generation who would lack the backbone, manly independence, and republican virtue 
necessary to sustain the state.”305 
Harvard was far from being the only site of student struggle with campus 
authorities. Throughout the elite era of higher education (and with increasing frequency 
during the first half of the nineteenth century), students sought to uphold and experience, 
as Jackson (2000) lyrically puts it, the “rights of man and rites of youth.” While the 
triggering events were case-specific, similar incidents occurred across New England (at 
Yale, Brown, Dartmouth, Bowdoin, Middlebury, Amherst, and the University of 
                                                             
305 Jackson (2000: 68). 
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Vermont) and in colleges located in other settled regions (including at Princeton, the 
University of Virginia, and the University of Georgia).306  
As the nation entered the antebellum period, student political energies at a number 
of Midwestern and Northern colleges were often directed toward supporting the 
abolitionist movement. Receiving mixed messages from institutional leaders due to 
stakeholder pressures, student advocacy was supported at colleges like Oberlin (OH) and 
Knox (IL) whose institutional founding and funding were linked to a religious 
denomination committed to abolition, while college officials in New England were 
usually less encouraging (and often downright dismissive) as tensions created by the 
issue might alienate patrons or threaten their own college’s (in)direct collaboration with 
the slave economy.307 Despite claims by some observers of student politics that youth 
participation during this (or any other) era was about “projective politics,”308 that is, the 
political concerns of the time simply serving as rationalization for youth insubordination, 
a more compelling explanation for antislavery agitation (or more parochial interests) is 
that students were motivated by the currency of ideas and chose plausible means within 
                                                             
306 See Allmendinger (1973: 75-76) for a brief review of these occurrences. On the Princeton 
Rebellion of 1807, see Novak (1977: 31-37). Like its peer colleges, the unrest at Princeton likely 
originated in the student literary societies and its leaders were “among the most respected 
students” (Novak 1977: 36). 
307 On the influence of “fundraising agents” on the purposes of higher education at the “western” 
colleges in the mid-nineteenth century, see Findlay (2000), esp. 124-126. On colleges as active 
beneficiaries of the slavocracy, see Wilder (2013). 
308 Feuer (1969: 528). 
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their given circumstances to advance their position, even if these tactics for expression 
were sometimes limited to what Scott (1985) calls “weapons of the weak.”309  
In this period of “uncertainty and instability,”310 the publication of the Yale 
College Report of 1828 provides us with the text and context to observe institutional 
developments during the nineteenth century. Having endured student demonstrations 
against the 1825 extension of a Greek languages requirement, stomached the “Bread and 
Butter Rebellion” of July 1828 over the cost of food in the Commons,311 and been 
scrutinized for its resistance to curricular change in a widely-circulated 1827 Amherst 
College pamphlet,312 Yale officials took advantage of the volatile environment to explain 
the “practicality of what others considered impractical.”313 In articulating institutional 
aims in the face of declining college revenues, any statement of purpose needed to be 
sensitive to the popular demands of an increasingly entrepreneurially-minded society yet 
cognizant of constituents who supported existing tradition.314 Prompted by a Connecticut 
state legislature committee critical of the college’s curriculum, the Yale Corporation 
                                                             
309 Despite its prevalence at the time, there remains little empirical evidence to support the 
“generational revolt” theory. The mass society (classical collective behavior) theory of social 
movement emergence, in which the Feuer (1969) and Novak (1977) argument finds theoretical 
support, has since been discredited by resource mobilization and political process models of 
social movement development. The delegitimization of political consciousness as being a venue 
for irrational and impulsive youth “acting out” should not be misconstrued as an indictment (or 
dismissal) of developmental approaches to youth civic engagement. See e.g. Flanagan (2003); 
Flanagan, Levine, and Settersten (2009). 
310 Potts (2010: 12). 
311 “Yale Food Wars: New Light on the Famous Commons Troubles of Earlier Days.” Yale 
Alumni Weekly 14:1 (October 1903), 75-76; Potts (2010: 21-22). 
312 Packard (1829). The Amherst Report warned its institutional brethren that their inattentiveness 
to cultural change put them “‘in danger of being left far behind, in the rapid march of 
improvement’ currently enjoyed by a ‘great and prosperous Republic.’” As quoted in Potts (2010: 
30).    
313 Rudolph (1977: 13). 
314 These tensions are noted in Potts (2010: 12); Lane (1987: 330); Pak (2008: 34). 
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commissioned a report whose charge was to “inquire into the expediency of so altering 
the regular course of instruction in this college, as to leave out of said course the study of 
the dead languages, substituting other studies therefor.”315 While this mandate was 
decidedly narrow in scope, the authors of three-part Report – President Jeremiah Day, 
Professor James Kingsley, and Governor Gideon Tomlinson – recognized Yale’s 
esteemed standing within the collegiate landscape (and the institutional ripples that a 
report bearing its name would produce) and, as a result, expanded its purview to examine 
the purposes of liberal education.   
The principal intent of the Yale Report was to reaffirm a distinctive institutional 
vision and codify the curriculum for evolving times – to modernize, but not moderate, the 
classical course of study.316 The “object of a college,” the authors contend in Part 1 of the 
Report, “is to lay the foundation of a superior education” and, moreover, that the “two 
great points to be gained in intellectual culture are the discipline and the furniture of the 
mind; expanding its powers, and storing it with knowledge.”317 The close study of the 
classical languages and literature, according to the Yale educators, was assumed to be the 
most effective means to achieve these goals because these “subjects were seen as ideal in 
                                                             
315 Reports on the Course of Instruction in Yale College: By a Committee of the Corporation and 
the Academical Faculty (New Haven: Howe, 1828). Published as “Original Papers in Relation to 
a Course of Liberal Education.” American Journal of Science and Arts 15 (January 1829), 297-
358, at 298. For an annotated copy of the entire report coupled with a thoughtful and thorough 
introduction, see Potts (2010). 
316 Additional background reading on the Yale Report may be found, e.g., in Brubacher and Rudy 
(1997: 104-105); Cohen and Kisker (2010: 83-84); Lucas (2006: 132-135); Rudolph (1977: 67-
75); Sloan (1971: 242-247). On the contemporary applicability of the report, see Kirp (2003: 256-
259).  
317 “Original Papers in Relation to a Course of Liberal Education,” 300. 
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compelling students to develop orderly, systematic, and accurate habits of thought.”318 
Though the Yale Report seeks to preserve a curriculum that gives primary emphasis to 
the classics, it is not, as has often been portrayed, myopic in its view of cultural and 
technological change. Yale had in fact already been responding to “realities outside the 
college”319 for some time by adding course instruction in fields which endorsed new 
scientific methods and approaches. The Yale Report made the case for an education 
which was grounded in the classical tradition, yet amenable to curricular supplements, so 
that students would graduate with “both factual knowledge and ethical conviction.”320 
Skeptics, however, found the Yale Report to be window dressing for a “stationary 
institution,”321 insufficiently responsive to the needs of the present. While calls for 
curricular change would intensify in the years after the Yale Report, the statement’s 
lasting impact lay in its commitment to the undergraduate college experience and its 
advocacy for liberal arts education in the United States.322  
 
Morrill Development: The Expansion Era of Higher Education (1862–1900)  
Is it not clear that the idea of liberal education, as it was held in American colleges prior 
to 1862, no longer commands the unqualified respect of thoughtful men? 
                                                             
318 Lane (1987: 333). 
319 Herbst (2004: 219). 
320 Herbst (2004: 222). 
321 Potts (2010: 30). 
322 Although the Yale Report is the most remembered curricular statement of the elite era, other 
colleges issued reports that echoed similar themes. The Columbia College Report of 1858, for 
example, maintained that higher education was to “make perfect the intellect in all its parts and 
functions; by means of a thorough training of all the intellectual faculties, to attain their full 
development, and by the proper guidance of the moral functions, to direct them to a proper 
exertion. To form the mind, in short, is the high design of education as sought in [the college].” 
As quoted in Lucas (1996: 52). 
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Daniel C. Gilman, President of Johns Hopkins University (1892: 109) 
 
Determining the precise moment when one historical period has ended – that is, 
when the relationship between higher education and society has changed enough to merit 
a fresh interpretive framework – is a difficult task. While the developmental process is 
gradual and measurements are often inexact, there are, however, temporal points in which 
new stakeholders arrive (or become differentially influential) and curricular missions 
shift (or relax) such that the guiding institutional purpose of higher education is 
sufficiently distinct from the preexisting structural arrangement to constitute “an era with 
its own internal logic and consistency.”323  
The growth of the United States in both size and scope during the nineteenth 
century led to societal demands for colleges to increase and broaden their service to the 
rapidly industrializing nation. The era of expansion is a historical period where many 
colleges were founded that aimed to be responsive to requests for “practical” education, 
as well as a time of adjustment for established colleges, which had to reassess their own 
curricular objectives in a context where the cultural expectations for higher education 
were more contested than they were during much of the elite era of higher education 
when greater clarity of institutional purpose had prevailed.324 The 1862 passage of the 
Morrill Land Grant Act is the starting point for the era of expansion – a critical juncture 
in institutional development – not because similar attitudes to those expressed in the 
                                                             
323 Geiger (2000: 9). 
324 See Figures 2.2 and 2.3 in Chapter 2 for details on increases in student enrollment and number 
of institutions during the era of expansion. 
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legislation hadn’t been proposed by educational reformers before, but rather because it 
represented a nascent federal interest in higher education, and by directing its attention to 
technical expertise and skills acquisition, the Act signified an “initial stimulus to practical 
curricula at colleges across the nation.”325 
Employing the institutional identity terminology described in Chapter 1, during 
the era of expansion we find (relative to the elite era) a decline in the centrality of liberal 
arts education, a shift in the meaning of citizenship preparation (from social contribution 
to economic production), an increasingly prominent role for occupational training, and 
with the rise of the university model toward the end of the era, the introduction of an 
advanced research focus for professors (and budding scholars). As noted throughout, the 
appeal of each institutional identity is contingent upon historical circumstances; as such, I 
am not describing a linear process where institutional functions that have lost favor in one 
era cannot garner renewed support in other temporal conditions. Throughout our 
historical survey, we are searching for lessons to be drawn about the impact of shifting 
institutional functions on student political socialization, our primary outcome of interest. 
How can our inquiry into the utilitarian-minded era of expansion, moreover, prove 
instructive when examining the prospects for student political development in a similarly 
jobs-focused era of higher education like the present?   
The expansion era is characterized, as the label suggests, by greater institutional 
contours – disciplinary, demographic, and geographical. The higher education landscape 
had to be reimagined in the mid-nineteenth century to accommodate previously 
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underserved constituencies with educational ambitions deemed useful in an economically 
and socially developing nation. The most noteworthy innovation during the first half of 
this historical period was the rise of what Geiger (2000) has called the “multipurpose 
college.” Multipurpose colleges offered a broad array of curricular options (more student 
choice, less emphasis on the classics), provided specialized training (such as programs in 
teaching, separate schools of agriculture and engineering, and commercial certifications), 
and appealed to new student markets (e.g. women, part-time matriculants, older students) 
– directions taken that their institutional forebears had resisted (or outright rejected) 
during the elite era. Situating their functional aims in relation to regional demands, 
multipurpose colleges that sprung up in the Midwest and Great Plains in the post-bellum 
period needed to be attentive both to competing patron requests (denominational sponsors 
vs. potential students) and budgetary constraints.326 While the notion had been 
percolating for some time that colleges had not been adequately preparing students for 
the technological developments and social challenges they would face off campus,327 the 
                                                             
326 Institutional goals were therefore shaped by the cultural expectations for higher education in 
the era in which these new colleges were founded. As Johnson (2007: 98) describes, “given that 
the nature and distribution of…resources vary from one historical epoch to another and that initial 
structures and practices often persist beyond the founding phase, it follows, that observed 
organizational diversity is a product not of past adaptation to changing environments but of 
variation in organizational age across the population in question.” 
327 Two prominent voices for curricular reform during the elite era, for example, were George 
Ticknor, Professor of French and Spanish Languages and Literature at Harvard and President 
Francis Wayland at Brown. Based on his experience studying abroad in Germany, Ticknor called 
for specialized study and the creation of academic departments similar to the model he saw 
practiced in Göttingen. See “George Ticknor and the Harvard Reforms of the 1820s.” Excerpted 
in Hofstadter and Smith (1961: 269-273). Wayland was an early proponent of what would later be 
termed an elective curriculum, a course of study which would be more integrated with the 
political environment in which higher education was located. In “Thoughts on the Present 
Collegiate System,” Wayland (1842: 41) asserts that “the college or university forms no integral 
and necessary part of the social system. It plods on its weary way solitary and in darkness.” See 
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less restrictive (more utilitarian) courses of study adopted at multipurpose colleges 
became further entrenched as an organizing principle of American higher education with 
the emergence of the state university and through efforts in support of an elective 
curricular system by leading academic figures of the time.328  
By appropriating land grants to establish (or maintain) state universities which 
would “promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes on the several 
pursuits and professions in life,” the agenda for federal investment delineated in the 
Morrill Land Grant Act (1862) had a “determinative influence on the shaping of 
American higher education.”329 In emphasizing these multiple aims within the legislative 
text, Justin Morrill (R-VT) had envisioned a system of higher education where technical 
and applied goals would (amicably) coexist with more traditional course instruction in the 
liberal arts.330 Morrill considered each curricular track (practical and liberal) equally 
important in serving an increasingly heterogeneous student body, but given the lack of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Hofstadter and Smith (1961: 334-375, esp. 357-359). On Wayland’s proposals for a more relevant 
curriculum, many of which would be embraced during the expansion era, see “Report to the 
Brown Corporation, 1850” (Excerpted in Hofstadter and Smith (1961: 478-487) and “Education 
Demanded by the People of the United States: A Discourse Delivered at Union College, July 25, 
1854 on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Presidency of Eliphalet Nott.”  
328 In contrasting the state university of the era of expansion with the denominational college of 
the elite era, Rudy (1951: 163) explains how each embodied the population during each historical 
period: “Reflecting the equalitarian spirit of Jacksonianism rather than the selective philosophy of 
Jeffersonianism, its main standards were quantitative, its main concerns materialistic, its 
educational bias utilitarian, and its outlook optimistic. In this, of course, it mirrored the temper of 
a people.” 
329 Geiger (2000: 153). 
330 Additional background reading on the Morrill Act and the land grant movement, more 
generally, may be found in Geiger (2013); Hyman (1987); Key (1996); Lucas (2006: 152-159, 
170); Nemec (2006: 47-76); Thelin (2004: 75-78, 135-137); Williams (1991). On their 
contemporary applicability, see Fogel and Malson-Huddle (2012) and Loss (2012). 
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implementation parameters within the bill,331 state governments had significant leeway in 
distributing federal monies disproportionately to colleges that emphasized more “useful” 
areas of study and advanced research.332  
Advocates for an elective system were able to gain momentum (and monetary 
support) for their curricular cause in the wake of the Morrill Act. To not caricature the 
proposed reforms to rigid curricular prescription, it is important to distinguish between 
the “liberty in education” movement promoted by Charles W. Eliot at Harvard and 
Andrew D. White at Cornell with the “anything goes” chaotic utilitarianism emanating 
from state legislatures (and other venues) largely ignorant of pedagogical matters.333 
Representative of the latter perspective is an 1850 proposal by the Massachusetts General 
Court whose members called on Harvard to employ a curricular model determined 
entirely on customer demand. Professors would be compensated according to the size of 
their classes and “those only would succeed who taught…in a manner acceptable to the 
public…That which was desired would be purchased, and that which was not, would be 
neglected.”334 Clarifying the more thoughtful view toward an elective system, President 
White of Cornell, in his Report of the Committee on Organization (1866), affirmed the 
                                                             
331 Concerning this legislative nod to the American wont for decentralization, Morrill later 
acknowledged that “the bill fixes the leading objects, but properly…leaves to the States 
considerable latitude in carrying out the practical details.” (As quoted in Geiger 2000: 154). 
332 Responding to the marginalization of the liberal arts, State Senator Preston M. Sutton, in an 
1884 address to the Iowa State Legislature, castigated his colleagues for neglecting the original 
dual purpose of the Act. See “A State Senator Argues for a Liberal Curriculum at Iowa State 
Agricultural College, 1884.” In Hofstadter and Smith (1961: 587-592). 
333 See “Charles William Eliot Expounds the Elective System as ‘Liberty in Education.’” 
Excerpts of Educational Reform (1885) in Hofstadter and Smith (1961: 701-714). On the elective 
system and its critics, see also Lucas (2006: 171-176, 219) and Brubacher and Rudy (1997: 111-
116). 
334 As quoted in Rudolph (1977: 102). 
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democratic intentions of the Morrill Act and argued that the university could offer greater 
options without divorcing itself from elements of its institutional progenitors. Stating that 
“undergraduate education should be both special and general,” White claimed that the 
Cornell curriculum “multiplied truth into truths.”335 Similarly, President Eliot, in his 1869 
inaugural address, no doubt understanding the significance of the moment as the 
incoming president of the nation’s oldest college, used the opportunity to discuss the need 
for higher education to broaden its curriculum because “the university must 
accommodate itself promptly to significant changes in the character of the people for 
whom it exists.”336 
While many “colleges fitfully but ineluctably followed in this path,”337 there was 
ample criticism of these trends toward curricular choice and disciplinary specialization. 
The grounds for skepticism related to the incompatibility of the elective system to the 
existing educational context in the United States and the apparent lack of forethought by 
its proponents regarding the core institutional functions that would be lost (or severely 
curtailed) in the process of development.338 Concerning the mismatch claim, President 
                                                             
335 Rudolph (1977: 118, 119). Critics of the elective curriculum included Yale’s Noah Porter 
(1870), who like his predecessor Jeremiah Day had argued in the Yale Report of 1828, mounted a 
spirited defense of the traditional curriculum. See also “Noah Porter Rejects the Elective System, 
1871.” In Hofstadter and Smith (1961: 699-700) and Hall (2000). 
336 Addresses at the Inauguration of Charles William Eliot as President of Harvard College (19 
October 1869). As quoted in Rudolph (1977: 7). 
337 Geiger (2000: 35). 
338 Having seen the impact of the elective system on institutional identity, even Andrew White 
had misgivings later in life about the system he helped wrought. Expressing second thoughts 
during his retirement, White (1908) conceded that “[t]here is certainly a widespread fear among 
many thinking men that in our eagerness for…new things we have too much lost sight of certain 
valuable old things…I believe that, whatever else we do, we must [not only] make men and 
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James McCosh of Princeton opposed what he termed the “New Departure” because 
unlike the European system from which many advocates for the elective system drew 
inspiration, secondary schools were far more rudimentary in the United States. Germany 
and France had a university model of advanced research and specialization that American 
educators envied, but McCosh argued that this post-secondary level was always preceded 
by a general education course in the gymnasium or lycée, a role somewhat equivalent to 
the American college of the elite era which would now be cast aside by the elective 
curriculum.339 In a 1882 essay in support of the “prevocational ideals”340 of higher 
education, William Goodell Frost, Professor of Greek at Oberlin College (1876-92) and 
future-President of Berea College (1892-1900), a liberal arts college which targets 
students with limited economic resources, forcefully condemns the elective system and 
addresses the primary difference between a college and a university:   
The one positive (and commendable) feature of the university is its wide range of 
electives: beyond this all is negative – no required studies or compulsory 
attendance, no rules, no responsibility for the moral or even the intellectual 
improvement of the student…We shall be glad to send our young men to 
[Harvard] or [Johns Hopkins] after they have completed a thorough curriculum 
under teachers who really teach, and who feel some responsibility for their 
welfare…the university is on a par with professional schools, the college is a 
second home; the university instructs, the college educates.341 
 
During the era of expansion, McCosh and Frost were fighting a valiant yet losing 
battle. Increased federal investment in higher education suited both proponents of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
women skillful in the various professions and avocations of life, but…[also] cultivate and bring 
out the best in them as men and women.” As quoted in Lucas (2006: 219-220). 
339 See “James McCosh Attacks the New Departure and President Eliot, 1885.” In Hofstadter and 
Smith (1961: 715-730) and Rudy (1951: 161-162). 
340 Grubb and Lazerson (2005: 14). 
341 “The American College vs. The European University.” The Nation. In Hofstadter and Smith 
(1961: 733-735).  
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occupational training and champions of advanced research.342 Neither group advocating 
growth focused on liberal arts education or student socialization, institutional objectives 
linked with a bygone era. In an historical period with fewer institutional mechanisms for 
political development – characterized by curricula in which the classics and the capstone 
seminar in moral philosophy were no longer mainstays and corresponding co-curricular 
shifts where student literary societies were gradually being replaced by fraternities and 
athletics as centers of campus life – how was student political engagement impacted?  
In a retrospective examination of the political style of the Mugwumps – the post-
Civil war defectors from the Republican Party who sought a more reformist agenda on 
matters of civil service, trade, and tariffs – McLachlan (1974b) presents a compelling 
case for the influence of curriculum on political socialization. Having attended college 
from the mid-1840s to the early 1870s, the Mugwumps were part of the last student 
generation to have the common experience of the classical curriculum and immersion in 
the literary and debate societies. Reflected in both approach and substance, what 
distinguished the Mugwumps from the industrial elite and machine politicians was the 
“educational experience of each group.”343 While only 37% of industrialists and 20.5% of 
political officials (in New York City) had attended college, 82% of Mugwumps had 
sought higher education. The huge disparity in college attendance between the 
                                                             
342 The second Morrill Act of 1890 provided for direct grants to research-minded universities and 
allocated funds to historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs) and other Southern 
colleges, two categories that were ineligible for support when the initial act was passed during the 
Civil War. 
343 The operational measures of “Mugwump” and “Industrial Elite” are defined in McLachlan 
(1974b: 191, fn 11). Paralleling the case described by McLachlan is the national data for 
members of the U.S. Congress. In 1875, 38% of congressmen were college graduates, while in 
1885, fewer than 25% of members were college educated. See Rudolph (1977: 101).  
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Mugwumps and their two “negative reference groups”344 – more specifically, the type of 
college education the future Mugwumps were exposed to – helped to shape their 
enduring and distinctive political commitments.  
During the latter years of the expansion era, students had fewer opportunities for 
comparable (co)curricular experiences. As the Daily Illini, the student newspaper at the 
University of Illinois, described in a November 1892 article, the literary societies had 
declined in popularity in Champaign (and at most other colleges), having been eclipsed 
by activities whose central focus was less academically (or politically) complementary to 
students’ course of study:  
The literary society no longer claims [the student’s] attention as something 
indispensable, but as a part of this feast of college life which is spread before him, 
which he can take or let alone at will…Elsewhere once the literary society held 
the palm, it is now being fast relegated to obscurity by the sports of the diamond 
or the quadrangle. The records of all the prominent educational institutions in the 
land show this to be true, our own University not excepted.345  
 
Because of the changes in cultural expectations for higher education and the broadening 
of student populations, new extra-curricular options for personal development became 
available, most notably collegiate athletics and fraternities. These institutional venues 
provided the social networking function of previous campus groupings, yet lacked the 
politically socializing role these earlier sites had served. As Lyman H. Bagg writes in 
Four Years at Yale (1871), his comprehensive treatment of college life, many of his peers 
(even at Yale) were not especially interested in national politics: 
                                                             
344 McLachlan (1974b: 190). 
345 DeMartini (1976: 530).  
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Now-a-days, there is very little excitement over political matters, and they seldom 
form a topic of conversation. When talked about at all it is usually in a bantering 
way, half in joke and half in earnest. There is hardly more interest in a man’s 
politics than in his family or his residence, and like them, they never affect his 
social position in any way. A loud-mouthed defender of this or that political party, 
or of any kind of ‘ism’ is looked upon by the rest as a sort of curiosity.346 
 
Bagg’s evaluation of the campus political climate, though, should not be taken to 
mean that local affairs were of little concern to students during the late nineteenth 
century. At many of the recently-founded land grant colleges and universities, for 
example, administrators faced sustained student resistance over military drill 
requirements and compulsory chapel attendance, two policies perceived by students to be 
relics of previous college efforts at promoting character development. Student interests – 
academically and socially – were revealing of the cultural context in which college 
aspirants were coming of age. While many first generation matriculants came from 
farming backgrounds, in an historical period of urbanization and industrialization, these 
students were increasingly indifferent to curricula that emphasized agricultural training, a 
condition of the Morrill Act which subsidized the state university system.347 In addition, 
students found comfort in the emergent fraternity and athletics scenes on campuses, 
experiences which “provided a type of anticipatory socialization in tune with 
the…demands of a changing society.”348  
                                                             
346 Bagg (1871: 521-522). For a brief summary of Bagg’s classic memoir, see Thelin (2004: 93-
95). 
347 DeMartini (1976: 527) reports that student enrollment in the College of Agriculture at the 
University of Illinois “declined from a high of 20.8 percent to a low of 1.1 percent” between 1871 
and 1894. 
348 DeMartini (1976: 531). 
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The 1880 and 1891 student strikes at the University of Illinois, as observed in 
DeMartini (1976), demonstrate the shifting focus of student politics across time and 
underscore participant continuity, that is, the particular kinds of students who are most 
inclined to be politically active on campus. Despite the student strikes being instigated by 
cadet officers opposing the military science requirements, the effects were more 
widespread because the initial act of refusal “resulted in the suspension of daily chapel, 
military drill, and [an] outbreak of general chaos in the daily campus routine.”349 Students 
were supportive of the military resisters, not simply due to their specific grievance, but 
more generally, because their actions spoke to a variety of concerns among the evolving 
student culture. The strike leaders and participants, moreover, were far more active than 
non-participants in other extracurricular aspects of student life, most prominently in 
student government, fraternities, student publications, and academic clubs.350 
Perpetuating the claim that “frequently, the most promising students [lead] the 
agitation,”351 students, even in this environment where curricular socialization was in 
decline, addressed the apparent disconnect between theory (in the classroom) and practice 
(on the quad): “It seems inconsistent in this age and country to educate young men and 
women in republican sentiments and at the same time attempt to govern them by a set of 
laws in the making of which they have no voice at all.”352 The students eventually earned 
policy changes in accordance with their aims; in 1880, military drill requirements were 
                                                             
349 DeMartini (1976: 532). 
350 See Tables 3 and 4 in DeMartini (1976: 533). 
351 Lipset (1976: 139). 
352 As quoted in Lipset (1976: 138). 
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eliminated for upperclassmen and by the conclusion of the 1891 strike, rules were further 
liberalized and compulsory chapel attendance had been abolished.353  
As football and fraternities began to occupy much of the student imagination, the 
primary attention of the faculty shifted as well – from teaching to advanced research. 
Often due to the prospects of career advancement, the role of the faculty during the 
expansion era would become increasingly specialized and professionalized. By 1900, The 
Nation remarked that “the decline of teaching” in higher education was the inevitable 
result of an institutional climate where it “is in the making of books, and not the training 
of the young in habits of thought and work, that holds out to the teacher of today the main 
promise of reward.”354 The changing standards by which a professor’s impact would be 
judged – from teacher to scholar – was part of the broader transition to a university (as 
opposed to college) model for American higher education.355 Having been captivated by 
the German post-secondary system during their travels abroad, a new generation of 
campus presidents attempted to devise a version of the German ideal for the United 
States.356 The American university turned out to be more of a reinvention, not a 
                                                             
353 DeMartini (1976: 534-535). 
354 “The Decline of Teaching.” The Nation 70 (8 March 1900), 18. 
355 As Metzger (1961: 36) famously wrote, “power was better exercised over subjects than over 
subject schoolboys, that a contribution to philology was far more significant than a contribution 
to student manners, that the whole emphasis of the college should be shifted from discipline to 
scholarship.” 
356 Graduate education was a major aspect of this German system that appealed to the American 
educators. In 1850 there were only 8 students seeking some form of graduate study in the United 
States. By 1900, there were 5,668 students pursuing post-baccalaureate training (Rudy 1951: 
169). 
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replication of German practice, as some of the institutional objectives were regrettably 
lost in translation.357 
At the conclusion of the era of expansion, the institutional transformation was 
near completion. In a comparative study of Bowdoin College and Stanford University, 
Dorn (2011) examines how the prevailing cultural expectations at the time of their 
respective founding influenced the “object” of higher education at each school during its 
formative years. Whereas Bowdoin’s mission, founded in 1794, represented the public 
values of the elite era, the aims of Stanford University established almost a century later 
in 1885, were shaped by the private social ethos of the expansion era. As demonstrated 
throughout this chapter, the institutional charter – the relationship between higher 
education and American society – had evolved over time, so much that officials at 
Bowdoin and Stanford could both speak about “qualify[ing]” students for “direct 
usefulness” in life,358 yet their conceptions of this goal were vastly different due to the 
changing institutional context of higher education at the time of each statement of 
purpose. Bowdoin’s purpose, according to Reverend Joseph Mckeen, its first president, 
was to prepare students for “liberal professions” (e.g. ministers, educators, and public 
                                                             
357 Lucas (1996: 65) details how the university officials misunderstood the foundational concept 
of Wissenschaft and in so doing attributed a narrow-minded vision to the German system which 
had lingering consequences when the German model was adapted for American consumption. 
According to Lucas’ reading, “Wissenschaft connoted ‘integrated knowledge,’ which is to say 
products of inquiry informed by some coherent scheme of human values. American interpreters, 
however, missed the more subtle connotations of Wissenschaft and, further, what many German 
intellectuals considered its highest manifestation, namely Geisteswissenschaft, or approximately, 
‘spiritual knowledge.’ The contemplative and integrative side of the term in its original German 
context was lost sight of altogether.” On the adaptation of the German model, see also Turner and 
Bernard (2000). 
358 Dorn (2011: 1568). 
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servants) because “every man who has been aided by a public institution to acquire an 
education…is under peculiar obligations to exert his talents for the public good.”359 
While Jane and Leland Stanford also claimed an interest in graduates “promot[ing] the 
public welfare,” the primary function of a university was to train students for “lucrative 
professions” (i.e. a job that promises material wealth) where their own “personal success” 
would provide opportunities, if they so desired, to “exercis[e] an influence on behalf of 
humanity and civilization.”360 In an 1889 essay, David Starr Jordan, Stanford’s first 
president, employs a market metaphor to unify the institutional aims of the historical 
period – curricular choice and economic growth. “It is not for the university to decide on 
the relative merits of knowledge,” Jordan declares, “Each man makes his own market, 
controlled by his own standards.”361 Despite some notable counter-efforts (to be 
discussed in Chapter 4), the institutional trends that originated during the expansion era 
would continue to play a determinative role throughout much of the twentieth century.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
359 As quoted in Dorn (2011: 1568). 
360 As quoted in Dorn (2011: 1568). 
361 Jordan (1903 [1889]: 58).  
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Chapter 4: “Strenuous, Complex, and Democratic”362:  
The Twentieth Century University (1900-1980) 
 
The essential difference between a college and a university is how they look.  
A college looks backward, a university looks forward.  
Edwin E. Slosson, editor of The Independent (New York) (1910: 374) 
 
The American college has been in the past a school of public sentiment, a place for 
forming conceptions of duty based on considerations other than those of self-interest, and 
standards of intellectual attainment unaffected by considerations of commercial 
value…The American college at the beginning of the twentieth century is confronted 
with a set of conditions which may threaten its very existence. 
President Arthur T. Hadley, Yale University (1900: 588)  
 
The institutional changes wrought by the university model, which had been 
initiated during the expansion era of higher education as detailed in Chapter 3, triumphed 
by the turn of the twentieth century. The university may have surpassed the college, but 
the potential social costs of this institutional development, as suggested by the 
apprehension in President Hadley’s remarks above, were yet to be determined. This 
chapter begins by describing the “symptoms of crystallization”363 during this historical 
period and demonstrates how institutional functions were adapted to suit fluid social 
circumstances and shifting cultural expectations for higher education. Given that many 
studies of the contemporary American university are justly criticized for being 
“historically ungrounded,”364 this chapter – in keeping with the broader analytical aims of 
the project – focuses on matters of time and context (i.e. continuities and discontinuities) 
                                                             
362 David Starr Jordan, The Call of the Twentieth Century: An Address to Young Men (1903).  
363 Veysey (1965: 338). 
364 In his crucial-case study on presidential emergency powers, Tichenor (2013: 770-771) 
employs this phrase to describe the imprecision of comparisons made without sufficient attention 
to “the emergence of new resources, precedents, and expectations,” what he terms “shifting 
historical set points.”  
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to consider the consequences of institutional (re)forms and their influence on student 
political socialization.  
In “What is College For?,” Woodrow Wilson (1909: 571) claims that the public 
interest (as understood in a particular temporal setting) should determine the “character of 
the study the college student should undertake.” The proper aims of higher education, 
Wilson argues, “involves an examination of modern life and an assessment of the part an 
educated man ought to play in it – an analysis which no man may attempt with perfect 
self-confidence.” A strong advocate for a liberal arts education – a mixture of what he 
calls “intellectual discipline and moral enlightenment” – in a period where proponents of 
highly specialized vocational training had gained favor among the general public, Wilson 
would play an important (yet ultimately unsuccessful) role in shaping curricular debates 
at the outset of higher education’s era of emergence, a time of institutional growth and 
standardization of mission. 
 
From Privilege to Right: The Emergence Era of Higher Education (1900–1944) 
Our colleges have become a part of the business and commercial machinery of our 
country, and must therefore be measured by somewhat the same standards. 
Clarence F. Birdseye, Individual Training in Our Colleges (1907: 189) 
The beginning of a century provides a natural opportunity for institutional actors 
to reassess mission and reflect upon purpose. While this calendric demarcation may be 
perceived as somewhat arbitrary, American higher education did undergo sufficient 
changes around 1900 such that delineating a new stage of development at this historical 
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moment is warranted.365 As with all periodization schemes though, the goal is not to 
identify an exact date where higher education moved from one era to the next, but rather 
to examine the influence of longer-term historical and cultural trends on institutional 
functions; a periodized approach allows us to gain leverage over these concerns.366 
Institutional shifts begun in an earlier period were consolidated, but not completely 
settled, during the era of emergence. While colleges and universities were committed to 
advanced research and offered curricula premised on the idea of student choice and 
focused on occupational training, there remained active debates within higher education 
over the “philosophical, social and practical considerations suggested by the plenitude of 
educational purposes and alternatives.”367     
In a 1903 address to incoming students, David Starr Jordan, President of Stanford, 
implores his audience to recognize the gravity of the moment in which they are 
commencing their studies and the integral role that higher education will be expected to 
play in achieving national ambitions. The twentieth century would be, according to 
Jordan, “strenuous, complex, and democratic.” In employing the word strenuous, Jordan 
is speaking to an active and vigorous era, a period when higher education would increase 
its footprint by growing the curriculum, broadening its research collaborations, and 
                                                             
365 As Goldin and Katz (1999: 43) state, “something fundamental changed around the turn of the 
20th century.” 
366 In clarifying the “different forms of modern moral education” across time, Reuben (1996: 4) 
acknowledges the imprecision and tenuousness associated with any proposed periodization 
scheme: “The notion of successive stages is, of course, an over-simplification; in reality, these 
various efforts overlapped and competed with one another…the notion of stages is still useful 
because advocates of particular forms of moral education did dominate the discourse within 
higher education in succession and as a result of the perceived failure of the previously most 
promising form of moral training.” 
367 Hudson (1920: 72-73) as quoted in Levine (1986: 18). 
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soliciting public and private investments. To avoid being left behind by an increasingly 
complex world, Jordan urges colleges and universities to embrace new scientific tools, 
become more service-oriented, and pursue curricular and commercial efforts in order to 
“establish a larger place for [higher education] in a practical world.”368 When Jordan 
foresees the coming years as being more democratic, he is specifically referring to greater 
educational opportunities for groups that had been neglected or discriminated against. “A 
generous education, a well-directed education,” he declares, “should be the birthright of 
each one of [the children of the republic].”369 
Higher education enrollment did rise exponentially during the emergence era 
(from 238,000 students in 1900 to over 1.5 million by the end of the period). 
Demographic growth (quantitative increases) inevitably led to functional conversion 
(qualitative change in curricular focus). Institutional purpose didn’t evolve simply 
because of enrollment surge, but rather due to the wider spectrum of students arriving to 
campus (with different backgrounds and objectives) that higher education had begun to 
attract. Students often received a preparatory education “indifferent to liberal learning” 
(at a time when high school was still considered a “terminal experience”370); increasingly 
attended public universities which were reliant on government support (that demanded a 
                                                             
368 Levine (1986: 18-19).    
369 There were, of course, limitations to this democratic rhetoric in practice. As Levine (1986: 21) 
explains, “ethnic and poor students often surpassed their more affluent peers in academic ability 
and drive, but more often than not they were channeled into less acclaimed schools and less 
prestigious occupations.” 
370 Rudolph (1977: 213). 
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return on investment);371 and sought the acquisition of technical skills and a credential 
which would help secure entry to a growing middle-class. 
To an industrializing and urbanizing nation, college attendance became closely 
linked to a certification of social status. During the era of emergence, higher education 
would become increasingly understood as a signal of upward mobility, a mechanism 
employed by both curriculum designers and beneficiaries alike. In companion volumes 
which reflect subsequent stages of this gradual process, Bledstein (1978) and Levine 
(1986) chart the cultures of “professionalism” (during the late Victorian/Progressive eras) 
and “aspiration” (during the interwar period) respectively, and examine how service 
providers responded to this new political economy of higher education. Embodying the 
meritocratic ethos of the age, university presidents (“thinkers in chief”) who were 
responsible for these institutional developments were seen as both institutional 
spokesmen and cultural exemplars. Hamilton W. Mabie, a leading editor of the time, 
opined that “[n]o class of men is rendering more important service to the Nation, none 
commands greater respect…They are heard with respect on public questions no less than 
on academic and educational questions; they are credited with large intelligence, with 
disinterestedness, and with high aims.”372 
Contingent upon increases in public support, the continued emergence of higher 
education was driven by a convergence of concomitant forces. Student desire for 
vocational forms of training coincided with a faculty trend toward specialization because 
                                                             
371 See Goldin and Katz (1999: 47-48, 52). 
372 Mabie (1893: 338, 341). See also Cohen and Kisker (2010: 163-165).  
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“the preparation of practitioners rested on their learning the scientific principles 
undergirding their specialties.”373 As faculty came to define themselves by their 
disciplinary affiliation, professionalization occurred within the academy as well with 
universities prioritizing graduate study, the solicitation of funding, the application of 
science to industry, and the measurement of faculty impact by research outputs.374 During 
the expansion era, the initial rationale for implementing an elective system was an appeal 
to broader constituencies through curricular choice. The iteration of “new education” 
embraced during the era of emergence, however, was more often framed as an approach 
which in itself illuminated important pedagogical goals – an “intrinsically valuable 
embodiment of the ideals of scientific inquiry.”375  
Given the embrace of science and business, it is not surprising that liberal arts 
education (criticized for its insufficient empiricism and lack of market relevance) faced 
challenges in this institutional climate.376 Reformers claimed that student socialization 
and civic participation, two functions associated with institutional identities 
deemphasized by the university reformers’ ascendant vision, were still important to the 
mission of higher education. These functions, though, would only be pursued indirectly 
as positive byproducts of an institution committed to science. Adhering to the ideals of 
open inquiry would condition students to make thoughtful (i.e. evidence-based) decisions 
                                                             
373 Cohen and Kisker (2010: 179). 
374 On the “founding of learned societies” (e.g. American Political Science Association in 1903, 
American Sociological Association in 1905) and changing “structures of knowledge,” see Goldin 
and Katz (1999: 39-40). 
375 Reuben (1996: 66).  
376 For example, Potts (1965) expertly traces the shift in emphasis from “values to techniques” in 
the teaching of social ethics at Harvard from 1881-1931. 
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because “particular scientific disciplines produced knowledge that was morally relevant 
[as] it could provide standards for individual behavior and social norms.”377 In addition, 
the deliberative political involvement exemplified by Jewett’s (2012: 35) “scientific 
democrats” – engaged social scientists whose moral aims were “justified empirically 
rather than biblically” – could serve as practical models for students to emulate in their 
own participatory efforts.   
Underscoring the applied value of faculty research would also prove beneficial as 
universities sought philanthropic and legislative support, constituencies that had included 
many vocal critics of higher education. Andrew Carnegie, in an 1891 commencement 
address at the Pierce College of Business and Shorthand of Philadelphia, for example, 
commended the graduates for attending a school which prepared them to be capable 
workers and didn’t bother them with a liberal arts education lacking worth. “Is 
Shakespeare or Homer to be the reservoir from which [traditional graduates] draw?” 
asked the famous industrialist. “I rejoice, therefore, to know that your time has not been 
wasted upon dead languages…and that you are fully equipped to sail upon the element 
upon which you must live your lives and earn your living.”378 While Carnegie’s 
complaints about the static nature of the curriculum were outdated even at the time he 
uttered them,379 the broader practical critique of higher education did succeed in 
stimulating institutional responses that aimed to allay these sentiments. This managerial 
                                                             
377 Reuben (1996: 133). 
378 As quoted in Donoghue (2004: 95-96). 
379 On the uninformed critics who claimed students “should have been given…special vocational 
instruction,” Wilson (1909) explains that these proposals “are generally put forward by persons 
who do not know how college life and work are now organized and conducted.” 
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revolution resulted in several important business-friendly reforms including corporate 
control of trustee boards at leading universities and the imposition of “efficiency” 
standards as measured by private sector foundations, both of which transformed the 
institutional landscape under which higher education operated.380 
Reflective of the growing place of higher education in American life, the 
institutional identities that prevailed during much of the era of emergence – occupational 
training and advanced research – were propelled by “technological shocks”381 that caused 
wider interest in the educational services being provided. Far from all within academia 
supported these curricular paths; indeed, voices of dissent (i.e. counter-reformers) sprung 
up to take advantage of the disillusionment with the elective system by exploiting 
historically-contingent opportunities to reassert the important role for the liberal arts and 
citizenship preparation. While some students (and many of the external political actors 
who lobbied for greater curricular choice) appreciated the “principle of liberty in 
education,” other students and many pedagogically-minded faculty members saw a 
chaotic system reminiscent to “the law of the jungle.”382 Teaching undergraduates was no 
longer the primary responsibility for professors because, according to Wilson (1909), 
“the side-shows are so numerous, so diverting…that they have swallowed up the circus 
and those who perform in the main tent must often whistle for their audiences, 
                                                             
380 See Thelin (2004: 238-243) for a summary review of these organizational changes. 
381 Goldin and Katz (1999: 40). 
382 Allardyce (1982: 698). A 1903 graduate of the University of California remarked that “all 
these studies were simply separate tasks that bore no definite intrinsic relation to each other…the 
right studies were there; what was lacking was the conscious organization of them for the 
student.” Quoted in Rudolph (1977: 227).   
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discouraged, and humiliated.”383 Even supporters of the system like Daniel Coit Gilman, 
President of Johns Hopkins, recognized its imperfections, acknowledging that “we have 
broken away from the restricted notions of the past; we have not yet learned how to 
adjust ourselves to the broader domains in which we are now walking.”384  
Benefiting from the deficiencies of, if not outright backlash to, the laissez-faire 
system, advocates for general education seized upon an institutional environment and 
historical moment which would be more receptive to their cause. While there were a 
variety of approaches to general education, each was founded upon a critique of 
contemporary life and endeavored to provoke further understanding of the responsibilities 
of citizenship and the appreciation of shared common values.385 Since these perennial 
objectives could be tailored to specific circumstances, reexamining (and renewing 
commitment to) core principles was conceived as a “useful” goal for institutional (and 
political) leaders to promote during the era of emergence, a time where external events 
(e.g. combat abroad and economic depression stateside) prompted a collective moment 
for reevaluation. Because there were different motivations (and, in some cases, 
potentially incompatible goals) among the proliferation of courses under the rubric of 
                                                             
383 Student Henry Seidel Canby in Alma Mater (1936: 81-82) writes about the difficult conditions 
“particularly in the first decade of the new century” that obscured the primary objectives of 
higher education. “A young instructor on the faculty,” Canby describes, “could look upon this 
unheard of combination of sporting resort, beer garden, political convention, laboratory, and 
factory for research with a mind as confused as a Spanish omelet.”  
384 As quoted in Bledstein (1978: 48). 
385 This movement cohesion, according to Levine (2006: 26) was grounded in the claim that the 
“crass philistinism of the vocational colleges and the sterile specialization of the research 
universities” had resulted in the “abandoning [of higher education’s] responsibility for the proper 
development of young people.” 
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general education,386 Levine (2000) provides an instructive outline of the “impulses that 
engendered the general education movement,” to help guide our discussion. General 
education advocates were driven by concerns over the modernizing processes of 
privatization, specialization, intellectual anarchy, or mediocratization and sought to 
implement curricular plans to thwart these institutional developments. 
Some proponents faulted the elective system for encouraging a privatization of 
outlook among students and saw the (re)introduction of general education as a method to 
enhance civic consciousness. Levine (2000, 2006) identifies A. Lawrence Lowell, the 
President of Harvard (1909-1933), as a leading voice in this movement faction. Lowell 
had become concerned about the impact of individuation of thought on a democratic 
nation because “all men partake of the character of rulers…and ought to be trained in 
some measure for that duty.”387 Distinguishing between “cultural” courses which 
“contributed to a student’s personal growth” and “vocational” courses that serve as 
“preparation for a career,” Lowell argued that Harvard should restore its undergraduate 
curriculum to emphasize courses “that were primarily cultural.”388 In At War with 
Academic Traditions in America, Lowell (1934) argues that general education would 
instill a sense of public interest, but curiously in this same book, the recently retired 
university president considers “the relation between faculties and governing boards”389 
and concludes that lay control (i.e. membership comprised of businessmen and 
                                                             
386 Allardyce (1982: 709) roughly estimates that general education offerings (e.g. Contemporary 
Civilization, Great Books, Citizenship and Critical Thinking) grew from “two courses in 1911 to 
eighty-two by 1925.” 
387 Lowell (1934: 104-105). 
388 Reuben (1996: 203). 
389 Lowell (1934: 281-291). 
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politicians) of the Harvard Board of Overseers was a promising development because 
“non-professional elements” serve as fine arbiters between different groups of experts 
and could use their position of influence to encourage the cultivation of public spirit.390 
Many fellow-travelers in the general education movement would certainly agree with 
Lowell’s diagnosis of the problem, but envisioning the business-minded boards as part of 
the solution would strike his peers as downright odd. Thorsten Veblen (1918: 88), while 
not considered a proponent of general education aimed at civic consciousness,391 has 
written compellingly about corporate interference in higher education during this 
historical period, and unlike Lowell, saw governing boards as culprits bent on 
“standardized erudition,” not saviors for general education (or any other non-immediately 
tangible objectives). 
For a second subset of general education supporters, the intellectual breadth 
exemplified by such a course of study would serve to counteract the narrow 
specialization that was, at present, preventing the development of well-rounded citizens, 
what Woodrow Wilson (1925) called “a new ignorance” produced by “separate baronies 
of knowledge, where a few strong men rule and many ignorant men are held vassals.”392 
This approach found resonance at Columbia University, under the leadership of Nicholas 
                                                             
390 Without dwelling on this point, it is important to note that Lowell, a former president of the 
university where the elective system was founded by his predecessor, is asserting that the Board 
of Overseers, which was broadly supportive of these changes, will provide a check on its 
continued predominance because of the civic aims which initially brought these members to their 
position. 
391 The “ideal university,” for Veblen (1918: 53), is “a place of refuge and a place of meeting, 
confluence and dissemination for those views and ideas that live and move and have their being 
in the higher learning.” 
392 As quoted in Levine (2006: 30). 
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Murray Butler, who had been a strong believer in curricular choice, but began to change 
course after seeing its impact on student outcomes. Imminent U.S. involvement in World 
War I caused President Butler to further appreciate the citizenship role that higher 
education could play in American life393 and, in concert with the U.S. War Department 
(the precursor to the Department of Defense), instituted a “War Issues” course at 
Columbia where student conscripts would gain, according to the course director, “some 
understanding of the view of life and of society which they are called upon to defend and 
of that view against which we are fighting.”394 After the armistice, there was continued 
interest at Columbia to pursue the general education purpose embodied by the War Issues 
course,395 including appeals by instructors for a “Peace Issues” course (that would 
presumably be less propagandistic than the prototype it was following).396 Declaring that 
“there is a certain minimum of our intellectual and spiritual tradition which a man must 
experience and understand if he is to be called educated,”397 the Contemporary 
                                                             
393 A similar argument in favor of liberal education as the means to develop a “disciplined mind” 
would be made by Harvard President James Conant (1935) in the buildup to the Second World 
War.  
394 As quoted in Allardyce (1982: 706). By this time, President Woodrow Wilson of Princeton 
had become President Woodrow Wilson of the United States. On the relationship between higher 
education and the military during World War I, including discussion of (classified) research being 
conducted on campus and student military training, see Gruber (1975).  
395 A faculty dean expressed this widely-held sentiment: “Born of the consciousness that a 
democracy needs to know what it is fighting for, it has awakened a consciousness of what we, as 
a people, need to know if our part in the world of today is to be intelligent, sympathetic, and 
liberal…If our youth are to be freed from a confusion of ideas and standards, no other means 
looks so attractive as a common knowledge of what the present world of human affairs really is.” 
As quoted in Allardyce (1982: 707). 
396 Indeed, as Jewett (2012: 203-204) explains in a brief review of primary texts assigned in the 
early years of Contemporary Civilization, the successor course to War Issues, instructors used 
readings which more often emphasized “democratic socialism,” a sharp contrast to Butler’s 
“hidebound nationalism.” 
397 As quoted in Rudolph (1977: 237).   
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Civilization course was born in 1919, extended a decade later (without opposition) to a 
two-year compulsory requirement, inspired similar programs throughout the nation (some 
more successful than others), and continues today as an integral part of the core 
curriculum at Columbia.  
A third group within the general education movement was motivated by “a 
condition of intellectual anarchy in modern times”398 and maintained that a curricular 
model based on the quest for the unity of knowledge could provide the necessary 
structure to restore an institutional mission of social utility. Although he was not the first 
scholar to propose “a common unspecialized form of study” as the solution to the 
problem of fragmentation, knowledge unification became popularly associated with 
Alexander Meiklejohn, President of Amherst College (1913-1923) and founder of the 
Experimental College at the University of Wisconsin.399 Meiklejohn is often credited 
with teaching one of the first general education courses, a 1914 seminar at Amherst on 
“Social and Economic Institutions,”400 but unlike his nationalist colleagues at Columbia, 
Meiklejohn was disinclined, when requested to alter the tone of his course in the buildup 
to American intervention. Since the aim of general education, for Meiklejohn, was to 
prepare students to be “free and responsible human beings,”401 he did not take kindly to 
this demand for “preparedness” from Amherst trustees; by 1923, Meiklejohn’s unyielding 
                                                             
398 Levine (2000). 
399 See Meiklejohn (1920, 1922, 1932). On intellectual anarchy and the need for clarity of 
institutional purpose, see also MacLeish (1920: 363). 
400 Similar in focus to Meiklejohn’s vision as later realized at the Experimental College at the 
University of Wisconsin, Marietta College (Ohio), in 1913, created a four year program in 
political institutions that applied “ancient history and moral philosophy to the public problems of 
the Progressive Era” (Rudolph (1977: 218-219). 
401 Meiklejohn (1932: 22). 
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commitment to academic freedom along with his vocal support for worker’s rights and 
education resulted in his ouster from Amherst.402 At the University of Wisconsin, 
Meiklejohn created the Experimental College, a two-year prescribed course of study 
designed to further the goal of curricular coherence because college should, “broaden and 
deepen…insight into life itself, to open up the riches of human experience…so that life 
may be fuller and richer in content.”403  
Sympathetic to Tocqueville’s insight that democracy leads to a debased taste for 
equality among the citizenry, a final group of general education enthusiasts aimed to 
combat the perceived mediocritization of American life by teaching students, in the 
words of its leading spokesman, Robert Hutchins, President of the University of Chicago 
(1929-1951), about “the elements of our common human nature.”404 Similar to other 
proponents of general education, this cohort articulated their concerns about 
commercialism and vocationalism within higher education,405 but unlike their peers, 
concentrated their animus at “our confused notion of democracy” in which it is 
acceptable that “education should be immediately responsive to public opinion.”406 
                                                             
402 On the Amherst years, see Nelson (2001: 61-130). 
403 Meiklejohn (1908: 558). Sloan (1979: 34) astutely suggests that John Dewey represents the 
scientific counterpart to Meiklejohn’s humanistic orientation in the “search for common 
learning.” While their methodological approach certainly differed, they both attempted to 
“establish a unifying principle and ethical orientation in the curriculum.” See e.g. Dewey (1910) 
for his address to the American Association for the Advancement of Science. On the attempt by 
Antioch College in the 1920s to create a curriculum inspired by Dewey’s progressive model of 
education, see Sealander (1988).   
404 Hutchins (1936: 85). 
405 In The Higher Learning in America, Hutchins (1936: 4, 43) claims that “the love of money” 
and demands for job training “lead…to triviality and isolation; it debases the course of study and 
its staff.” 
406 Hutchins (1936: 13). 
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Resolutely elitist in its conception and its anticipated impact – i.e. higher education is not 
intended for everyone nor should its aims be altered to accommodate those who are not 
adequately equipped for (or interested in) serious academic study – this framing of 
general education would prove less attractive in later more egalitarian eras when higher 
education prided itself (at least rhetorically) for its outreach to socially and economically 
diverse constituencies.  
Implemented during the Great Depression at Chicago, the “New Plan,” as it was 
then called, although it would soon be rebranded as the Great Books Program, was a 
curriculum that would “prepare the young for intelligent action,” and “lay a basis for 
advanced study.” Through engagement with the “greatest books of the Western world,” 
students “will have learned what has been done in the past, and what the greatest men 
have thought,” and as a result, Hutchins argues, “[t]hey will have learned how to think 
themselves.”407 Hutchins’ approach was influenced by Mortimer Adler, a philosopher and 
co-founder of the Great Books Foundation who had been taught by John Erskine, one of 
the creators of the Contemporary Civilization course at Columbia.408 This academic 
genealogy is important because, although students at Chicago and Columbia might be 
assigned similar readings, the ahistoricism rooted in the Chicago teaching style differed 
from the contextualism and contemporaneity of the Columbia education, and therefore, 
                                                             
407 Hutchins (1936: 85). 
408 On Mortimer Adler and the Great Books movement, see Lacy (2013). 
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may have limited its socializing potential for political engagement, and more generally, 
speaks to the various purposes embedded within general education advocacy.409 
As part of the general education “course correction,” colleges and universities 
began to offer classes which oriented students to broader thematic content (i.e. less 
explicitly vocational, less specialized) and, according to a 1922 report issued by the 
American Association of University Professors (AAUP), provided “the student a 
stimulating and intelligent interest in the main human problems of the present.”410 Fitting 
this description included courses such as “Contemporary Theories of Social Reform” at 
the University of California, Berkeley, which considered the “programmes and principles 
of the leading reform movements of the day” and “Problems in Political Economy” at the 
University of Michigan, which examined the “immigration problem, industrial crisis, free 
trade, [and] the railway problem,” as well as new programs in social science such as 
Columbia’s “School of Political Science” and the Johns Hopkins “Department of History 
and Politics,” both of which aimed to teach students to become “wise interpreters of 
politics…strong promoters of democratic institutions.”411 These curricular reforms (along 
                                                             
409 Even today, students at the University of Chicago and other schools that have imported the 
Great Books approach (e.g. St. John’s College, University of Dallas) are not known to be 
breeding grounds for student political engagement. In The Atlantic Monthly, Randolph Bourne 
(1911: 673) wrote about his undergraduate experience at Columbia: “We come [to college] to 
learn from men, not from books. We could learn from books as well at home, but years of 
individual study will not equal the inspirational value of one short term of listening to the words 
of a wise and good man. Only enthusiasm can knit the scattered ideals and timorous aspirations 
into a constructive whole.” 
410 As quoted in Reuben (1996: 163).    
411 For further details and additional examples, see Reuben (1996: 157-167). 
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with their co-curricular counterparts)412 allowed higher education officials to (re)claim an 
institutional commitment to character development and political socialization.  
In a work known primarily for the introduction of a measurement scale named for 
its second author, Murphy and Likert (1938) ponder the animating concern of this project 
– the relationship between curricular purpose and student political socialization – in 
relation to the most politically engaged students during the era of emergence. In 
contemplating “why the bookish student is more radical,” the authors conclude that the 
“answer lies in a study of the modern temper.” Surveying a student sample at four leading 
universities (Columbia, Yale, Northwestern, and the University of Michigan), Murphy 
and Likert (1938: 108-109) construct a measurement of political attitudes and find that 
the most “radical” respondents413 cite reading as a “consistent and powerful” influence in 
shaping their beliefs and disproportionately major in fields (e.g. philosophy, history, 
English literature) that embody a strong commitment to the liberal arts.414 Regarding the 
relationship between higher education and political socialization, student Randolph 
Bourne (1912) wrote that “education, if it has been in one of the advanced universities, 
will have only tended to confirm [a student’s] radicalism.”415   
                                                             
412 E.g., see Reuben (1996: 7, 260) on the building of dormitories during the emergence era and 
the establishment of a “community of student life.” 
413 Murphy and Likert (1938: 66) define radicalism as “desire for fundamental change in our 
social institutions.” 
414 Unsurprisingly, less radical students were significantly more likely to focus their studies in 
fields which emphasize “laboratory work, mathematical calculation, or the acquisition of practical 
skills.” While Murphy and Likert (1938) base their findings on student attitudes at four elite 
colleges, the relationship between serious-mindedness and political engagement has been found 
in other institutional contexts during this historical period. See, e.g., Graham (1969) on the 
leaders of the 1927 student strike at the Hampton Institute (VA). 
415 As quoted in Lipset (1976: 148).  
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Despite his contention that college had become a “reorganizing force” in 
American life during the era of emergence, Bourne’s youthful exuberance about 
institutional outcomes on student politics may be overstated. In the first two decades of 
the twentieth century, it would be more precise to modestly claim that “though there 
might be no ‘youth movement,’ there are some ‘youths in movement.’”416 Campus 
expressions of progressive ideals took several forms including, most prominently among 
them, the settlement house movement and the founding of the Intercollegiate Socialist 
Society.417 Originated by British students, and popularized in the United States through 
the model of Hull House in Chicago, settlement houses provided arriving immigrants 
with residential, educational, and cultural support as they confronted the difficult 
conditions produced by the forces of industrialization and urbanization. By 1911, over 
10,000 students had taken advantage of this opportunity to “apply their values in social 
betterment” at one of the nation’s 413 settlement houses.418 Settlement house efforts 
exposed students to massive social inequities and although the palliative work being done 
was indispensable, some students concluded that these projects didn’t adequately address 
the root causes of the social problems that they were encountering.     
This realization led a small but vocal contingent of college students to entertain 
more systemic critiques of industrial capitalism. Founded in 1905 by author and agitator 
Upton Sinclair, the Intercollegiate Socialist Society (ISS) served a purpose similar to the 
                                                             
416 Kirkpatrick (1926: 198). 
417 Additionally, politically engaged students (especially at women’s colleges) were active in the 
College Equal Suffrage League which advocated for women’s voting rights, and the 
Intercollegiate Civic League promoted legislative reforms regarding issues including municipal 
government and child labor. 
418 Lipset (1976: 152); Cohen (1989: 429). 
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student literary societies of the nineteenth century – a campus study group that aimed at 
filling perceived curricular gaps. Sinclair contended that “since the professors refused to 
teach the students about modern life…it was up to the students to teach themselves.”419 
As has been a common thread in all historical periods, the most organized and active 
chapters were located in institutional settings where students received “exposure to the 
liberal arts tradition…and the values it promoted” in contrast to environments where 
students were “preoccupied with attaining career goals” and, as a result, showed minimal 
interest in ISS (or, more generally, any other kinds of sociopolitical education).420 At 
Amherst, ISS meetings were structured around informal discussions of “contemporary 
social and economic problems in conjunction with readings” among students, faculty, and 
often President Alexander Meiklejohn (during his tenure) while members at Yale had a 
more formal reading list which acquainted students with socialist themes in the works of 
theorists such as Jeans-Jacques Rousseau, Karl Marx, and Ferdinand Lassalle.421 
Embodied in its motto “light, not heat,” education, not propaganda, was the stated goal of 
the ISS.422 Organizers were quite confident, though, that as more students learned about 
socialism, many would embrace the philosophy as a plausible way forward in combatting 
contemporary ills. From its rising influence during the reform-minded Progressive Era to 
                                                             
419 As quoted in Horn (1979: 2). For further context of Sinclair’s full-throated indictment of 
higher education, see The Goose-Step (1923). Although it was his idea to create the national 
organization, Sinclair held the position of inaugural vice-president of ISS. Jack London was 
chosen to be the first president, not simply for reasons of cachet. The famous author gave inspired 
lectures as he toured the nation promoting the cause and castigating universities for engaging in 
the “passionless pursuit of passionless intelligence.” Horn (1979: 13-14).    
420 Horn (1979: 80-81). 
421 Horn (1979: 67). 
422 Cohen (1989: 428). 
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its declining acceptance on campus as World War I commenced, the appeal of ISS (both 
in terms of membership and outreach) correlated with the diminishing legitimacy 
accorded to the ideals associated with the group.423 
Declaring an official position of neutrality, the ISS tried to maintain its scholastic 
approach by promoting debates on campus, while other groups like the Collegiate Anti-
Militarism League attempted to mobilize opposition to American involvement in the war 
and, more specifically, against military preparedness due to its direct impact on campus 
operations.424 Illustrating the effectiveness of student-led campaigns against compulsory 
military training on campus was a 1915 poll which indicated that almost eighty percent 
(of a total of eighty-thousand) of student respondents opposed military activity on 
campus.425 As American intervention was fast approaching, vocal opposition on campus 
receded (or was censored due to increasingly nationalistic impulses), but student efforts 
during the pre-war era laid the groundwork for similarly inspired student strikes and other 
actions during the interwar period. The most successful of these efforts aimed at ending 
military science requirements were those which were able to link opposition to particular 
policies with their apparent incompatibility with the liberal (i.e. non-vocational) goals of 
education. As one student editorial explained about compulsory military courses, “It 
prevents the question-asking attitude, since its watchword is obedience without flicker of 
                                                             
423 See Horn (1979: 84-88) for membership numbers throughout the organizational history. 
424 On the strategies and tactics of the Collegiate Ant-Militarism League, see Rudy (1996: 111-
114). 
425 Altbach (1997: 26). 
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a doubt. And it violates the truce with the world of action by requiring exactly the kind of 
professional training the college does not exist to give.”426   
The actions of these “militant minorities” were covered by an emerging 
independent campus press and received nationwide exposure when their efforts were 
picked up by The New Student, the preeminent student journal of the period.427 Published 
every fortnight by the National Student Forum, The New Student served to amplify 
critical student voices during the 1920s. In its mission statement concerning “Where We 
Stand,” the editorial board connects the unease that students felt about higher education’s 
complicity with the military with a broader condemnation of the increased influence of 
commercial and vocational forces, a development that was considered anathema to stated 
institutional purposes. This “gigantism”428 represented an abrogation of responsibilities, 
according to The New Student, because  
We are in college to ask the puzzling questions about the bases of all things that 
active professional people have no time to think about…We are not in college for 
training to act, as merchants or lawyers or doctors or engineers: that’s the job of 
the university.429 
                                                             
426 Kirkpatrick (1926: 202). See Kirkpatrick (1926: 208-213) for examples of opposition to 
military training on campus. 
427 Kirkpatrick (1926: 200). Other independent campus newspapers founded during this era 
included the Harvard Gadfly, the Oberlin Critic, the University of Wisconsin Proletarian, the 
University of Michigan Tempest and the Yale Saturday Evening Pest. Kirkpatrick (1926: 198-
199). 
428 Editors of The Vagabond (Indiana University), “Gigantism and the University,” as reprinted in 
The New Student 4 (24 January 1925), 7. See also “‘Too Big’: Our Higher Education is 
Overgrown – and End of Student Influx Is Not in Sight,” The New Student 5 (11 November 
1925), 1. 
429 As quoted in Kirkpatrick (1926: 202); Altbach (1997: 32-33). See also the Report on 
Undergraduate Education (1924), a “philosophy of education” pamphlet written by a 
commissioned group of twelve Dartmouth College students that addresses similar concerns. The 
“active learning” recommendations of the curricular report, which offers the “rough scaffolding 
by means of which a variety of needs can be met,” are outlined in Kirkpatrick (1926: 216-220). 
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Despite some notable victories, by the end of the decade, long-time editor Douglass 
Haskell wrote in despair that many of the causes that The New Student had championed 
over the years had encountered constant setbacks, often due to activist burnout and 
shifting student priorities.430 This disengagement (or indifference) led visiting British 
scholar Harold Laski (1931) to wonder, in contrast to the European students to which he 
was most familiar, “why don’t your young men care?”431 
The economic crisis of the early 1930s would soon transform the political 
atmosphere on campus. Despite the collapse of the job market – according to one 
estimate, between 50 and 85 percent of male college graduates were unemployed 
between 1929 and 1934 – students, in contrast to other periods of insecurity (such as the 
present historical era), increasingly moved away from a “specialized education of limited 
use to courses of a more general nature.”432 Students often credited their studies in 
helping to shape their political commitments. Writing in the Daily Princetonian during 
the build up to American involvement in World War II, editor William H. Attwood 
explained that “[we] had taken enough social science courses to develop a fairly hard-
boiled attitude toward war [and] have been taught to be skeptics…[this] skepticism was 
fortified by the realization that [our] own postgraduate plans would be wiped out in the 
                                                             
430 Altbach (1997: 38). 
431 In his role as president of the National Student Federation (NSF) – the association of college 
student governments – Edward R. Murrow of Washington State University hosted a CBS radio 
news show called University on the Air. Murrow, of course, went on to an illustrious broadcast 
career, but he concluded that this early effort at “awaken[ing] student interest in national and 
international problems” was a failure. As he told delegates in his December 1931 farewell address 
to the NSF convention, the “greatest sins” of his peers continued to be “political apathy [and] 
smug complacency.” See Cohen (1993: 7). 
432 Rudolph (1977: 248); Altbach (1997: 59). 
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bargain.”433 While Attwood and his (middle-class) college peers were not as immediately 
affected by the Depression as many other groups in society, college and universities felt 
the impact by 1932 and 1933 when enrollments dropped four percent each year, a loss of 
80,000 students who would have sought higher education in better economic 
conditions.434   
Within this social context, it is notable that the earliest mobilizations of the 
thirties occurred among the more working-class student population at the City College of 
New York (CCNY).435 In its debut issue, the editors of Frontiers, a student magazine 
sponsored by the CCNY Social Problems club, argued that military science courses 
(including ROTC training) should not be part of the school’s curriculum, even if they 
were voluntary, because they “function as the agency for the dissemination of jingoist, 
imperialist propaganda.”436 For challenging school policy, Frederick C. Robinson, the 
president of CCNY, responded by suppressing distribution of Frontiers, revoking the 
charter of the Social Problems club, and suspending ten students who had contributed to 
the issue. Facing a citywide coalition of free speech student advocates, the administration 
eventually relented and agreed to reinstate the suspended students and to authorize 
continued publication of Frontiers. Energized by its victory, student leaders saw the 
                                                             
433 As quoted in Rudy (1996: 137). 
434 Cohen (1993: 9). 
435 Benefiting from the support of local (non-student) organizers in New York City was likely the 
driving force for this initial emergence. Given the content of the grievance at CCNY, propinquity 
to allies, not class consciousness, was the initial spark.  
436 Frontiers (February 1931), 1. 
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promise of forming a more permanent organization that would allow for better 
coordination among New York students.437    
The National Student League (NSL) was founded in December 1931 to achieve 
this goal. Conceived as a group to address the needs of students in New York City – it 
was originally named the New York Intercollegiate Student Council – the NSL proposed 
an inclusive left-oriented agenda for social change that represented a diversity of student 
concerns during the Depression-era. In its short-lived journal, Student Review, NSL 
organizers laid out an ambitious platform which called for commitments by higher 
education (e.g. respect for academic freedom, lowering of tuition fees, ending of military 
training, and stopping racial and sexual discrimination on campus) and demands for 
government action (e.g. increased appropriations for education, unemployment insurance 
for graduates, state aid for financially-strapped students).438 A slogan later chalked on 
campus sidewalks concisely summed up the vision of the National Student League: 
“Down with Imperialistic War. Scholarships Not Battleships.”439  
Serving as a harbinger of later student actions, two NSL-affiliated events in 
Spring 1932 demonstrated the potential influence of a broad-based student politics. In 
March, an eighty student delegation tried to show solidarity with striking coal miners in 
Harlan County, Kentucky by bringing supplies to the workers and vowing to investigate 
                                                             
437 Cohen (1993: 28-30). 
438 See “Building a Militant Student Movement: Program and Constitution of the National 
Student League,” Student Review (December 1931) and “For a National Student Movement: A 
Suggested Basis,” Student Review (January-February 1932). The NSL was one of the first groups 
to recommend the creation of a federal work-study program, an idea later piloted as part of the 
New Deal’s New Youth Administration (NYA) initiative. 
439 As quoted in Loss (2011: 76). 
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charges of malfeasance by the operating company and vigilantism against the miners. 
Like the group of writers led by Theodore Dreiser who had recently attempted a similar 
expedition which inspired the trip and reminiscent of the obstacles faced by Freedom 
Riders a few decades later when they ventured South, the NSL students, who attended 
colleges located not just in New York – Harvard, Smith College, and the state universities 
of Wisconsin and Tennessee were among the schools represented – were turned back by 
armed intimidation. Despite this (predictable) outcome, the students brought national 
publicity to the poor wages and mistreatment of the miners. NSL leaders called the 
experience an “historic vanguard” which “test[ed] the freedom of speech and assembly in 
that region” and “acted as a catalyst for the student movement.”440  
Further indications of the ability of the National Student League to reach 
constituencies beyond its founding core of public college members was its support of 
Reed Harris, editor of the Columbia University Spectator, who had been expelled in 
April, for publishing “misrepresentations” in the student newspaper, the breaking point 
for administrators being a recent series in which he charged the university with 
profiteering and mismanagement of the dining halls and exploitation of student 
workers.441 Harris responded by criticizing Columbia for its “regimented, hypocritical 
thinking”442 and claimed that the violation of his free speech rights was a clear 
                                                             
440 Cohen (1993: 45, 53); Brax (1981: 22). On the Harlan County expedition in support of the coal 
miner’s strike, see Cohen (1993: 44-53). 
441 Cohen (1993: 56-57). 
442 Cohen (1993: 58). 
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contradiction of the values he was taught by Columbia faculty to respect.443 A one-day 
student strike, bolstered by the presence of several thousand students, was organized by 
the NSL and called for the reinstatement of Harris and a full investigation into the issues 
that his reporting had uncovered. The tactic was ultimately successful and Reed was 
reinstated – an ironic resolution given that Harris’ role as editor was nearing its 
conclusion when the administration began its crusade against him.444  
The student strike was later employed to even greater effect during the thirties 
peace movement. In April 1934, working with the Student League for Industrial 
Democracy (SLID) – a successor group to the Intercollegiate Socialist Society (ISS) 
described above – the National Student League organized the first national student “peace 
strike” to oppose American involvement (e.g. armament sales, military support) in future 
conflicts abroad. Held on the anniversary of U.S. entry into World War I, the 25,000 
student participants engaged in one-hour boycotts of classes, a practice that would 
continue throughout the duration of the annual event. The inaugural strike was a way for 
student groups to further publicize support for an Americanized version of the Oxford 
Pledge, an oath adopted by the Oxford Union debating society in 1933 which stated that 
“under no circumstances should one fight for King and Country.” The American pledge, 
whose text substituted “government of the United States” for King and Country, enjoyed 
                                                             
443 Unlike Columbia, which claimed to maintain a (rhetorical) commitment to student civil 
liberties despite the Harris incident, faculty and administrators at other universities were often 
willing to acknowledge the curbing of student rights. As Frederick Woellner, professor of 
education at the University of California-Los Angles (UCLA) explained in his praise of student 
suspensions over a 1934 free speech dispute, “We no longer believe in free speech. We believe in 
responsible speech.” Quoted in Cohen (1993: 98). See Cohen (1993: 98-133) on the suppression 
of free speech and surveillance of students during this historical era. 
444 On the Reed Harris controversy at Columbia, see Cohen (1993: 55-68). 
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widespread approval on campus.445 In a Spring 1933 poll conducted by the Brown 
University Daily Herald with more than 22,000 students (at 65 colleges and universities 
in 27 states), the newspaper found that 39% of student respondents expressed a 
preference for noninterventionism (pacifism), 33% stated an unwillingness to serve in the 
U.S. military unless the “nation was invaded,” and 72% of those surveyed said that they 
would “refuse to fight in an overseas war.”446 Building upon this level of support, the 
student peace movement reached an apogee of influence between 1934 and 1937.  
Contemporaneous student accounts attest to the influence that faculty and a liberal 
arts based curriculum had on their political consciousness. “Courses in economics, 
history and political science awakened me to local, national and international affairs,” 
said one student recruit who saw participation as the vehicle to “solidify and to integrate 
my many new interests.”447 A female student leader from Randolph-Macon College (VA) 
recalled the discussions with her psychology professor as “the most important single 
influence in my intellectual growth” that led to her immersion in student politics.448 
During this period of united popular front – so-called because the NSL joined forces with 
                                                             
445 “We pledge not to support the government of the United States in any war it may conduct.” 
446 On the Oxford Pledge, see Cohen (1993: 80-83, 89-90). 
447 Cohen (1993: 243). 
448 Cohen (1993: 246). On familial and intellectual influences on politicization, see the 
autobiographical essays written by student attendees to the 1935 Student League for Industrial 
Democracy (SLID) Summer Leadership Institute and the 1938/1939 American Student Union 
(ASU) Summer Institute. Joseph P. Lash Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library 
(Available at http://newdeal.feri.org/students/docs.htm). Cohen (1993: 240) concedes that student 
reports also suggest that faculty could be “obstacle[s]” to rather than “facilitator[s]” of political 
engagement.  
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SLID in December 1935 to form the American Student Union (ASU)449 – attendance 
grew each year at the National Student Strikes Against the War. In 1937, 500,000 
students were estimated to have participated in the nationwide strike, a numerical growth 
coinciding with modest economic improvements achieved by the New Deal, a point that 
would not be lost on students as Roosevelt administration officials and surrogates 
(including Eleanor Roosevelt) increasingly chided the movement for its intransigent 
position on the war.450  
Student unity would not last. A factional split within ASU membership over the 
policy of collective security developed between liberals and communists who were in 
support of an increased international presence for the United States and pacifists and 
socialists who advocated maintaining the organization’s stated position of neutrality (as 
reflected in its endorsement of the Oxford Pledge). Coming to a head at the 1937 national 
convention, it was well past time for the ASU to debate the Oxford Pledge plank in its 
platform as some within the group’s own ranks had been directly undermining its anti-
interventionist message. From 1936-1938, five hundred students, including eighty-eight 
ASU members, violated U.S. neutrality laws by joining the Abraham Lincoln Battalion 
                                                             
449 For an instructive timeline of “U.S. Student and Youth Groups,” see Schwartz (2006: 817). 
The organizations that comprised the student movement of the thirties are detailed in Altbach 
(1997: 72-96) and Draper (1967). 
450 On the national student strikes against war, see Cohen (1993: 91-94). Students also found 
satirical ways to express their antiwar views. In Spring 1936, the Veterans of Future Wars (VFW) 
was chartered at Princeton. The goal of the organization, according to the “Post Commander” at 
nearby Drew University (NJ), was to secure preemptive bonus payments to all students because 
“many will be killed or wounded in the next war and the most deserving will not get the full 
benefit of their country’s gratitude.” In a few months, VFW chapters were active on 415 
campuses with female students joining a parallel group called the “Gold Star Mothers of the 
Future.” See Rudy (1996: 125-126) and Whisenhunt (2010). 
174 
 
    
 
and fought on the anti-fascist (Loyalist) side in the Spanish Civil War.451 Conditions had 
now changed and the result of the ASU vote was never much in doubt. By a vote of 382 
to 108, the American Student Union dropped the “anachronistic”452 pledge. The delegates 
meeting at Vassar College also formalized their support for much of the New Deal 
domestic agenda, particularly those initiatives (such as student scholarships and the work 
study program) which established federal interest in expanding access to higher 
education. The student movement against the war would soon lose appeal as “the antiwar 
students of 1937” would likely become the “effective soldiers in 1942.”453 If these 
students were fortunate enough to return from combat, they could benefit from the 
educational provisions of the GI Bill. This merging of the warfare and welfare state was a 
partnership which would shape higher education during the egalitarian era, the next 
period of institutional development to be considered. 
 
Multiversity and Its Discontents:  
The Egalitarian Era of Higher Education (1944–1980) 
Warning! I am a student. Please do not bend, fold, spindle or mutilate me. 
Protest Rally Sign, Free Speech Movement (1964)454 
 
Endeavoring to ease veteran reintegration into the postwar labor market, the 
Roosevelt Administration, working with its allies in Congress, proposed “an act to 
provide Federal Government aid for the readjustment in civilian life of returning World 
                                                             
451 See Cohen (1993: 156).  
452 Cohen (1993: 171). 
453 Altbach (1997: 71). 
454 As quoted in Eynon (1989: 58). 
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War II veterans.”455 Passed in June 1944, the omnibus legislation included an educational 
program which “guaranteed military personnel a year of education for 90 days service, 
plus one month for each month of active duty, for a maximum of 48 months.”456 The GI 
Bill was considered bureaucratically novel, not simply because of its status as an 
entitlement – all veterans who were not dishonorably discharged from service were 
eligible for the benefits – but also due to its portability as tuition payments could be 
“carried” to any accredited college or university.457 By 1950, more than two million (out 
of fourteen million) eligible veterans had taken advantage of the program, and largely due 
to its impact, the total number of college students had doubled since prewar era 
enrollment figures.458 Billions of public dollars flowed into campus coffers. Public 
universities were especially appreciative as the government paid out-of-state tuition rates 
irrespective of student residence. 
                                                             
455 The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act. Public Law 346, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, June 24, 
1944. On the legislative debate and the influence of lobbying groups in favor of (and in 
opposition to) the proposed legislation, see Mettler (2005).  
456 Kiester (1994) credits the landmark legislation for changing the life trajectory of veterans who 
would have not otherwise even considered seeking higher education. 
457 Thelin (2004: 264-267). Given the social realities of the time, benefits were not equally 
distributed to all eligible veterans. A lower percentage of female veterans made use of their 
benefits because they were either not told of their eligibility by their military superiors or were 
encouraged to fulfill gender role expectations which did not include seeking post-secondary 
education. (It should be noted that women had represented forty percent of the total college 
student population in 1940, a figure which was not reached again until 1970.) Since there was no 
requirement in the legislation that “participating institutions” demonstrate nondiscrimination – a 
concession to Southern politicians loathe to support any federal policy that infringed on “state’s 
rights” – colleges with segregationist traditions could maintain racially discriminatory practices 
without fear of federal reproach. Since African Americans had very restricted choices in the 
South, Turner and Bound (2003) conclude that rather than “closing the gap,” the GI Bill 
contributed to “widening the divide” between educational outcomes by race. 
458 Thelin (2004: 263); Bender (1997: 9). 
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While the GI Bill would register near unanimous popular approval years later – 
on its fiftieth anniversary one headline, indicative of this praise, called it the “Best Deal 
Ever Made by Uncle Sam”459 – initially there were serious critics of the program, 
including leading voices within higher education, whose concerns merit reconsideration. 
Arguably the strongest skeptic, Robert Hutchins (1944: 21), president of the University of 
Chicago, claimed that the legislation, in its present state which “asks no questions about 
the ability and experience of the veteran,” was neither good for the system of higher 
education nor its intended beneficiaries. Hutchins welcomed a national policy that 
espouses the “the principle that there must be no relation between the education of a 
citizen and the income of his parents,” but contends that safeguards were not in place to 
ensure policy success and worries that implementation failure would “demoralize 
education,” “defraud the veteran,” and result in the principle of increased access being 
discredited.460 Despite his overblown rhetoric about the impact of the GI Bill on campus 
culture – colleges were not “converted into educational hobo jungles” – Hutchins’ 
apprehensions about the effect of an influx of federal money on institutional purpose 
would prove prescient.    
In addition to the significant impact that the GI Bill had on individual veterans, 
the reverberations of the policy were felt both throughout the nation and within higher 
education. Although the legislation had been targeted to a specific class of citizens, 
                                                             
459 Kiester (1994). 
460 Hutchins (1944: 20). Hutchins (1948: 107) returned to similar concerns in his inimitable 
response to the Truman Commission Report on Higher Education, arguing that it “reflects the 
educational system with which it deals. It is big and booming. It is confused, confusing, and 
contradictory…It is confident that vices can be turned into virtues by making them larger. Its 
heart is in the right place; its head does not work very well.” 
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cultural awareness of higher education grew exponentially due to its passage leading 
increasing numbers of Americans (representing a range of social backgrounds) to believe 
that “everyone could go to college.”461 Signaling a federal commitment to mass higher 
education, the Truman Administration commissioned a study which would “explore 
whether the [access and affordability] principles of the GI Bill might be extended.”462 In 
following the presidential directive to examine the “ways and means of expanding 
educational opportunities for all able young people,” Higher Education for American 
Democracy (1947-1948), the resulting six-volume report produced by its thirty 
appointees, explored “the functions of higher education in our democracy” and “the 
means by which they can best be performed.”463  
Emphasizing the themes of accessibility and equal opportunity, the authors 
proposed recommendations which attempted to address the limited options for lower-
income students and to respond to the problem of institutional stratification.464 Promoting 
the value of demographic diversity and establishing a blueprint for the student loan and 
scholarship system realized in the Higher Education Act of 1965, the Truman Report 
advocated for students from humble backgrounds to be eligible for financial aid so that 
their prospects for attendance would be less restricted by economic barriers. Because 
                                                             
461 Cohen and Kisker (2010: 195). On the cultural portrayal of the GI Bill in Post-War America, 
see Clark’s (1998) content analysis of the “most popular periodicals of the day,” including 
Saturday Evening Post, American Magazine, Life, Time, and Ladies Home Journal. 
462 Thelin (2004: 268). 
463 Harry S. Truman, “Letter Appointing Members to the National Commission on Higher 
Education.” (13 July 1946), The American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12452. 
464 See Vol. I (Establishing the Goals), Vol. II (Equalizing and Expanding Individual 
Opportunity), and Vol. V (Financing Higher Education) of the President’s Commission on 
Higher Education (1947-1948). 
178 
 
    
 
private colleges and universities were often considered more prestigious than their public 
counterparts due to financial advantages (e.g. large endowments, elite donor classes, 
ability to recruit top scholars and students), the commissioners proposed a massive 
program of federal aid for public institutions that would seek to counter this unequal 
distribution of resources. Due to successful lobbying efforts by private universities, who 
were predictably opposed to this section of the report, federal monies would not primarily 
be allocated by institutional governance, but rather would be determined competitively by 
the relevance of grant proposals to national research objectives, a development whose 
significance is discussed below.465     
The democratic ideals embodied by the GI Bill and Truman Commission Report 
heralded what I have termed the egalitarian era, a historical period in which access to 
higher education – as signified by policies which fostered growth in student enrollment 
and government actions that demonstrated greater federal investment – moved from 
being considered an elite privilege to increasingly being recognized as a civil right. The 
aims undergirding this change in philosophy were clustered in the immediate postwar era 
while the products of this gradual process of expansion, the “most dramatic changes in 
the social profile of the collegiate population,”466 are reflected in measurable outcomes 
(e.g. trends in public sector, female, and minority student enrollment) by the end of the 
era.467 Without disparaging the unquestionably positive elements of a mass system of 
                                                             
465 Reuben and Perkins (2007: 267-268, 270). 
466 Kim and Rury (2007: 305). 
467 On public sector enrollment, Reuben and Perkins (2007: 269) provide the following numbers 
(public/private): Fall 1947 (1,152,000/1,186,000); Fall 1957 (1,973,000/1,351,000; Fall 1967 
(4,816,000/2,096,000); Fall 1977 (8,847,000/2,439,000). On “making a female majority” and the 
179 
 
    
 
higher education, we cannot ignore the (non)financial tradeoffs to increased access. 
“Mass” doesn’t simply refer to more students and increased federal involvement; mass 
also speaks to changes in the “product” of higher education caused by the presence of 
these expanding constituencies.468 In an era when public and private universities “became 
increasingly dependent on federal grants for substantial portions of their budgets”469 and 
the legislative mandate was to broaden access and generate scientific (defense-related) 
research, institutional functions that did not speak directly to these objectives would 
likely receive scant attention. 
These tensions are evident in Higher Education for American Democracy, a 
document which combines its goals for greater access with a preference for a general 
education curriculum that merges liberal arts education and citizenship preparation 
because “the democratic way of life can endure only as…personal ambition is reconciled 
with public responsibility.”470 The Report finds fault with what its authors see as 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
“growing minority” enrollment rates, see Kim and Rury (2007: 304, 317-324, esp. Table 1 and 
Charts 1 and 2). 
468 In an empirical study of college student beliefs during the mid-1950s, Goldsen (1960: 198) 
discusses the socialization effects of this “impersonally directed” posture “toward an anonymous 
consumer without regard to his inner experience in using or applying it.” When students are 
introduced to “institutional norms and values in the very milieu in which they are explicit and 
authoritative,” Goldsen concludes that, “they will come to acknowledge their legitimacy.” 
Educational services that represent counter norms (e.g. liberal arts education) are likely to have 
less mass appeal. 
469 Rudy (1996: 140). 
470 President’s Commission on Higher Education (1947-1948: vol. I, p. 10). In public sentiments 
like these, the significant influence of Harvard’s General Education in a Free Society (1945) on 
the Commission is readily apparent. Colloquially referred to as the Red Book for its crimson 
cover, General Education in a Free Society, in some respects, provided the course curriculum to 
advance the democratic aims of the Truman Report. The Harvard committee recommended a 
broad yet integrated sampling of course material required for engaged citizenship and asserted 
that the primary purpose of higher education should be to “help young persons fulfill the unique, 
particular functions in life which it is in them to fulfill, and fit them so far as it can for those 
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vocational motivations driving higher education, an environment in which “today’s 
college graduate…is ‘educated’ in that he has acquired competence in some particular 
occupation, yet falls short of that human wholeness and civic conscience which the 
cooperative activities of citizenship require.”471 Recommending a form of general 
education that was pragmatic and outward reaching – what Schrum (2007: 279) 
characterizes as an “instrument that nurtured a student’s capability for democratic living 
rather than as a pathway to ultimate reality” – the authors envisioned a liberal arts 
education for all, not simply for students attending the most elite colleges and 
universities.472 Yet, despite an opposition to specialization, the funding mechanisms and 
policy apparatus that were created in the longer-term wake of the Commission’s work 
rewarded advanced research and occupational training, not the development of 
democratic citizens through the creation (or refinement) of general education 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
common spheres which, as citizens and heirs of a joint culture, they will share with others.” 
(Harvard University 1945: 4). Reuben (2010: 42) explains that the course of study proposed in the 
Red Book should be understood as a historicized modification of the Great Books model created 
at the University of Chicago. “Western Thought and Institutions,” the course which would seek to 
unify the curriculum, “focus[ed] on those periods in the past most relevant to the ‘great questions’ 
of democracy in the present.” The specific distribution requirements outlined in the Red Book 
were never implemented at Harvard, but the conversation spurred by its publication was central to 
curricular debates throughout the postwar era. On the ethical orientation and democratic 
obligations implicit in the Red Book, see Rudolph (1977: 258-259); Sloan (1979: 35); Talcott 
(2005: 3). 
471 President’s Commission on Higher Education (1947-1948: vol. I, p. 48).  
472 As the Commission describes its approach, “general education is liberal education with its 
matter and its method shifted from its original aristocratic intent to the service of democracy.” 
(President’s Commission on Higher Education 1947-1948: vol. I, p. 49). Similar to General 
Education in a Free Society (1945: 58), which claims that effective teaching would be necessary 
to “adapt a central unvarying purpose to varying outlooks,” the Truman Report also expected that 
local context would play an essential role.    
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programs.473 The access targets that were achieved were largely due to the expansion of 
business and technical programs at public universities.  
The National Defense Education Act (1958), which provided federal loans and 
fellowships to students pursuing study in “educational programs to meet critical national 
needs,” was a prominent example of this policy design. Because the bill was passed in 
response to the rising Soviet space program (most notably, the recent launch of its 
Sputnik satellite), “critical” in this context meant science, engineering, and area studies, 
fields that could provide “brainpower for the Cold War.”474 Leaving little confusion 
about legislative intent, grantees, as a condition of acceptance, were required to sign a 
loyalty oath swearing allegiance to the United States.475 Representing a blending of Cold 
War politics and democratic values, federal government expenditures for financial aid 
and sponsored research climbed from 2.2 billion to 23.4 billion between 1950-1970.476 
This level of investment during the egalitarian era inevitably resulted in a change in 
                                                             
473 Schrum (2007: 300) argues that the “lack of intellectual consensus among those who desired 
higher education to have a unified center…enabled the triumph of the specialized research 
model.” 
474 Clowse (1981). 
475 Public Law 85-864, 85th Congress 2nd Session, September 2, 1958. (See loyalty oath provision 
in Title X, Sec. 1001, f(2). See Loss (2011: 156-159); Urban (2010). Subsequent legislation that 
increased access and guided higher education more toward professional and vocational training 
included the Vocational Education Act (1963), the Health Professions Educational Assistance Act 
(1963), and the National Vocational Student Loan Insurance (1965). See Cohen and Kisker 
(2010: 253) for a comprehensive list. 
476 Smith and Bender (2008: 5). An emphasis on public funding is not meant to minimize the 
extensive philanthropic support of academic research (or to discount the tradeoffs of this kind of 
partnership). The Port Huron Statement (1962), the founding document of the Students for a 
Democratic Society (SDS), alleged that “private financial interests shape under-financed colleges 
and universities, not only making them more commercial, but less disposed to diagnose society 
critically, less open to dissent.” For a critical historical view of private investments in the 
behavioral sciences by the Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller foundations, see Parmar (2012). For a 
nuanced review of Cold War university research, see Engerman (2003).  
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institutional identity within academia and a shift in cultural expectations about the 
purpose of higher education among external publics. Relying upon federal funding had 
not been considered an unalloyed good; indeed, colleges and universities were often 
reluctant to accept government money because of possible constraints on academic 
freedom, but in the aftermath of World War II, looking to recoup economic losses from 
the previous decade, university administrators were less discriminating in the sources of 
their monetary support. 
In Sciences, the Endless Frontier (1945), Vannevar Bush, the inaugural Director 
of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), codified this research 
collaboration and laid the groundwork for the organizational infrastructure (e.g. National 
Science Foundation) needed to manage federal patronage of academic work. Bush 
claimed in the executive summary of the report to President Roosevelt that “science can 
be effective in the national welfare only as a member of a team,” but his colleagues 
would soon realize that certain kinds of research were more likely to be funded by their 
teammates in Washington. Grant applications that promised “immediate payoffs sought 
by military-related federal agencies” along with other forms of applied (as opposed to 
basic) research were seen as most desirable to appropriators.477 President Eisenhower, in 
his remarkable Farewell Address (1961), cautioned against the potentially corrupting 
influence of state funding on the process of scientific inquiry:   
Partly because of the huge costs involved [in the conduct of research], a 
government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual 
curiosity….The prospect of domination of the nation’s scholars by Federal 
                                                             
477 Thelin (2004: 272). 
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employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present – and is 
gravely to be regarded.478  
 
Higher education leaders failed to heed these warnings as appeals for subsidies 
would continue unabated throughout the egalitarian era. This unparalleled period of 
institutional growth was exemplified by the arrival of the “multiversity,” a neologism 
created by Clark Kerr to describe the all-encompassing functions that comprehensive 
research universities were expected to provide to their various constituencies (with often 
competing demands). Acknowledging the lack of intellectual coherence in this 
extemporized configuration, “the idea of a multiversity,” Kerr (2001: 5) explained in The 
Uses of the University, “is an imperative [caused by the exigencies of the time] rather 
than a reasoned choice among elegant alternatives.”479 As president of the University of 
California and overseer of its “master plan” framework for tiered instruction, Kerr’s 
system represented the prototype beneficiary of federal funds, whose institutional 
prestige was raised during this “golden age” of higher education. Partially due to its 
(uncritical) alliance with the national security state, though, the University of California, 
notably the Berkeley campus where Kerr had previously served as Chancellor, became a 
central site for the most active (and iconic) student political mobilizations of the era.  
These two developments were not unrelated. As Mattingly (2012: 489-490) 
describes in a retrospective symposium on The Uses of the University, a book he 
                                                             
478 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Farewell Address.” (17 January 1961), Public Papers of the 
Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953-61, 
http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/all_about_ike/speeches/farewell_address.pdf.  
479 Originally delivered as the Harvard Godkin Lectures (1963), Kerr updated The Uses of the 
University in 1972, 1982, 1995, and 2001. Each revised edition includes a new chapter to reflect 
institutional developments. 
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considers a “singularly ahistorical apologia for a new state system of higher learning,” 
Kerr extols the “democratic inclusiveness” and “new service [research] orientation” of 
the egalitarian era, yet remains silent about the “disruptive consequences” (e.g. “the 
inequality of resource allocation”) associated with this collaborative arrangement 
between higher education and the state.480 Politically conscious students increasingly 
drew attention to this complicity with external interests (e.g. military recruiters, private 
defense contractors) that represented values which students claimed were inimical to the 
intellectual principles which differentiated higher education from other institutional 
settings. This attitude is exemplified in the 1965 manifesto of the Free Speech Movement 
at Berkeley (“We Want a University”) which claims that the university had been 
“grotesquely distorted”  into a “factory for the production of knowledge and technicians 
to service society’s many bureaucracies,” a place where “research and training replace 
scholarship and learning.”481 
Despite these curricular shifts toward vocationalism (which have accelerated ever 
since), the egalitarian era was also a flourishing (if fleeting) time for liberal arts 
education, a byproduct of increased public support for the entire system. In surveying the 
different stages of this period of higher education, the students who majored in the social 
sciences and humanities were most likely to respond to the sociopolitical inequities they 
                                                             
480 Thelin (2004: 274) affirms that “[f]or once the principal headache facing university presidents 
was not a shortage of money but rather the political problems created by new monies and their 
uneven distribution.”  
481 Free Speech Movement (1965: 2862), as reproduced in Cohen (1973). In asserting that “the 
authors sought restoration rather than revolution,” Jewett (2012: 555) calls the 1965 document 
“one of the most striking defenses of liberal education penned in the twentieth century.” 
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saw around them (on and beyond campus) and often credited their studies for prompting 
their participation.482 
The political mood on college campuses during the 1950s was analogous to 
student outlooks one would encounter during the 1920s. While the early years of each 
decade were marked by an “apoliticism and withdrawal from the controversial affairs of 
society”483 – an attitude of disengagement that tends to characterize postwar periods – a 
marginal (yet persistent) presence of socially conscious students functioned as a bridge to 
a more politically active decade defined by another (though, in the case of the 1960s, 
considerably more divisive) war abroad.484 When queried about their beliefs and values, 
contemporaneous studies indicate that students were “conformist,” “fairly conservative” 
and made “little mention of social awareness.”485 Goldsen (1960: 116) observed nominal 
political interest on campus during the McCarthy era, and likely as a consequence of this 
time of data collection, students reported becoming increasingly conservative throughout 
their undergraduate years. Like most other institutions in American life, higher education 
did not evade purveyors of the “red scare.” The mythical golden age of higher education 
was tarnished by faculty purges, suppression of thought, restrictions on academic 
                                                             
482 Libraries are replete with books about sixties-era student politics, many of which have been 
consulted while preparing this manuscript. The objective of this project, though, as has been 
noted, is not to present exhaustive coverage of all of the significant events during any particular 
historical era but rather to offer illustrative cases which help us trace institutional developments in 
higher education to demonstrate how shifting functions (including curricular aims) may influence 
student political socialization. 
483 Altbach (1997: 114).  
484 The Korean War occurred from 1950-1953, but despite tepid student support at best, there was 
no anti-war movement (or even serious questioning about the efficacy of American policy) on 
campuses nationwide. See Suchman, Goldsen, and Williams, Jr. (1953). 
485 Altbach (1997: 116). According to the Port Huron Statement (1962), this was an institutional 
environment where “students don’t even give a damn about the apathy.”  
186 
 
    
 
freedom, and an overarching political climate which produced “caution, weariness, and 
inhibition induced by current pressures.”486 This Cold War sensibility was reflected in 
student politics, both in determining the issues upon which groups chose to organize and 
on the limits of proposed solutions given the narrow spectrum of “acceptable” policy 
positions. 
The U.S. National Student Association (NSA), a federation of student 
governments, was praised and denounced by its student peers during the egalitarian era – 
the former due to the groundbreaking Student Bill of Rights that the group had passed at 
its 1947 founding convention and its pioneering interracial Southern Student Human 
Relations Project,487 the latter because of the 1967 revelations that the organization had 
been clandestinely funded for much of its history by the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA).488 With a domestic agenda that emphasized the restoration of free speech rights on 
campus and advanced a commitment to higher education access to all, irrespective of 
racial or ethnic background, and a foreign policy perspective that was aggressively anti-
                                                             
486 Seigel (1951), as quoted in Altbach (1997: 117). Schrecker (1986) remains the classic study on 
the impact of McCarthyism on higher education. 
487 See Whittington (2013) for a compelling review of the intellectually rigorous and personally 
transformative “Southern Project.”  
488 Other student groups which were active during the 1950s, but less prominent than the NSA, 
included the Students for Democratic (SDA), an early civil rights and civil liberties organization 
that was financially controlled by its adult counterpart, the Americans for Democratic Action 
(ADA), an arrangement which caused consternation among the student membership, who felt 
constrained by the limited vision of its parent organization. (Altbach 1997: 132-137). More 
radically-inclined students could join the Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID) or the 
Young People’s Socialist League (YPSL), two groups which advocated for social democracy, the 
first of which would later become central to the student movement after its disaffiliation from the 
League for Industrial Democracy (LID) at the end of the decade and its subsequent rebranding as 
the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). See Altbach (1997: 152-163) for a discussion of 
these reformist organizations along with a brief review of several Marxist revolutionary groups 
scattered throughout the nation. 
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Communist, the NSA was situated within a mainstream Cold War liberal ideological 
space. Established by a small student delegation who had attended the 1946 World 
Student Congress in Prague, the interest of the NSA in international fellowship remained 
a central focus for the organization. In 1952, the NSA created the International Student 
Relations Seminars (ISRS) for student leaders of the developing world and, in so doing, 
attracted the attention (and surreptitious monetary support) of the CIA, which considered 
the student group to be a “useful tool” for American diplomacy and found its leaders, in 
urgent need of financial assistance, willing to share information about their international 
peers.489 These compromises are a significant part of the NSA’s legacy, and although 
appreciation of the group’s contributions may (rightfully) be tempered by regret, its often 
constructive voice for student political participation during a period of abeyance should 
not be forgotten.490 
By the end of the 1950s, with the demise of its eponymous leader and the 
discrediting of his cause, McCarthyite overreach had considerably weakened. In a 
prelude to later escalation, the roots of (what became known as) the New Left began to 
grow as student groups organized around civil liberties issues on their own campuses and 
joined with peers elsewhere on matters of national concern including nuclear 
disarmament and racial discrimination. As Irving Howe (1967: 5) remarked, “After a 
                                                             
489 On the NSA-CIA connection, see Paget (2003). Johnston (2009) provides the most detailed 
historical study of the United States National Student Association. See also Altbach (1997: 122-
132), Loss (2011: 140-142), and Friedson’s (1955) NSA-commissioned study of six-hundred 
college student governments. A brief history of this oldest student group that remains active, 
renamed in 1978 as the United States Student Association (USSA), is available at 
http://www.usstudents.org/about/history/. 
490 On social movement abeyance structures, see Taylor (1989). 
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decade of torpor, in which petty caution dominated academic life, the campus became 
again what in part…it should always be: a place of intellectual opposition and political 
controversy.” 
A model for college political parties that developed nationwide, SLATE was 
created in 1958 by students at the University of California at Berkeley to be the electoral 
arm of a campus campaign to advance student interests (e.g. affordable housing and 
increased wages for student workers) and a student ally to the mobilizations for civil 
rights and free expression stirring off campus (e.g. boycotting businesses and protesting 
the regional meetings of the House Un-American Activities Committee).491 Two 
additional groups that materialized in this environment – the National Committee for a 
Sane Nuclear Policy (1958) and the Student Peace Union (1959) – merit attention, not 
just because of their substantive concerns, but also due to the effect that divergent 
management structures have on organizational policy. Unlike Student SANE, which was 
an offshoot of an adult organization (a “youth division”) which controlled its message, 
the Student Peace Union (SPU), adopting a non-hierarchical approach which would 
become the norm among New Left groups, was an independent student-run operation 
                                                             
491 Boren (2011: 114). SLATE, which evolved from an earlier effort called Towards an Active 
Student Community (TASC), inspired the emergence of political parties at many colleges and 
universities including, but not limited to, ACTION at Columbia, FOCUS at Reed, SCOPE at San 
Francisco State, the Progressive Students League at Oberlin, and THINK at the University of 
Oklahoma. University of Michigan student Tom Hayden founded VOICE at Ann Arbor after 
spending time with SLATE leaders in Berkeley. Hayden was in California to cover the July 1960 
Democratic Party nominating convention in his capacity as editor of the Michigan Daily. (SLATE 
Digital Archives, http://slatearchives.org/history.htm). See also Freeman’s (2004) historical 
memoir.  
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which cultivated close relations with non-student groups in the peace movement, yet 
retained its autonomy.492  
On February 1, 1960, four African American college students were arrested for 
“trespassing” at Woolworth’s in Greensboro, North Carolina after attempting to buy 
coffee at the lunch counter and refusing to leave when service was denied to them 
because of their race. The Southern student sit-in movement had thus officially begun yet 
its moral and ideological impacts would transcend local targets.493 Initially spreading 
across the region due to the strategic acumen of the newly-organized Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the audacity of the direct action tactics employed and 
the philosophical convictions espoused by these young militants soon captured the 
attention of students in pursuit of social justice elsewhere.494 The most affected among 
these students formed Friends of SNCC chapters that supported their counterparts 
through fundraising and publicity while members also personally contributed to the cause 
through sympathy sit-ins to desegregate businesses near their home campuses or by 
                                                             
492 Altbach (1997: 189). 
493 On the sit-in movement, see Durward (1970: 459-461) and Morris (1981), and on the tactical 
diffusion of sit-in protests, see Andrews and Biggs (2006). It is a misnomer to say that the 
Greensboro sit-in began the student sit-in movement. As other scholars have observed, this tactic 
had been used many times by local civil rights organizations in the previous few years, but the 
media response to the February 1960 incident (and the mobilization which followed as a result) 
lead to this mischaracterization. It is more accurate to state that the Greensboro sit-in helped to 
reactivate a preexisting movement that had made the 1960 sit-in possible. Greensboro is the point 
of departure in this section, not because earlier civil rights efforts were inconsequential (e.g. 
Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955-56 or the founding of the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference led by Martin Luther King, Jr. are clearly important) or because SNCC was the first 
campus-based civil rights organization – the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), for example, 
had been founded in Chicago in 1942 by seminary students to protest segregated dining 
establishments – but rather because it is a pivotal moment for the student movement due to the 
ideological linkage of SNCC with the politics of the New Left. 
494 On the development of SNCC and consideration of intra-organizational debates, see Carson 
(1981) and Zinn (1964). 
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participating in Southern campaigns to mobilize African American voter registration 
drives and advance other educational objectives. SNCC taught students how to transform 
ideas into action; by its own example, SNCC awakened a political consciousness on 
northern and western campuses and for those who traveled south to volunteer in 
programs such as the 1964 Freedom Summer, the experience inspired subsequent 
political activity and provided intellectual lessons that could be applied in a variety of 
social contexts.495 At the height of the Free Speech Movement (FSM) at the University of 
California, Mario Savio, a philosophy student and leading member of the FSM Steering 
Committee, drew parallels between the violation of rights he encountered down South 
and the conditions faced by Berkeley students in the wake of an administrative ban on 
campus political advocacy:    
Last summer I went to Mississippi to join the struggle there for civil rights. This 
fall I am engaged in another phase of the same struggle, this time in Berkeley. 
The two battlefields may seem quite different to some observers, but this is not 
the case. The same rights are at stake in both places – the right to participate as 
citizens in democratic society and the right to due process of law.496  
 
Despite his (arguably) hyperbolic tone, Savio is indicating the powerful impact that the 
civil rights movement provided to other aggrieved parties during this historical period, 
whether the cause was free speech, curricular reform, women’s liberation, or ending the 
war in Vietnam. The civil rights influence was not merely symbolic, but operational in 
offering ideological principles and organizational practices – what one scholar calls the 
                                                             
495 On the Southern civil rights movement as direct motivation for later New Left political action, 
see Cohen and Zelnik (2002: Part I) and Hogan (2013). On Freedom Summer, see McAdam 
(1988) and Watson (2011). 
496 Savio (1966 [1964]: 254). 
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“connective fibers”497 – that were adopted by (and helped to shape the culture of) a range 
of groups within the spectrum of New Left politics.498  
In compiling oral histories of sixties-era students who were motivated to act by 
the civil rights movement, Eynon (1989: 45) finds that the shared ideals among the 
organizations they joined were centered on three fundamental themes: “participatory 
democracy, a re-definition of the political, and an emphasis on community as an issue, a 
strategy, and a goal.” Each of these ideas addressed a desire for greater inclusiveness in 
decision-making at all institutional levels – from campus governance to American foreign 
policy – and New Left groups attempted to build organizational structures (with varying 
success499) that prefigured these aspirations.500 The notion of politics was expanded to 
encompass not just non-electoral political activities, but more generally, all of the 
“conditions of everyday life,” a theoretical trajectory which culminated in the feminist 
                                                             
497 Obear (1970: 24). 
498 In contrasting the Old Left with the New Left, the Port Huron Statement (1962) suggests that 
the former was “plagued by vision without program” while “our own generation is plagued by 
program without vision.” Later in the text, the authors reference this generational deficiency and 
credit the civil rights movement with helping students become more visionary as it is “the most 
heartening [social force] because of the justice it insists upon, exemplary because it indicates that 
there can be a passage out of apathy.” The founders of SDS are consciously referencing the 
intellectual influence of sociologist C. Wright Mills (1960) to their cause by recognizing a 
distinction between an Old and New Left and explicitly framing their mission as one which seeks 
to offer a way “out of apathy.” See Geary (2008), Hayden and Flacks (2002), Hayden (2012), and 
Miller (1987: Ch. 4). 
499 Women faced rampant misogyny in the leading New Left organizations. Stokely Carmichael 
of SNCC, for example, repeatedly joked that “the only position for women in the movement is 
prone” and an internal SDS pamphlet equated “the system” which the group was fighting against 
to “a woman” because “you’ve got to fuck it to make it change.” As quoted in Loss (2011: 1999). 
Feminist critiques of the New Left from within, such as “Sex and Caste: A Kind of Memo” by 
Mary King and Casey Hayden (1965), ultimately led to the creation of the women’s liberation 
movement. See Evans (1979). 
500 Eynon (1989: 57). 
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slogan that the “personal is the political.”501 The process of community building was 
considered essential in order to counteract what was often described as the increasing 
depersonalization of contemporary life. This sentiment was satirically depicted in the 
protest signs that were brought to Free Speech Movement (FSM) rallies, which mocked 
the instructions on the IBM cards that students used to register for courses (“please do not 
bend, fold, spindle or mutilate”), a stand-in for all of the challenges to individuality and 
meaning triggered by the growth of the multiversity.502 In embracing these themes, the 
New Left (in its earliest years) may usefully be understood as a moral and intellectual 
movement driven by conservative impulses, determined to confront institutions (for 
which participants deeply cared) to embody their stated ideals.503 As one student 
explained years later about his participation in the FSM, “the university was the focus of 
our energies,” because “for all we hated [Berkeley], we loved it.”504  
A brief review of the origins and development of the Free Speech Movement 
further illustrates this process of tactical diffusion and thematic reappropriation. The FSM 
was initiated in October 1964 due to the Berkeley chapter of Friends of SNCC being 
prohibited from using the campus to recruit participants for a desegregation campaign 
                                                             
501 Eynon (1989: 46). Epitomizing this expansive view of politics, Hayden and Flacks (2012) 
recall early SDSers like themselves often quoting Thoreau’s entreatment in Civil Disobedience 
(1849) to “vote not with a strip of paper alone, but with your whole life.”  
502 In more earnest language yet similar in message, Tom Hayden (1966 [1962]: 282), the lead 
author of the Port Huron Statement, argued in a Spring 1962 speech at the University of 
Michigan, that “the main and transcending concern of the university must be the unfolding and 
refinement of the moral, aesthetic, and logical capacities of men in a manner that creates…a 
moral meaning in life that is direct and authentic for the self.” 
503 The final words of Port Huron Statement (1962) exemplify an optimism required by the times 
in which the words were written: “If we appear to seek the unattainable, it has been said, then let 
it be known that we do so to avoid the unimaginable.” 
504 Eynon (1989: 57). 
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being waged on behalf of African Americans seeking employment at local hotels and 
supermarkets. After student Jack Weinberg was arrested for disobeying the rule by sitting 
at a table and handing out fliers about the off-campus action, a crowd of students, whose 
numbers would peak at over 3,000 during a 30-hour stalemate, swarmed the campus 
police car in which Weinberg was being held. Students occupied this time not only by 
railing against the ban on political speech, but more generally to communicate their 
concerns about an institutional climate that considered such draconian measures to be 
acceptable at a public university which claimed to value free expression. Failing to exact 
any concessions from college administrators, the student coalition, emulating the civil 
rights organizers with whom they felt close affinity, decided to force an institutional 
response. In refusing to recognize the policy, the FSM embarked on a semester-long 
campaign comprised of rallies, academic symposia, and (unlawful) distribution of 
movement literature, all of which were aimed at examining student rights and the 
purposes of higher education in a democratic society. 
When university officials announced plans in late November to discipline students 
for their role in the October demonstrations, the FSM organized a sit-in strike for the 
second of December. Six thousand students attended the event, which is remembered 
most for Mario Savio’s call-to-action in which he condemns the dehumanizing behavior 
of the University of California (and by implication the United States), and implores his 
fellow students to “make it stop!,” because by remaining silent to these 
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“sick…operations,” they would be complicit in legitimizing an “odious machine.”505 The 
administrative response to the sit-in, which resulted in mass student arrests and the 
stationing of National Guard troops on campus, provoked outrage among Berkeley 
faculty, who as a group had not previously taken a formal side in the conflict. Unnerved 
by this overreaction, the faculty senate passed a resolution in support of FSM demands.506 
Recognizing a lost cause, the University of California Regents relented on January 4 and 
revoked the policy on political advocacy.507 The Free Speech Movement had triumphed.  
While the significance of this victory for both the Berkeley community and for 
college students who became motivated to seek reform on their own campuses should not 
be minimized,508 it is also important to appreciate the FSM as a formative space for 
                                                             
505 Mario Savio, “Sit-in Address on the Steps of Sproul Hall.” (2 December 1964).  
506 The faculty took a more active role moving forward. Education at Berkeley (1966), a 
commissioned report chaired by Professor of English Robert Muscatine, provides an often 
sympathetic view of the motivations for student dissent and the FSM’s specific grievances. 
Identifying the most committed students as “scholastically able young people,” the Muscatine 
Report recommended curricular changes (e.g. smaller class sizes, experimental programs) that 
sought to personalize the college experience and offer a “sense of viable community” at Berkeley. 
See also Mario Savio’s (1966) response published in Harper’s Magazine in which he faults the 
authors for not soliciting student input before proposing particular curricular reforms and predicts 
that many of the suggestions are largely cosmetic and will not result in a meaningful shift in 
institutional purpose.  
507 For a detailed narrative description of the events at Berkeley along with reminiscences by 
participants on all sides of the conflict, see the anthology edited by Cohen and Zelnik (2002). 
Primary source documents including oral history interviews, pamphlets, newsletters, and other 
movement ephemera are accessible via the university-hosted Free Speech Movement (FSM) 
Digital Archives (http://bancroft.berkeley.edu/FSM/) and the independently-curated FSM-A, Free 
Speech Movement Archives (http://www.fsm-a.org/).  
508 In trying to understand what had happened during the 1960s on college campuses, the 
President’s Commission on Campus Unrest (1970: 22) singled out the 1964 “Berkeley Invention” 
as being instrumental in igniting a spirit that guided later student mobilizations: “What happened 
at Berkeley was more than the sum of its parts. The events on that campus in the autumn of 1964 
defined an authentic political invention – a new and complex mixture of issues, tactics, emotions, 
and setting – that became the prototype for student protests throughout the decade.” As excerpted 
in Smith and Bender (2008: 374-375). 
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intellectual reflection. The FSM, similar in aim to co-curricular groups that previously 
appeared on American college campuses (e.g. student literary societies of the elite era or 
the Intercollegiate Socialist Society of the emergent era), served as an outlet for students 
to debate the proper role of higher education and raise questions about the political and 
social values that should determine institutional goals. Steve Brier explained that the Free 
Speech Movement was appealing to him as a Berkeley undergrad because of members’ 
concerns “about the nature of the university, and the struggles over what a university 
education could be.”509 Another student joined the FSM because “I found the moral 
arguments most persuasive. I was also persuaded by Jefferson and de Tocqueville.”510 
New Left political thought was inspired by the moral clarity and tactical 
innovation of the civil rights movement and informed by the critical writing and personal 
encouragement of intellectuals who synthesized the ideological perspective that would 
undergird the programmatic aims of “the movement.” Tom Hayden (2012), the lead 
author of the Port Huron Statement, describes the impetus for his own political 
development: 
I wrote the first notes for the Port Huron Statement in December 1961, when I 
was briefly in an Albany, Georgia, jail cell after a Freedom Ride to fight 
segregation in the South. The [students] engaged in direct action there changed 
my life. I had never met young people willing to take a risk – perhaps the ultimate 
risk – for a cause they believed in. Quite simply, I wanted to live like them. 
 
Despite the Port Huron Statement being drafted in June 1962, it was not until two years 
later due largely to the rise of the (unaffiliated) Free Speech Movement that the document 
                                                             
509 Eynon (1989: 58). 
510 As quoted in Eynon (1989: 63). 
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came to be widely circulated and SDS membership soared across the country. In an 
historical moment where there appeared a great desire to understand the causes of student 
discontent, the manifesto of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) presented a 
detailed narrative that identified the societal and institutional problems that students 
sought to combat at Berkeley. Although most of the FSM leaders had not been present at 
the founding of SDS, the Statement that emerged from the retreat in Port Huron, 
Michigan, reflected common roots, overlapping communication networks, and shared 
objectives between members of both groups.     
Distinguishing the Port Huron Statement was its expressive prose style, 
sophisticated analysis, and intellectual breadth, much of which can be ascribed to the 
ideas of C. Wright Mills and John Dewey and derived with the input of Arnold Kaufman, 
a philosophy professor at the University of Michigan, who had been asked by his students 
who had convened the meeting, to speak with those who had assembled to write the final 
version.511 Regarding Mills, the sociologist who had diagnosed the origins of democratic 
malaise in The Power Elite (1956), Tom Hayden explained that “I was completely 
absorbed in his writing. He was the inspiration for what I was trying to do.”512 The 
intellectual debts owed to Mills by the contributors to the Port Huron Statement are 
abundantly evident in the text.513 Concurring with the premise of Mill’s critique that an 
                                                             
511 Kaufman is said to have “functioned as a kind of free-floating guru” at the meeting. Miller 
(1987: 111). The entire text of the Port Huron Statement is available as an appendix to Miller 
(1987: 329-374). 
512 As quoted in Miller (1987: 79). On Mill’s influence on the Port Huron Statement, see Miller 
(1987: 79-91). 
513 Mills’ concerns were not altogether novel for the time. Other leading social critics like David 
Riesman in The Lonely Crowd (1950) and William H. Whyte in The Organization Man (1956) 
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uncoordinated ruling class “neutralizes” (and benefits from) an acquiescent public, the 
Port Huron Statement declares that “apathy is not simply an attitude; it is a product of 
social institutions.”514 In a passage faithfully channeling their intellectual mentor, the 
authors describe the deleterious effects of this sclerotic condition on democratic life: “the 
very isolation of the individual – from power and community and ability to aspire – 
means the rise of a democracy without publics.” Mill’s analysis clearly resonated with the 
founders of SDS, but countervailing evidence appeared in the form of the Southern 
student movement, which offered, according to students in attendance at Port Huron, “an 
example of a different way to see ourselves in history” and a way forward to “break out 
of apathy.”515  
In search of a concept that reflected the deep and meaningful forms of political 
participation being practiced by African American students in the South, several SDSers 
were reminded of the idea of participatory democracy they had been introduced to by 
Arnold Kaufman in political philosophy courses he taught at the University of Michigan. 
Building upon John Dewey’s (1927) insights about the limitations of conventional 
understandings of democracy, Kaufman’s conception of democracy was expansive, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
offered similarly impactful analyses of the “spirit-breaking ‘massification’ of American life.” See 
Loss (2012: 533). 
514 This line ends with the clause “and of the structure and organization of higher education 
itself.” The question of whether higher education was “designed to encourage political passivity” 
or rather disengagement was an unintended byproduct of the stultifying environment in which 
higher education operated is what often divided liberal faculty from radical students like Brad 
Cleaveland at Berkeley, for example, who cautioned undergrads, in the SLATE Supplement 
Report 1:4 (September 1964), that “[i]n the name of human learning you acquire the capacity to 
be docile in the face of rules.” Reuben (2002: 491) 
515 Hayden and Flacks (2002). It is beyond the scope of this project to provide a detailed 
organizational history of SDS. Sale (1973) remains the most comprehensive one-volume source 
on the topic. 
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empowering, and articulated in the language of interdependence and civic renewal.516 
Echoing Kaufman’s approach, Tom Hayden wrote in his Port Huron draft notes that 
“participation means both personal initiative – that men feel obliged to help resolve 
social problems – and social opportunity that society feels obliged to maximize the 
possibility of for personal initiative to find creative outlets.”517 To gain support for the 
cause, Kaufman advised his students to “allude to American ideals while criticizing their 
misapplication,” and explain that participatory democracy was a complement to, not a 
replacement for, representative institutions.518  
During the mid-to-late sixties, students embraced Dewey’s (1937: 457) statement 
that “all those who are affected by social institutions must have a share in producing and 
managing them,” by pursuing curricular reforms (and other more inclusive forms of 
institutional governance) that furthered the aims of participatory democracy. Drawing 
upon the political education acquired outside of the regular course of study, veterans of 
Port Huron and inheritors of its spirit became involved in campus efforts at curricular 
change to try to mitigate the challenges of the egalitarian era of higher education. 
Students sought to “waken our sleepy universities” by (1) working within existing 
structures (an incremental approach); (2) creating new “parallel institutions” often 
bearing the “Free University” moniker (the most radical plan); or (3) helping to establish 
experimental colleges (pilot programs that were often responsive to student input yet did 
                                                             
516 See Kaufman (1960). Mattson (2002: 187-227) provides a close reading of Kaufman’s imprint 
on the founding values of SDS. For an assessment of his philosophical and political contributions, 
see Social Theory and Practice 2:1 (Spring 1972), a memorial issue published in the aftermath of 
Kaufman’s sudden death due to a plane crash. 
517 Quoted in Miller (1987: 95). Emphasis in original. 
518 Mattson (2002: 189), Miller (1987: 94-95). 
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not threaten other university stakeholders).519 Employing means which did not 
significantly alter the relationship between students and the multiversity, some 
educational reformers pursued membership status on curriculum committees, assisted in 
the planning of topical conferences, or served as liaisons between students and 
administrators.520 In contrast to those operating within the system to achieve a greater 
institutional role for students, some politically-engaged advocates helped to create 
intellectual opportunities alongside official university classes which would aim, by their 
own example, to provoke curricular and cultural change at their “parent” school. Free 
Universities would function as an alternative to the present system of higher education (in 
terms of relevant class content and pedagogical objectives), while Experimental Colleges, 
which were staffed by faculty and imparted material deemed worthy of formal academic 
credit, acted in close conjunction with their sponsoring institution. 
In proposing a “Free University of California,” the FSM Steering Committee 
(1965) envisioned a parallel independent institution to provide a curricular model of 
political socialization that would “catalyze a nationwide revitalization of liberal 
education”521 and “bring humanity back to campus.”522 Motivated by enthusiastic calls 
                                                             
519 See Schwebel (1968) for an overview of the different kinds of student involvement in 
curricular change. 
520 Schwebel (1968: 34) discusses a student committee being formed at New York University, for 
example, to evaluate the school’s statement of purpose and the faculty being responsive to student 
concerns about “an overemphasis on vocational goals and an under-emphasis on the development 
of the student.”  
521 Jewett (2012: 552). 
522 A resolution advocating a similar idea was passed by delegates at the 1965 SDS national 
convention. At the 1966 convention, Carl Davidson delivered a position paper on university 
reform that explained “why it is imperative that we organize the campuses.” See Reuben (1998: 
155).     
200 
 
    
 
for university reform, students (with the support of sympathetic faculty) founded “free 
universities” on hundreds of campuses ranging from elite private colleges (e.g. Princeton, 
Stanford, Amherst, and Smith) to public state universities (e.g. Colorado, New Mexico, 
and North Carolina).523 Designed as a counterweight to the large impersonal specialized 
lectures to which students had become accustomed, free university courses were often 
taught (or facilitated by a team of instructors) as small interdisciplinary seminars with the 
cultivation of serious intellectual passions as the primary objective. The course titles – 
e.g. “Conflict Resolution and Non-Violence,” “Technology and the Needs of Man,” 
“Existentialism,” “The Beat Movement in Literature,” and “Modern Urban 
Development” – as well as the service learning and community outreach components that 
were often part of the experience may have been novel at the time, but in a sign of the 
project’s eventual impact as a source for innovation, these subjects have since become 
commonplace in many course catalogs.524  
Experimental colleges were established in response to the groundswell of student 
support for curricular reform, but unlike the independent free universities, these “colleges 
within colleges” represented an inside strategy where educational experimentation 
prevailed despite the program residing under the auspices of the parent institution. The 
model for this kind of reform was the Experimental College at the University of 
California, which was founded in 1965 by philosophy professor Joseph Tussman, who 
                                                             
523 Schwebel (1968: 39); Brubacher and Rudy (1997: 279). 
524 Reuben (1998: 156); Schwebel (1968: 40). The boundaries of acceptable course topics were 
limitless; according to the Free University Coordinating Committee at the University of 
Pennsylvania “any subject matter is considered valid and will be offered if an instructor wants to 
teach it and there are students who wish to take it.” As quoted in Schwebel (1968: 39). 
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had been personally influenced (during his undergraduate studies at the University of 
Wisconsin) by the example of Alexander Meiklejohn. In agreement with many of the 
student concerns about higher education, Tussman devised a two-year program for 
incoming students which focused on intellectual development through intensive reading 
and extensive discussion of primary texts (from antiquity to seventeenth century England 
to the contemporary United States) and emphasized close collaboration among faculty 
and students.525 To accommodate student demands for concentrated study, some colleges 
also experimented with their academic calendars so that students would take fewer 
classes concurrently: Dartmouth and Goucher changed to a trimester schedule, Williams 
added a standalone January term, and Colorado College had students focus on one course 
for a several week period of study.526 Most of these reforms – even the creation of course 
evaluations! – did not provide for the institutional changes that many students had hoped; 
experimental colleges only served a small and select group within a university, and since 
free universities did not have an official presence on campus, many colleges could safely 
ignore their institutional critiques.  
                                                             
525 Employing Deweyan prose, Tussman (1997: 5) explained years later that he “start[ed] with the 
wonderfully baffling idea that liberal education is education for the ruling function, and the 
companion conviction that since everyone in a democracy is to share in the ruling function, 
everyone needs to share in the education reserved, in elitist societies, for the ruling class.” See 
also Reuben (2002: 489) on the Experimental College. 
526 Brubacher and Rudy (1997: 280). Many of these efforts were (in)direct responses to the claim 
made in the 1965 FSM manifesto that students were not given enough time to focus: “We all 
know what happens when we really get ‘turned on’ by a great idea, a great man, or a great book: 
we pursue that interest at the risk of flunking out. The pursuit of thought, a painful but highly 
exhilarating process, requires, above all, the element of time.” To facilitate individual initiative, 
Tufts University implemented its Experimental College to, in part, help students to develop 
courses to be taught to their peers for academic credit. This successful experiment persists to the 
present day. See http://www.excollege.tufts.edu/aboutHistory.asp.  
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Direct forms of engagement inside the university would be necessary to compel a 
discussion about the role and responsibilities of higher education in American society. 
With the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Higher Education Act, 
opportunities increasingly presented themselves for African American students (and their 
allies) to press administrators on matters of campus life – including curricular affairs – 
that did not adequately reflect the anti-discrimination ideals underlying these landmark 
pieces of legislation. Spurred by this “minority rights revolution” and stimulated by the 
black power movement, students, in their demands for more diverse and relevant course 
content, employed a dual strategy of persuasion and disruption, with specific tactics 
determined by the level of campus resistance to such campaigns.527 The debates were less 
contentious at colleges that were more amenable to these requests like the University of 
Wisconsin at Madison where a joint faculty-student committee concluded that “the 
important role of Afro-Americans in the shaping of these United States has been 
seriously ignored and quite often distorted in the curricula of this and other 
universities”528 or Yale University, which approved in 1968 the nation’s first 
undergraduate major in black studies after administrators were swayed by arguments put 
forward by members of the Black Student Alliance (BSAY).529 More confrontational 
methods including student strikes and building occupations were judged to be necessary 
                                                             
527 On the relationship between student politics and the growth of black studies programs, see 
Nelson (2003) and the theme issue of the Journal of African American Studies 16:1 (March 2012) 
on “Expanding the History of the Black Studies Movement.” 
528 Committee on Studies in Instruction in Race Relations, “The Rationale for Afro-American 
Studies,” as quoted in Loss (2011: 190). 
529 As the co-founder of BSAY, Armstead L. Robinson, declared that group members “refuse to 
come here and lose our blackness.” “I have some identity that I intend to preserve,” explained the 
future historian. As quoted in Loss (2012: 535). 
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on campuses where state officials intervened for reasons of political expediency as was 
the case at San Francisco State or due to vocal faculty (and white student) opposition.530 
This latter circumstance occurred at Cornell in April 1969, which had begun with a 
formal complaint submitted by the Afro-American Society (AAS) alleging that an 
economics professor had equated “development” with “western civilization” during class, 
quickly escalated when a burning cross was discovered on the lawn of a residence for 
black female students, and reached its climax during an armed 36-hour standoff by black 
students who were holed up in the Student Union to protest what they considered to be 
“institutionalized racism” on campus.531  
Apart from these relatively few outlier cases, most university officials recognized 
that accommodating to (practical) student demands for curricular innovation was not only 
the proper educational decision, but also understood that ceding to these requests would 
allow for disciplinary professionalization532 and might prevent disturbances similar to the 
events that transpired at Cornell. By the early 1970s, over 800 black studies programs 
and/or departments had been formed.533 The successful mobilization of black studies 
advocates prompted other student groups (and their faculty allies) to attempt to 
                                                             
530 On the connection between black power and black studies at San Francisco State, see Joseph 
(2003) and on the 1968 “Third World Strike” at San Francisco State, see Rojas (2010).  
531 On the institutional atmosphere at Cornell which led up to the building occupation, see Loss 
(2011: 184-188) and Eden and Sawyer (2006: 35-43). For a negative view of the student 
movement at Cornell, see Downs (1999). 
532 On the institutionalization of the black studies movement to the academic discipline of African 
American Studies, see Rojas (2007) and Huggins (1985). On the Ford Foundation’s funding as a 
moderating influence on the emergent field of African American studies, see Rooks (2006).  
533 Reuben (1998: 154). 
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“diversif[y] diversity”534 studies on campus. In affirming the central importance of 
gender identity and benefiting from outside social movement pressure, women’s studies 
would become the natural successor to black studies. In holding consciousness-raising 
sessions and adopting decentralized organizational structures, female stalwarts of New 
Left student groups effectively transported the ideals of participatory democracy (leaving 
behind the retrograde gender politics) to a movement for women’s liberation in all 
institutional spheres, including higher education. Though not without its critics, the 
implementation of women’s studies – by the mid-seventies there were 270 programs and 
15,000 courses being taught at 1,500 colleges – did not produce the strife that had 
accompanied the addition of black studies to the curriculum.535 The debates about black 
studies had occurred in a different temporal context, a time when the war in Vietnam was 
raging and thus never far below the surface of any political controversy, especially in an 
institutional environment that was deeply implicated in the conflict. Indeed, campaigns 
for black studies often had their origins in the Vietnam teach-ins, a socializing experience 
where faculty and students joined together in opposition to the American intervention in 
Southeast Asia.    
The February 1965 escalation of bombing in North Vietnam by the Johnson 
Administration was the catalyst for the first teach-in, held on March 24 at the University 
of Michigan. Devised by a small group of Ann Arbor faculty (including Arnold 
                                                             
534 Loss (2011: 197). 
535 Loss (2011: 207). On the founding and development of women’s studies, see Howe (2000) and 
Kennedy and Beins (2005). For newspaper coverage from the period, see e.g. “Pressure and 
Popularity Spur Variety in College Women’s Studies Courses,” New York Times (7 May 1975), 
39. See Arthur (2011) for discussion of additional underserved groups who built upon the black 
studies model for incorporation (e.g. Asian American Studies and Queer Studies). 
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Kaufman, the advisor of SDS discussed above), the all night dialogue, scheduled as to not 
infringe on regular class time, aimed to create a “democratic public…for academic and 
intellectual critics” of the war.536 At the first teach-in, which attracted 3,000 student 
participants, and at dozens of colleges over the next few months where the model 
pioneered at Michigan was replicated, the proceedings began with a formal address by an 
expert on the American intervention that would be followed by additional speeches and 
discussion periods where audience members conversed (in smaller group settings) about 
the arguments they had just listened to and considered possible collective actions in 
response to the political challenges that they, as opponents of the conflict, were facing.537 
Not surprisingly, the most raucous expression of the teach-in concept happened at UC-
Berkeley on May 21 where over ten-thousand people gathered to hear prominent speakers 
(including author Norman Mailer, Dr. Benjamin Spock, muckraking journalist I.F. Stone, 
and activist-comedian Dick Gregory) present their views on the war in what organizers 
described as a “carnival atmosphere” which lasted over 36-hours.538 The Vietnam Day 
activities are noteworthy, not simply because the event was effective in attracting public 
attention to the cause, but rather due to the impact of this accomplishment on the 
advocacy efforts of the Vietnam Day Committee (VDC). Concluding that a follow-up 
teach-in planned for October 15 would be seen as a mere reprisal of the May event (and 
as a result be perceived as unworthy of significant media coverage), the VDC combined a 
                                                             
536 Mattson (2002: 188). On Kaufman’s influence on the nationwide teach-in movement and on 
his role in brokering a compromise among antiwar faculty at Michigan, a vocal minority of whom 
initially preferred a faculty strike rather than the teach-in strategy, see Rothman (1972) 
537 Rudy (1996: 156). 
538 De Groot (1995: 102). 
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teach-in with an off-campus march to the Oakland Army Terminal, a location chosen to 
register strong opposition to the Johnson Administration’s recent announcement of a 
troop buildup from 25,000 to 200,000 active-duty soldiers. While the VDC’s direct action 
proved alienating to the mass public – large majorities still supported the conflict despite 
the military surge and doubling of draft quotas – radicals within the anti-Vietnam war 
movement believed that confrontational tactics were necessary due to the lack of 
available channels (within the party system) for their disapproving voices to be heard.539 
As American casualties mounted and the student deferment policy was tightened, 
more strident expressions of campus protest including sit-ins, draft card burnings, and 
occupations of recruitment offices became increasingly common.540 In need of more 
(college-aged) bodies for combat operations in Southeast Asia, the selective service 
altered its deferment policy in late March 1966 making it more difficult for students to 
avoid military service because of their academic pursuits. The new guidelines stated that 
only full-time matriculants who achieved high class ranks would be exempt. While this 
regulation was thought to be aimed at politically-engaged students who participated in 
campus actions that could endanger their student status (because of the potential risk of 
being expelled) or to students who might reconsider spending their time demonstrating 
                                                             
539 This non-mainstream messaging was not a miscalculation by members of the VDC. As De 
Groot (1995: 105), explains “‘the issue is not the issue’ was a popular slogan. The purpose of an 
issue was to create a confrontation in which moderates were radicalized.” 
540 Attendance at national peace marches on Washington also grew exponentially during this post-
escalation period. While students certainly represented a sizable portion of the crowd at these 
events (which drew tens of thousands of people in successive marches in October, November, and 
December 1965), these rallies were planned independently by non-student organizations. Student 
groups primarily focused their efforts at the campus level where they could potentially influence 
changes in institutional policy. 
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when their grade point averages were being closely monitored, the most vulnerable were 
often lower-income students who supplemented their studies with off-campus jobs and as 
a result maintained a part-time status which made them immediately draft eligible.541 
With momentum gained by effective pressure toward colleges and universities to 
withhold class rank data from draft boards, students accelerated their goal of undermining 
the conflict by directing opposition toward targets within academia (e.g. ROTC 
programs, defense contractor presence on campus, conduct of classified military 
research) and demanded that higher education abandon the “business of war.”  
Students were most successful in their efforts at exposing the complicity of higher 
education in the intervention in Vietnam when they were able to partner with faculty for 
specific campaigns. The development of chemical biological warfare (CBW) on campus, 
for example, represented a violation of institutional mission to both constituencies; for 
students, the research was morally indefensible given its current application in Indochina 
(e.g. poisoning food supplies) and for faculty, the classified nature of such projects spoke 
to a lack of transparency, a breach of the academic enterprise. Goldstein (1986) explores 
these coalition dynamics in his case study of the twenty-month protest (October 1965 to 
March 1967) at the University of Pennsylvania in response to the public disclosure of 
contract work being conducted by the Institute for Cooperative Research (ICR).542 The 
                                                             
541 The policy was based on the misguided premise that the most politically active students were 
not also the most intellectually serious students, when in reality, as Rudy (1996: 165) explains, 
the “antiwar minority in 1965 and 1966 tended to be ‘the best students at the best institutions’ an 
elite, a prophetic minority.” 
542 Research scientists at ICR provided the military with “computer assisted analyses of the 
production, delivery, and effects of the entire spectrum of CBW weaponry” and the “political and 
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research was initially discovered by a Penn undergraduate, who, in his capacity as a clerk 
at the college bookstore, noticed the secluded ICR offices while making a book delivery 
run, and upon checking the inventory list for the location saw titles about rice crop 
diseases and Vietnamese politics.543 This revelation, which was subsequently confirmed 
by defensive college officials, triggered large protests organized by the Penn chapter of 
SDS (with the Committee to End the War in Vietnam) and weekly “bitch-ins” held on 
Tuesday mornings at 11am, the only time during the week when no classes were 
regularly scheduled.544  
While the proximate cause of these actions was the propriety of CBW research on 
campus, the debate evolved into a broader (and more nuanced) discussion over the social 
obligations of higher education and the effects of the institution’s dependence on 
government-funded research.545 Similar to other private universities during this historical 
period, almost one-third of the operating budget of the University of Pennsylvania was 
provided by government-funded research grants,546 a condition which worried critics of 
the war like Senator William Fulbright (D-AR), who observed that “under this system, 
the government was paying for the service of scholars, who ought to be acting as 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
psychological consequences of the uses” of such “lethal and incapacitating agents.” Goldstein 
(1986: 27, 31). 
543 Goldstein (1986: 32). 
544 Goldstein (1986: 37). 
545 In recounting the October 1967 eight-hour detainment by Harvard students of a Dow Chemical 
job recruiter on campus (one of 203 self-reported campus demonstrations against the napalm 
producer between 1967-1969), Samuelson (1967: 1294) references the institutional benefits of 
student unrest, concluding that “the incident, despite its inconvenience was ‘healthy’ for the 
university – that it laid bare many of the students’ deep frustrations and opened the way for a 
better understanding of the war’s impact on the university.”  
546 Goldstein (1986: 30). 
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responsible and independent critics of their government’s policies.”547 Conscious of who 
controlled the purse strings, Fulbright claimed that scholars were likely to engage in a 
subtle form of self-censorship to not offend federal appropriators, a situation which the 
lawmaker regarded as having a “damaging and corrupting…impact on the education 
of…students.”548 This institutional amorality is reflected in the comments by Thomas 
Sovereign Gates, Jr., member of the Penn Board of Trustees (and U.S. Secretary of 
Defense 1959-1961), when asked about the CBW research:   
If the government wants something done it’s all right to do it and accept the work. 
If there’s a special problem that cuts across an institution like a university, if they 
are uniquely qualified to carry on something in our national interest that is 
important to keep secret, I don’t know why they shouldn’t do it.549 
 
Student and faculty opponents disagreed strongly with this formulation about the role of 
higher education in a democratic society. Students concentrated on Gates’ failure to see 
the university as a moral actor while faculty focused on his misperception that 
universities are merely in the knowledge production business; in actuality, scholars are 
also expected to disseminate their research findings, especially when public funds are 
                                                             
547 As quoted in Rudy (1997: 168). 
548 As quoted in Rudy (1997: 168). The Johnson Administration (and its “Truth Team” affiliates) 
went on the offensive and countered campus critics by providing support to sympathizers like 
Professor Wesley Fishel of Michigan State University (MSU) who were willing to publicly 
endorse Vietnam policy. Admittedly, Fishel is an extreme example given the extent of his 
advocacy – he founded “American Friends of Vietnam,” organized the dissemination of open 
letters in support of American policy, arranged a pro-war rally at MSU, and received millions of 
federal grant dollars (outside of the standard peer review system) – but his case is illustrative of 
government’s (often clandestine) role in academic affairs. See Rudy (1996: 160-163).  
549 Goldstein (1986: 30). This position was not unique to Gates. A large majority of faculty who 
were conducting the controversial research as well as students majoring in the physical sciences 
felt similarly. Leslie (1993: 238) quotes a MIT graduate student in engineering who causally 
stated in 1969, “What I’m designing may one day be used to kill millions of people. I don’t care. 
That’s not my responsibility. I’m given an interesting technological problem and I get enjoyment 
out of solving it.” 
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financing their inquiries.550 Uneasy about the possible implications on academic freedom, 
some faculty distanced themselves from student calls for an outright ban on military 
research, and instead emphasized the transparency angle, an approach which ultimately 
proved critical to university divestment from the specific military research contracts 
being opposed.  
The key to success at the University of Pennsylvania was the combination of 
energetic student opposition with faculty support and guidance. This kind of resistance 
worked well elsewhere as students and faculty sought opportunities to expose and 
pushback against their own institution’s connections to the war in Vietnam. While 
historical memory has tended to downplay the role of the faculty in student politics 
during the egalitarian era, Boruch’s (1969) contemporaneous analysis of student 
demonstrations at 181 colleges and universities between 1967-68 found that faculty 
members had assisted in the planning of more than half of the actions and in almost two-
thirds of the events, faculty bodies had passed resolutions in support of student 
demands.551 In terms of student population and institutional setting, there were several 
features shared among the most politically active campuses, each of which provides 
                                                             
550 In contrast to their faculty allies, transparency was not the driving force of the radical student 
opposition. As two student representatives summarized in a November 1966 interview with the 
Daily Pennsylvanian: “We oppose CBW research not because it is classified but because it is 
CBW research commissioned for use in an unjust war. We should be no less opposed if its results 
were wholly public.” Goldstein (1986: 34). The mobilization at the University of Pennsylvania 
was part of an SDS anti-classified research campaign at all universities affiliated with the Institute 
for Defense Analyses (IDA), a consortium that administers federal research programs on matters 
of national security. See Rudy (1996: 183-185). 
551 Even in the South, where there was much less mobilization against the war than in other 
regions of the United States, Cohen (2013: 11) credits the impact of the “critical intellectual and 
political sensibility fostered by a more cosmopolitan faculty” on campuses (e.g. Vanderbilt 
University) where there was sustained political engagement. 
211 
 
    
 
confirmatory evidence for the central claims of this project. The most “virulent 
upheavals”552 occurred on campuses where the dominant culture was characterized by a 
resident (not commuter) student population of traditional-age undergraduates and joined 
to a curriculum which emphasized a broad liberal arts (rather than strictly professional or 
vocational) education.553 Historian Jackson Lears (2000: 16) describes his own political 
socialization at the University of Virginia, an institutional setting where politically-
engaged students had a disproportionate influence on campus (based on their actual 
numbers) because the issues that stimulated their participation resonated with the 
curricular themes being discussed in the classroom. The student-led movements of the 
time had 
demonstrated the radical strength of the liberal arts tradition. They showed its 
uses as a resource for resistance to illegitimate power…I never went near a SDS 
meeting. And yet I was profoundly affected. The second half of the 1960s was a 
great time to study…Enrollments were soaring in philosophy, literature, history. 
The Vietnam War made us confront urgent ethical dilemmas.554   
                                                             
552 Cohen and Kisker (2010: 216). 
553 Readers will note that these elements, which distinguished student politics during the late 
sixties, have weakened (if not become absent) during the contemporary historical era.  
554 Far from all students shared Lears’ experience. Many students were not susceptible to 
curricular influence because they steered clear of liberal arts fields which might awaken a critical 
political consciousness. On the motivations for college attendance of these career-oriented 
students who “paid no attention to protest,” see Rudy (1996: 164). While students who were 
openly favorable of the war were numerically small (in organizational terms) on most campuses, 
their views on the conflict represented the “silent majority” of the nation. Conservative student 
voices were less prominent on campus because supporting the status-quo does not often arouse 
collective action and those who held this perspective often claimed to be dispositionally averse to 
confrontational tactics that might gain more visibility. This latter point is more reflective of a 
particular kind of conservatism; therefore, it makes more sense to distinguish among the (largely 
regionally-based) campus conservatisms between the aristocratic staid New England 
traditionalism of the Young American Foundation (YAF) – as described in its founding Sharon 
Statement (September 1960) – and the anti-intellectual Southern populism wing who focused 
their attention in the late sixties on demonstrably resisting campus integration. See Huff (2013). 
Ironically, until Vietnam became the all-encompassing issue on campus, a conservative audience 
could plausibly be sympathetic to the premise of the New Left critique of higher education 
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Coming to the realization that teach-ins, “bitch-ins,” or any other alternative 
educational creations were not going to end the war, a small minority within the student 
movement embraced increasingly radical rhetoric and endorsed desperate measures 
which both alarmed previously supportive faculty and alienated an already skeptical 
public. Although greater numbers of Americans were becoming war weary, this 
attitudinal shift did not translate into sympathy for the student movement, whose popular 
appeal continued to decline due to internal factionalism and fragmentation of agendas. 
An illustrative case is the April 1968 occupation at Columbia University when an 
multiracial coalition comprised of the campus chapters of SDS and the Student Afro-
American Society (SAS) joined together to oppose university policy, both foreign and 
domestic. The largely-white SDS membership highlighted Columbia’s involvement with 
military research while the SNCC-influenced black students of SAS focused their 
attention on the plan to build a gymnasium adjacent to the campus in Harlem, a proposal 
strongly opposed in the African American neighborhood, whose residents claimed that 
the local development would encroach upon community space and, by gentrifying the 
area, would result in the displacement of families.555 The challenges of maintaining a 
commitment to the ideals of participatory democracy caused consternation among the 
coalition and the escalating tactics employed by some students within the occupied 
buildings (e.g. property damage and threats of violence) closed down the possibility for 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
regarding the loss of institutional purpose and neglect of personal developmental growth. On 
conservative student politics during the egalitarian era, see Andrew (1997), Klatch (1999), and 
Schneider (1998). On movement-countermovement dynamics more generally, see Meyer and 
Staggenborg (1996). 
555 On “Gym Crow” and the “Battle of Morningside Heights” at Columbia, see Bradley (2003, 
2009) and Cox Commission (1968). 
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dialogue with the university officials. Even though students did earn significant 
conciliations for their efforts – gym construction was terminated and institutional 
collaboration with the military was reassessed – the residual fallout from the eight-day 
occupation (which was followed by a six-week student strike) was damaging to the 
reputation of all sides involved (with the possible exception of the SAS, who, unlike their 
SDS colleagues, behaved laudably throughout the ordeal by all accounts). Administrators 
were faulted both for being indecisive at the beginning of the campus disturbance and 
overzealous in their later actions; in the aftermath of the events, President Grayson Kirk 
was forced to resign for his ineffective handling of the crisis. 
The student movement at Columbia (and elsewhere) was derailed by the gradual 
loss of its most valuable group of defenders. Many faculty allies voiced disapproval over 
the aggressive manner in which students had asserted their demands and claimed that this 
confrontational style both undermined their important message and was not well suited 
for an intellectual environment dedicated to passionate yet respectful debate. This 
condemnatory (but well-meaning) critique is represented in Richard Hofstadter’s 1968 
commencement speech at Columbia.556 Taking place in the immediate post-occupation 
period, the Columbia historian argued that the role of the university as a politically-
disinterested entity – “a citadel of intellectual individualism” in an “age of rather 
overwhelming organizations and collectivities” – must be protected. Through their 
                                                             
556 Signifying the intellectual drift away from the New Left’s original concerns (and reflecting the 
tumult of the intervening years), Smith and Bender (2008: 346) contend that Hofstadter’s (1968) 
response to the Columbia occupation – a “compelling articulation of the university’s 
calling…committed to the values of intellectual seriousness and a plurality of voices” – was not 
far removed from the institutional objectives envisioned by Mario Savio and the Free Speech 
Movement just a few years earlier. 
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militant actions which, according to Hofstadter, had short-circuited campus discussion, 
students were causing harm to an institution they claimed to admire and providing 
ammunition to external forces looking to negatively portray higher education.557 
Hofstadter’s call for restraint went unheeded, both by the student movement, which was 
ultimately hijacked by (self)-destructive forces like the Weathermen, and by university 
officials who proved unable (or unwilling) to resist the increasingly repressive climate 
being fostered upon college campuses by political actors eager to garner public goodwill. 
The volume and intensity of campus dissent peaked in 1969-70; one study calculated that 
there were 9,400 “violent campus incidents” during this brief period, “of which at least 
730 eventually led to forcible intervention of police and the arrest of student 
demonstrators.”558 The most memorable event occurred during a peaceful anti-war 
demonstration at Kent State University in Ohio on May 4, 1970 when four students were 
shot and killed by members of the Ohio National Guard.559 In the immediate wake of 
Kent State, roughly four million students at 1,350 colleges and universities – sixty 
percent of the national student enrollment – demonstrated against the campus shootings 
                                                             
557 Although first elaborated by Hofstadter in the aftermath of the student unrest at Columbia, the 
model of institutional neutrality for which he advocated was not unique to him. Expressing a 
similar sentiment on the “university’s role in political and social action,” the Kalven Report 
(1967), written by faculty at the University of Chicago, argues that all campus constituents are 
encouraged to be politically engaged, but in order to preserve their individual rights and not 
threaten the institutional ideal of free inquiry, the university, in its “corporate capacity,” cannot 
speak on behalf of the entire campus community. On the continued relevance of the Kalven 
Report in the context of debates over severing business ties with Sudan and divesting from fossil-
fuel producers, see Fang (2013) and Standish (2013). 
558 Rudy (1996: 190). See Bayer and Astin (1969). 
559 On Kent State, see http://www.may4archive.org and on the much less-publicized killing of 
two students at the historically black Jackson State College (MS) ten days later, see Spofford 
(1988). 
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and the U.S. invasion of Cambodia, the primary motivation for the Kent State 
demonstration that had ended in violence. Fearing for similarly frightening outcomes on 
their own campuses, administrators at more than 130 colleges canceled classes for the 
remainder of the spring semester.560  
The American public was shocked by the images they had seen at Kent State (and 
at the 1968 riots at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago) and rallied around 
candidates who promised to restore “law and order.” Ambitious politicians quickly 
learned that the mass electorate approved of strong arm tactics and positively responded 
to language that vilified students.561 California gubernatorial candidate Ronald Reagan 
had been a forerunner of this populist approach when he successfully ran for office in 
1966 pledging to “clean up the mess” at Berkeley. Indeed, Reagan’s personal and 
political trajectory is instructive in reviewing the two eras of higher education discussed 
in this chapter and as a transition to the contemporary era. While Reagan’s perspective on 
higher education was shaped by his own experience attending bucolic Eureka College, a 
private small liberal arts college in rural Illinois – a time he fondly recalled as “four years 
                                                             
560 Rudy (1996: 193). As expected, there was regional variation regarding campus responses to 
the May 1970 invasion of Cambodia and the shootings at Kent State. Cohen (2013: 15) reports 
that 41% of colleges and universities in the Southeast experienced protests having “significant 
compact on campus operations” compared to 76% in the Northeast and 68% in the Pacific West. 
On the possible causal effect of the May 1970 campus protests on the Nixon Administration’s 
moderation of tone and troop withdrawal policy, see Rudy (1996: 195).  
561 Despite much of the campus violence being perpetrated by outside agitators or agent 
provocateurs (i.e. not registered students) and/or incited by police over-exuberance, a March 1969 
Gallup poll found that 82% of Americans were in favor of “expelling militant students” and 84% 
were in favor of “withdrawing their federal student loans.” Less than 40% of those surveyed 
affirmed “the right of students to protest (even peacefully).” De Groot (1996: 125). On FBI 
surveillance at Berkeley and Ronald Reagan’s rise to power, see Rosenfeld (2012). 
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on a campus with red brick walls and you leave with a tear in your eye”562 – it bears 
mention that decades before Governor Reagan rose to the national stage, in large part, 
due to his crusade against rebellious students, he began his own political career in a 
similar manner, having been chosen by his peers as the class speaker at the “Student 
Strike” of November 1928. Given that the student rally was organized to oppose a college 
proposal to cut classes (in response to the economic challenges of the time), a 
consequence of which would make it difficult for seniors to graduate according to 
schedule, it is unclear why Reagan, a freshman at the time of the strike, was selected as 
the student representative. Notwithstanding this peculiarity, Reagan apparently gave a 
convincing speech which led to the policy being amended so that seniors would be able 
to complete their studies on time, and in the process, according to the creation myth 
provided by the college’s official history, “helped encourage the creation of ‘The Great 
Communicator.’”563  
For all its charms, though, Eureka College did not prepare Ronald Reagan for the 
challenges he would face (and skillfully exploit for political advantage) during the 
egalitarian era of higher education. While seeking office and throughout his tenure as 
Governor of California, Reagan played an significant role in shaping mass public opinion 
on (what he saw as) the failings of public higher education, an approach guided by a free 
market orthodoxy which would later propel him to the White House. During this period 
characterized by the growth of the multiversity, Reagan needed to strike a delicate 
                                                             
562 As quoted in De Groot (1996: 119). 
563 On Reagan’s undergraduate years at Eureka College (IL), see 
http://reagan.eureka.edu/lead_lessons/leader.htm.  
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balance between emphasizing the perceived threats posed by campus unrest while at the 
same time reassuring stakeholders that the California system was still prepared to make 
proper use of defense department contracts and to serve private business interests. 
Expertly capitalizing on the public loss of trust in higher education, Reagan was able to 
generalize his critique of the universities into a broader indictment of the social welfare 
state, a strategy which served him well when campaigning for the presidency in 1980 on 
a small government platform which included a promise to abolish the federal department 
of education.564 As president, Reagan advanced an agenda which sought to consolidate 
this vision (e.g. cutbacks in support for higher education, shifting the burden from federal 
student grants to personal loans, incentivizing market values) and in the process, helped 
to change cultural expectations about the purpose of higher education from a public good 
(a social right) to a private investment (a requirement for economic mobility). The mass 
system of higher education, which defined the egalitarian era, had transformed into a 
universal system of higher education, an animating feature of the contemporary era of 
economic necessity, the focus of Chapter 5.   
 
 
 
                                                             
564 As De Groot (1996: 114) explains, Reagan “did his best to widen the breech [dividing the 
university community from ordinary citizens] by enflaming prejudices.” Reagan was certainly not 
the only state official that used the situation at Berkeley as a springboard to national service. 
Edwin Meese, the deputy district attorney of Alameda County during the Free Speech Movement, 
was responsible for filing the police reports that led to the arrest of student protestors. Meese was 
hired by Governor Reagan to be his Chief of Staff and would eventually ascend to the position of 
U.S. Attorney General during the second term of the Reagan presidency. Eynon (1989: 64, n 37).  
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Chapter 5: The University Means Business: 
On Higher Education in the Era of Economic Necessity 
A lot of young people no longer see the trades and skilled manufacturing as a viable 
career. But I promise you, folks can make a lot more, potentially, with skilled 
manufacturing or the trades than they might with an art history degree. 
Barack Obama, Waukesha, Wisconsin Address (30 January 2014)565 
The economic organization of our country is being transformed at such a rapid rate that it 
is no longer wise for students to elect a course that is too narrowly vocational. 
Allegheny College (PA) Course Catalogue (1944)566 
 
As the functions of higher education have become more central to American life, 
institutional developments have increasingly been shaped by shifts in political values and 
institutional priorities have been conditioned by fluctuating economic conditions and 
societal demands. Epitomized by the policy proposals and worldview linked to the rise of 
the Reagan era (as described at the conclusion of chapter 4), the terms of the relationship 
between colleges and universities and their (public and private sector) benefactors would 
have lingering effects on the aims of higher education that redound to the present. 
                                                             
565 “Remarks by the President on Opportunity for All and Skills for America’s Workers.” GE 
Energy Waukesha Gas Engines Facility. Waukesha, Wisconsin. Transcript available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014 /01/30/remarks-president-opportunity-all-and-
skills-americas-workers. President Obama later apologized to art historians for his inelegant 
choice of words (DeSantis 2014a, 2014b) and it must be noted that the vision for higher education 
that underlie his initial comments has been embraced by opportunistic politicians from both major 
parties looking to exploit an easy target for mockery. Republican governors in several states, for 
example, have proposed lower tuition for students who major in subjects that are aimed at “post-
graduate employment” (Kiley 2013), an extremely short-sighted (and quantifiably imprecise) idea 
that would incentivize students to not pursue a broad liberal arts course of study and thereby 
abandon the “nonmarket forms of development” (Newfield 2004: 56) traditionally associated 
with U.S. higher education. While many of its advocates are (rightfully) uncomfortable reducing 
the benefits of the liberal arts to purely economic payoffs, these kinds of utilitarian justifications 
are increasingly required in the contemporary era of economic necessity. 
566 As quoted in Rudolph (1977: 286). 
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Emblematic of the historical period in which it is operating, the changes within the higher 
education system, which coalesced around 1980, mirror the broader transformations in 
the social order that have occurred during this time. In a temporal context where “there is 
no such thing as society,” higher education is simply another individual (private) good, a 
personal investment, as opposed to a collective (public) good which provides social and 
civic benefits. 
Situating higher education within these cultural dynamics, scholars from a range 
of disciplinary traditions have employed concepts with similar explanatory aims 
regarding the (d)evolving relationship between the university and the state. Despite their 
minor differences of emphasis, these words and phrases are frequently used 
interchangeably to describe the same phenomenon: how shifts in a nation’s political 
economy are reflected in higher education practices and student outcomes. In 
synthesizing the research on privatization, Fryar (2012: 523-525) distinguishes between 
two trends: an institution becoming less public and/or more private. The extent of policy 
(or attitudinal) changes in both of these domains – funding cuts, fewer regulatory hurdles, 
and declines in public approval representing the former, and a greater emphasis on 
market-driven efforts such as commercializing research and embracing corporate 
partnerships while transferring the increased financial burden of attendance to the student 
exemplifying the latter – signifies (in the language of periodization adopted for this 
study) the onset of a new historical era of higher education.567 Academic capitalism, a 
                                                             
567 See Fischer and Stripling (2014) on the de-emphasis of public higher education during this 
“era of neglect.” On the post-2007 decline in state appropriations (often blamed on the economic 
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neologism originally coined by Slaughter and Leslie (1997) to encapsulate these 
structural changes, speaks to a “[fundamental] change in academy practices…that 
prioritizes potential revenue generation” in the “realms of knowledge, learning, and 
consumption.”568 This narrow vision for higher education encourages institutional actors 
to view themselves as independent contractors in search of economic rewards – student 
customers pursue marketable degrees, faculty are remunerated for commodifying their 
research, and administrators seek to procure external monies through various means (e.g. 
licensing agreements, donor outreach, online learning efforts, satellite campus 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
recession), see Oliff, Palacios, Johnson, and Leachman (2013) and on the growth in tuition costs 
to make up for the revenue loss, see Quinteros (2012: 21-25). Trends in student financial aid over 
this historical period – from grants to loans – are graphically summarized in Loss (2011: 238). 
568 Rhoades and Slaughter (2004: 37-38). The oft-invoked privatization (Fryar 2012) and 
academic capitalism (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, Slaughter and Rhoades 2004) are illustrative of 
a variety of terminological constructions that have emerged to contextualize the role of higher 
education in American society. Welch (1998: 172), in a cross-national discussion of the rhetoric 
of efficiency measures in higher education, for example, situates his analytical findings within 
Ritzer’s (1993: 9-12) McDonaldization society thesis about “quantification…predictability and 
the substitution of non-human technology for human controls.” In his close reading of A Test of 
Leadership, the 2006 Presidential Commission Report chaired by Secretary of Education 
Margaret Spellings, Greenwood (2009: 3) sees the policy recommendations for higher education 
as an application of a broader (bipartisan) commitment to a neoliberal philosophy, an ideological 
lens which promotes “individual responsibility and individual consequences.” Neoliberal 
reformers tend to favor “free market” solutions, “reduc[ed] governmental expenditures,” “and the 
destruction of the concept of the ‘public good.’” Perhaps the most instructive of the concepts is 
Schugurensky’s (2006: 306) heteronomous university, which in contrast to the autonomous 
model from which higher education has transitioned, this structural arrangement is characterized 
by “subjection to external controls and impositions.” Institutional agendas are constrained by a 
combination of “market demands” and “state imperatives,” an environment in which the 
university is both “commercial” (service-oriented) and “controlled” (responsive and accountable). 
On the ten “C’s” of the heteronomous university, see Schugurensky (2006: Table 11.1). In each 
of these conceptual formulations – privatization, academic capitalism, efficiency, 
McDonaldization, neoliberalism, heteronomy – higher education is understood as a business 
transaction, a private good where students (“customers”) are “seen as human capital who must 
acquire the skills necessary to compete in the job market” (Kezar 2004: 437). 
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expansion).569 Guided by these institutional objectives, the governing premise of higher 
education has transitioned “from equality to economic engine.”570 Especially pertinent to 
student socialization efforts, this “instrumental form of rationality”571 impacts the 
academic subjects that are seen as essential to the notion of a higher education and a 
“stratification” of disciplines occurs, as Gumport (2000: 81) concludes, “based upon the 
increased use-value of particular knowledg[e] in the wider society and exchange-value in 
certain markets.”  
The current historical period, which I have termed the era of economic necessity, 
is characterized by market pressures and the development of human capital (as a 
precondition for employment). While recognizing the porous boundaries in demarcating 
the presence of any new era, 1980 is an appropriate beginning to this post-egalitarian age 
due to a confluence of factors that reflect an institutional recalibration in response to 
changes in funding mechanisms and shifts in cultural expectations about the purposes of 
higher education. Employing the word presence, rather than arrival, in the previous 
sentence is a conscious choice because the social forces that delineate a distinctive 
historical period represent a consolidation (not an introduction) of developments that 
embody predominating values and thereby distinguish the present from the recent past. 
                                                             
569 In describing his own campus, Michael M. Crow, president of Arizona State University, 
succinctly captures this entrepreneurial mindset. ASU is an environment, Crow boasts, where “we 
are expanding what it means to be a knowledge enterprise. We use knowledge as a form of 
venture capital” (Giroux 2002: 432). On the “dangers of financial interest” due to university-
industry cooperation, see Newfield (2004: 44-46, 62 fn. 15-17). 
570 Hutcheson (2007: 365). This interpretation is consistent with the “market calculus” analysis by 
Slaughter and Rhoades (2004: 44, 52) who assert that institutional aims at “access” (for 
disadvantaged groups) have been overridden by goals of “accessibility” (to privileged interests). 
571 Welch (1998: 172). 
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Given the election of Ronald Reagan, propelled to office in part due to his campaign 
pledge to reduce education funding, along with the transformation of the research policy 
environment triggered by the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act, which allowed for the 
private patenting of scientific discoveries made possible by federal support, 1980 is a 
suitable point of departure. Both of these events, it should be noted, signify a culmination 
of efforts. Reagan would have faced greater difficulty being elected, moreover, if his 
agenda of “efficient” government spending did not resonate with a public susceptible to 
anti-intellectual bromides and still intent on “punishing” higher education for the student 
“excesses” of years ago while implementation of Bayh-Dole (and other technology 
transfer laws) legitimated commercial practices that were already common on many 
campuses.572 
Declining public investment and increased dependence on alternative revenue 
streams have become defining features of the era of economic necessity. Due to cost-
cutting measures (which may reduce access and/or undermine best teaching practices) 
and by accommodating donor demands (which may include ethical compromises), 
undergraduate education is often the greatest victim to these developments.573 This 
                                                             
572 University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act (or Patent and Trademark Law 
Amendments Act). Public Law 96-517, December 12, 1980. On the lobbying efforts that 
eventually resulted in the successful passage of the Bayh-Dole legislation, see Berman (2008: 
837), who compellingly argues that the Act symbolized “a final legitimizing step in a longer 
project of institution-building.” 
573 An increased reliance on private funding may have deleterious effects on the curriculum in 
terms of what is (not) taught. Giroux (2012) considers the case of the BB&T Corporation, a 
financial holdings company, which bequested $1 million dollars to Marshall University (WV) “on 
the condition that Atlas Shrugged by Ayn Rand be taught” at the business school. Regardless of 
one’s views on the pedagogical benefits of assigning Randian literature, Giroux wonders “[w]hat 
are we to make of the integrity of a university when it accepts a monetary gift…demanding as 
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economizing imperative is especially challenging at a time when higher education has 
become ever more indispensable for job acquisition. Carnevale, Smith, and Strohl (2010: 
14) forecast that by 2018, 62% of all jobs will require some post-secondary study; this 
estimate follows an upward trend over the last several decades (in which actual numbers 
have multiplied from 28% in 1973 to 56% in 1992 to 59% in 2007).  
There have been consequences to this institutional growth from a mass to 
universal system of higher education. Calling into question the primary assumptions of 
Baumol’s (1967) “cost disease” concept – that the costs of “personal services” like 
education will always rise because labor intensive activities, in order to be effective, 
require a “handicraft element” (evaluative skills) that cannot be replicated by technology 
– colleges and universities have proposed “solutions” to problems of unsustainable 
expansion and cost that exacerbate the limitations stressed by Baumol’s model.574 As 
student enrollments increase and other interested publics look to financially capitalize on 
the circumstances, the institutional response has been to make courses bigger, experiment 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
part of the agreement the power to specify…how a curriculum should be shaped?” On the 
priorities of institutional patrons, more broadly (and often less nefariously than the circumstances 
presented by Giroux), see “Influence by Degree” (November 2012), a BBC Radio documentary, 
which describes how alumni donors are primarily interested in funding “fur coats rather than 
knickers” (i.e. supporting the maintenance of bare essentials is less appealing). Available for 
download at http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p0104hwp.  
574 Baumol’s co-author, William G. Bowen, revisited the issue in the 2012 “Tanner Lectures” at 
Stanford University and describes himself as a conditional supporter of an “online fix” to (some 
of) the cost problems in higher education. Most astute observers of the higher education 
landscape (see, e.g., Bady 2012, 2013) are less sanguine about the democratic possibilities of 
online education, arguing that these platforms tend to increase educational inequalities and result 
in poor learning outcomes. John Unsworth, chief information officer and librarian at Brandeis 
University, has cleverly remarked that the acronym MOOC, as currently embodied, should 
accurately stand for “marketing over other considerations” (Quoted in O’Neill 2014). MOOCs 
are, of course, not the first “technology-enhanced education” whose supporters claim will 
revolutionize higher education. On radio distance courses during the 1920s and 1930s, the 
“disruptive innovations” of an earlier era, see Matt and Fernandez (2013). 
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with on-line instruction, and delegate teaching to non-tenure track professors, all 
decisions which result in fewer opportunities for (overextended) faculty to focus on non-
vocational goals.575 Central to the era of economic necessity is a “logic of managerial 
production,” which sees “the notion of higher education as a place for dissent and 
unpopular ideas, for creativity and the life of the mind” as immaterial to profit-seeking 
institutional objectives.576 Higher education is mainly preoccupied with producing 
credentialed workers, moreover, and the significance of (and support for) those areas of 
inquiry which may not satisfy the (short-term) needs of employers – the “wasteful 
inefficiencies” – should be scaled back if not eliminated. While many expressions of this 
private good ethos are discussed in Chapter 1 above, this concluding chapter revisits 
these themes, not simply by way of summation, but to further contextualize contemporary 
developments within the longitudinal historical narrative presented in Chapters 3 and 4.  
The growth of the for-profit sector may personify the purest manifestation of the 
market values of the era, but the for-profit perspective about mission and purpose has 
increasingly permeated the words (and often deeds) of institutional actors throughout the 
entire system of higher education. For-profit colleges and universities – an honorific 
designation that is conferred (if not warranted at times) once accreditation is gained577 – 
have benefited from the market opening caused by the combination of increased demand 
                                                             
575 See Umbach (2007) on the effects of non-tenure track faculty on student learning outcomes. 
See also Finder (2007) on longer-term trends and the consequences of the shift to a faculty 
workforce in which a large majority of classes are staffed by contingent labor. 
576 Gumport (2000: 75-76). 
577 Many of these “digital diploma mills” (Noble 2002) are remotely located; some service 
providers may have an offline “campus” in the form of an office park storefront which provides 
customer support. 
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(for occupational training) and state disinvestment in public higher education. Taking 
advantage of technological improvements that make the “delivery of education” less 
costly and exploiting changes in tax policy which make available ample federal support, 
enrollment at FPCUs rose by 235 percent from 2000 to 2010; at present, 26 percent of all 
postsecondary educational providers (serving almost 10 percent of the student 
population) are considered for-profit institutions.578 
In addition to the legislative inducements that suggest a hospitable political 
climate for the for-profit sector, the pedagogical values these colleges and universities 
promote have been rhetorically embraced by recent presidential reports on the future of 
higher education, namely the 2006 Commission convened by Secretary of Education 
Margaret Spellings (with the input of Sally Stroup, Assistant Secretary for Post-
Secondary Education, who before joining the Bush Administration, had been a lobbyist 
for the Apollo Group, the corporation which owns the for-profit University of 
                                                             
578 Douglass (2012: 2-3). The for-profit business model is only possible in a particular kind of 
regulatory environment. Lobbyists for the industry have found support in Congress, for example, 
for its use of Title IV taxpayer funds as a primary source of revenue (the so-called 90/10 rule) and 
in its efforts to eliminate the fifty percent rule, which had stated, until its 2006 non-
reauthorization, that online-only student enrollments could not comprise more than half of all 
enrollments. This latter boon for the for-profit sector resulted in the creation of hundreds of new 
online-only schools. Often focusing their recruitment efforts at under-informed constituencies 
looking for marketplace advancement, for-profit colleges and universities, despite enrolling 10 
percent of all students, secure over 25 percent of all federal student loans. This federal investment 
would be less contentious if not for student’s low retention rates, low graduation rates, and high 
loan default rates at these schools (compared to their non-profit counterparts). See Douglass 
(2012: 4, 7). The financial practices at FPCUs have recently come under greater scrutiny – see 
e.g. the U.S. Senate Committee Report, “For-Profit Higher Education: The Failure to Safeguard 
the Federal Investment and Ensure Student Success” (July 2012) – but stronger regulatory 
oversight is unlikely because the industry has been effective at courting political allies in 
Congress. 
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Phoenix).579 Given the demographic composition of the Commission (in which only 3 of 
the 19 appointees were sitting faculty members) and the neoliberal frameworks for 
analysis that the coauthors looked toward for inspiration – A Nation at Risk (1983), the 
Reagan-era report which assessed the nation’s elementary and secondary schools, was 
cited as its model – the instrumentalist conclusions drawn in A Test of Leadership were 
preordained. The report proposed an agenda of accountability which blamed higher 
education for inadequately preparing students for the twenty-first century economy and 
called on college administrators to see themselves as leaders of an institution whose 
primary function is to train workers. In a critical discourse analysis of the Spellings 
Commission report, Jones (2009: 51-52) examines how the language employed indicates 
a limited role for higher education: according to the text, students should learn the skills 
necessary to become employable, the value of knowledge is directly related to its “use in 
the marketplace,” and colleges and universities should “be governed according to the 
operating norms of business.”580 
Lost in this conception of higher education is support for institutional functions 
which may promote “non-economic qualities.”581 As previous chapters have 
demonstrated, colleges and universities have faced similar questions before about how to 
properly balance competing objectives, but efforts to reconcile disparate goals in the era 
of economic necessity are particularly challenging given the intensification of cultural 
demands (due to stakeholder influence). Despite this institutional emphasis on the profit-
                                                             
579 Douglass (2012: 4). 
580 See also Greenwood (2009: 9-16). 
581 Jones (2009: 51). 
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maximizing ideals linked to occupational training and advanced research, a committed 
group of scholars (like their general education forebears in previous historical eras) have 
resisted this private good mentality by reasserting the central significance of liberal arts 
education and citizenship preparation, the two institutional identities traditionally linked 
to student political socialization and civic development. 
The civic engagement movement in higher education was born in the 1980s as an 
“offspring of discontent,”582 a response to the increasingly market-centered climate which 
regarded students as mere career-minded customers. Newman (1985: 31), in what is often 
credited as the founding document of the emerging movement, argued that if there was a 
“crisis in education,” it was not that students were ill-prepared for the job market (a direct 
rejoinder to A Nation at Risk), but rather that colleges and universities had “failed to 
provide the education for citizenship that is still [our] most important responsibility.” 
Inspired by this call to action, a coalition of college and university presidents joined 
together in 1985 to promote the institutional goal of “producing an educated citizenry for 
the American democracy.” While this organization, Campus Compact, grew steadily 
throughout the era – there were 520 members in 1995, 1,100 by 2008 – its effectiveness 
was constrained by its (necessary) lack of specificity. How Campus Compact resolved 
the central questions of “what does civic engagement actually mean?” and “how will we 
as an organization advance this aim?” tied itself to a specific conception of civic 
engagement that in order to be successful needed to be both transformative-minded yet 
not alienating to existing sponsors or potential allies, a daunting task indeed. Paralleling 
                                                             
582 Hartley (2009: 14). 
228 
 
    
 
the experience of other civic engagement efforts, Campus Compact was able to grow (in 
numbers and influence) during the era of economic necessity precisely because it 
advocated civic development through service learning and volunteer activities while 
shying away from programs that might address more structural concerns, a course of 
action which political leaders, philanthropic groups, and corporate donors would be less 
inclined to support.583 
Bipartisan legislative support for pragmatic approaches to civic engagement 
include the National and Community Service Act (1990) and the National and 
Community Service Trust Act (1993)584 and foundation encouragement such as the 
“Carnegie Elective Classification for Community Engagement” established in 2006 to 
provide metrics by which colleges and universities could be recognized as a “community 
engaged institution.”585 While often embracing instrumentalist higher education policies 
shared by its political opponents,586 the Obama Administration has presented a rhetorical 
veneer that suggests otherwise. In contrast to the singularly-focused Spellings Report of 
the Bush era, the presidential commission report of the Obama presidency, A Crucible 
Moment: College Learning and Democracy’s Future (2012), written in the wake of the 
financial crisis, talks about balancing the objectives of career training and citizen 
                                                             
583 This paragraph relies on the movement chronology traced by Hartley (2009) and Pollack 
(2013).  
584 Public Law 101-610, 101st Congress, S. 1430 and Public Law 103-82, 103rd Congress, H.R. 
2010, respectively. 
585 Pollack (2013: 227). 
586 As suggested in both the first epigraph (and accompanying note) of this chapter.  
229 
 
    
 
obligation and asserts that “education for democracy and civic responsibility” should be 
“pervasive, not partial; central, not peripheral” to the purpose of higher education.”587  
For all these accomodationist efforts may lack in detail and sustained attention, 
they are not without benefit. Moreover, they represent a public good vision for higher 
education in an historical period where the private good ethos remains the governing 
principle. It is true that “movements must adapt to gain broader currency,” and although 
efforts to institutionalize concern for student political socialization have succeeded in 
some meaningful respects, many civic engagement pioneers argue that these 
contributions have been inadequate to the founding ambitions of the movement because 
“the complex socio-political factors that perpetuate the status quo” are largely missing 
from these initiatives.588 The “immense apparatus” of funding has certainly brought 
increased exposure to the movement, but among its advocates, civic engagement is still 
considered to be “marginal and adrift.”589 In diagnosing the reasons for this “stalled” 
movement, Saltmarsh, Hartley, and Clayton (2009: 4-5) posit that champions of civic 
engagement have underachieved because (1) the goals of the movement are not seen as a 
priority by much of the public that is pursuing higher education590; (2) the lack of a 
                                                             
587 National Task Force on Civic Learning and Democratic Engagement (2012: 6). 
588 Hartley (2009: 24). See Finley (2011) for a review of the literature on the effects of civic 
engagement.  
589 Butin (2012: 14); Pollack (2013: 226). 
590 This is not a groundless concern. Focus groups conducted in 2004-2005 by the Association of 
American Colleges and Universities (AAC&U) asked students to rank the value of a variety of 
college outcomes and found that students identified “preparation for personal success” as the 
most important purpose of higher education and “sense of values” and “appreciation of your role 
as citizen” as the least-valued outcomes. As Schneider and Humphrey (2005) conclude, students 
“view college as a private rather than a public good.” See also Humphreys and Davenport (2005). 
Similarly, Ferman (2012: 232-234) argues that an “unholy troika” of factors – “relevance,” 
230 
 
    
 
“unifying vision” or agreed-upon terminology has limited internal cohesion and 
prevented external appeal; and (3) the actual examples of civic learning work have been 
“strikingly apolitical” and therefore uninspiring to those seeking to revive the 
“democratic purpose” of higher education.591 
Given the curricular retreat of the liberal arts (i.e. those fields that had been 
previously responsible for instilling a sense of social consciousness), what are the 
implications of relying upon service learning as the primary method for student political 
socialization and civic development? As Westheimer and Kahne (2004) describe in their 
taxonomy of citizenship, there is a continuum of personal sacrifice and cultural context 
among different conceptions of the “good citizen.” The particular citizenship model that 
is cultivated – personally responsible, participatory, or justice oriented – “underscore[s] 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
“negativity,” and the “triumphant market” – have contributed to student disengagement (in terms 
of declining voting rates, political knowledge, and interest in government). On instrumentalist 
motivations for college attendance, see also Flacks and Thomas (2007). Potentially heartening to 
civic engagement advocates are the results of Is College Worth It?, a recent Pew study which 
found that although 47% of the public agreed that the “main purpose of college” was to “teach 
work-related skills and knowledge,” 39% of survey respondents chose the option “help 
individuals grow personally and intellectually” as the primary mission of higher education. See 
Pew Research Center (2011: 14, 48-49). 
591 Hartley (2009: 24). Proposed solutions to this “internal malaise” (Butin 2012: 15) include 
Pollack’s (2013) endorsement of “critical civic literacy,” a more forthright commitment to 
providing the tools for structural analysis and Butin’s (2012: 17, 19-21) call for “community 
engagement” to follow the path of Black Studies and Women’s Studies by shifting its self-
identity from a “transformational social movement” to an academic discipline (with all of the 
attendant norms and practices associated with such a label). The “disciplining of service 
learning,” according to Butin, would increase the institutional legitimacy of civic engagement and 
provide internal processes for critical self-examination and intellectual development. For an 
earlier examination of “frameworks of engagement” and consideration of the “curricular deficit” 
in service learning efforts, see the Wingspread Statement on Student Civic Engagement (Long 
2002), a student-faculty collaboration which endorses “service politics,” an approach described as 
an “alternative form of politics,” not an “alternative to politics.” 
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[the] political implications of education for democracy.”592 Both personally responsible 
and participatory citizens contribute through voluntarism and charity, but the former 
focuses on individual efforts (such as recycling or donating toys to children in need) 
while the latter seeks collective opportunities for involvement (e.g. forming an 
environmental action committee or serving on a community board that addresses issues 
concerning at-risk children). The justice oriented citizen concentrates on investigating the 
root causes of the social problems that arouse the interest of personally responsible and 
participatory citizens, but in contrast to these two other conceptions of citizenship, the 
justice oriented citizen prioritizes acts of prevention to acts of palliation. “If participatory 
citizens are organizing the food drive and personally responsible citizens are donating 
food,” Westheimer and Kahne (2004: 4) explain, “justice oriented citizens are asking why 
people are hungry.”  
During the era of economic necessity, programs which nurture personal 
responsibility are the most widespread (and well-funded) kinds of reform promoted by 
higher education. Scholars who have noted increased volunteerism among college 
students in recent years have attributed this growth to greater opportunities for 
participation as well as high school requirements which may habituate the behavior at an 
early age.593 The potential drawbacks of this approach – where students may find 
community service personally rewarding yet remain uninformed of the structural sources 
and/or possible collective responses to current conditions – is reflected in the anecdote 
                                                             
592 Westheimer and Kahne (2004: 1). 
593 Sax (2004: 67-68). 
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told by Lagemann and Lewis (2012: 32) about a student who so enjoyed his volunteer 
work at a soup kitchen that he said, “I hope it is still around when my children are in 
college, so they can work here too.” 
Levine and Hirsch (1991: 125-126) suggest that historical periods of youth 
volunteering are often followed by surges in “broader social advocacy.” The argument 
holds that civic engagement (in the form of community service) exposes young people to 
inequities (of which they were previously ignorant) and inspires them to act more 
forcefully in confronting collective problems. Reflective of this hope are remarks made 
by Nannerl O. Keohane, president of Duke University in 1999, when anti-sweatshop 
demonstrations were organized on campus calling on the administration to adopt a “code 
of conduct” for athletic apparel manufacturers to obey in order to maintain their business 
relationship with the university. Keohane speculated that “[t]his generation is one where 
there’s a very strong sense of personal responsibility to make a difference for immediate, 
real people you can see and touch…My own hunch, as a political theorist, is this 
sweatshop movement is a direct outgrowth of this practical [community service] 
mindset.”594 The assertion that volunteerism is a harbinger of further (and deeper) 
political commitments (such as anti-sweatshop organizing) is plausible, yet most scholars 
                                                             
594 Greenhouse (1999). Many advocates for “sweat-free” campuses, including the student 
leadership at Duke, did not frame their participation as an extension of community service, but 
rather credited their educational experience at Union Summer, an AFL-CIO organizing program 
modeled after Freedom Summer, for inspiring their fair labor efforts. See Van Dyke, Dixon, and 
Carlon (2007) on Union Summer and “manufacturing dissent.” On the formation of the United 
Students Against Sweatshops (USAS) see Ross (2004: 288-293) and Featherstone (2000). Similar 
to the trajectory of previous student movements, political consciousness around clothing supply 
chains began at the most prestigious universities and small liberal arts colleges before spreading 
“outward…to less elite campuses.” (Ross 2004: 297) 
233 
 
    
 
who have researched this possible link conclude that the association is not as clear as 
Keohane posits.595     
In an era of civic decline, characterized by “increasingly consumerist and market 
driven” ideals, it should not be unexpected that student engagement would embody the 
“individualist ethos” of the wider cultural environment.596 From understanding 
volunteerism as a “resume-padding” activity597 to embracing a “highbrow provocative”598 
political style that won’t endanger future career prospects, entrepreneurial political 
engagement may take several forms. Instrumentalist politics may serve the greater good, 
but as Friedland and Morimoto (2005: 3) explain, there are constraints to this type of 
participation: “When civic activity is more closely linked to personal benefit, it is 
possible that the longer term effect of that activity may either decline or change its 
meaning and/or its form.” Functioning as “zombie categories”599 – labels which are dead 
but still alive – service learning activities, which in the past may have led to more 
structurally-focused political efforts, may no longer have that motivating effect because 
                                                             
595 Loeb (2001). Countering President Keohane’s intuition, Serow (1991: 543), concludes, based 
on his systematic study of survey and interview data of student volunteers, that the motivations 
for participation appear to be “grounded in a norm of personal assistance [occupational goals and 
personal relationships] rather than in broader social or political commitments.” 
596 Grigsby (2009: 172-173). 
597 Friedland and Morimoto (2005); Finnegan (2011). Malone (2011) makes the explicit 
connection between working on the 2008 Obama campaign and enhancing one’s job prospects 
arguing that “the activism it entailed felt like work – not a turnoff for us. Dialing your way 
through spreadsheets of get-out-the-vote phone numbers is something you can add to a résumé.” 
598 Binder and Wood (2013: 234-235, 267). 
599 Beck and Beck (2002) as cited in Friedland and Morimoto (2005: 5-6). 
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the way in which these programs are designed do not provide the “kind of critical 
reflection and action many assume are essential in a democratic society.”600 
Also indicative of these period effects, though, are cases of contemporary student 
politics where student leaders, despite inhabiting the same institutional space as their 
career-oriented peers, have drawn more civically-motivated lessons that influence their 
political participation. Two recent examples at highly selective liberal arts colleges – the 
campaign for fossil-fuel divestment at Swarthmore College (PA) and the negative student 
response at Haverford College (PA) to the selection of Robert Birgeneau, the former 
chancellor at the University of California, to serve as commencement speaker – 
demonstrate that students are most likely to voice dissent when their conception of the 
ethical commitments of their college is called into question by countervailing evidence.601 
                                                             
600 Westheimer and Kahne (2004: 6). On the developmental and democratic outcomes of campus 
dissent, see Biddix, Somers, and Polman (2009) on the 2005 student-worker alliance at 
Washington University (MO). For a thoughtful discussion of the persistent effects of student 
participation in the New Orleans Rebirth Movement, see Heldman and Israel-Trummel (2012). 
Occidental College students who had engaged in “disaster volunteerism” in response to Hurricane 
Katrina reported increases in individual political efficacy and commitment to further political 
participation but also experienced “dramatic increases in cynicism and emotional distress” as a 
result of their service. The high costs associated with this kind of civic involvement is reminiscent 
of McAdam’s (1986, 1988) work on Freedom Summer veterans whose life trajectories were 
forever changed by their experience teaching children and registering voters in the South. 
McAdam’s more recent work exploring the impact of Teach for America (TFA) suggests the 
difficulty in replicating this civic achievement. Demonstrating the variation of effects (as well as 
the sociopolitical context in which the service is occurring), McAdam and Brandt (2009) found 
TFA alumni to have been politically demobilized by their participation, citing less political 
activity after their service. Unlike the high-risk, high-cost engagement of Freedom Summer, 
Teach for America, according to this first longitudinal study of the organization, does not appear 
to serve as a catalyst to a life of political engagement.  
601 Additional examples, which represent an explicit student pushback to disinvestments in higher 
education (at schools which have often portrayed themselves as being conscious of increasing 
student costs), include protests to state budget cuts at the University of California (Friend 2010), 
opposition to Cooper Union (NY) imposing tuition fees for the first time in its 150-year history 
(Kaminer 2013), demonstrations at Wesleyan (CT) against a proposed end to need-blind 
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In the case of Swarthmore, this process of awareness has been directly “fueled” by 
curricular socialization. Stirred to action by the study of nonviolent direct actions in a 
peace and conflict studies class (which included field research at a mountaintop coal 
removal site in nearby West Virginia), student leaders applied the principles learned to 
their own role as stewards of the environment and called for the divestment of 
endowment resources from the fossil fuel industry.602 The Swarthmore campaign remains 
a work in progress as the Board of Managers has voted against divestment claiming that 
it would be fiscally unwise for the College to relinquish the future returns on investment, 
income which members maintain has already been earmarked for student scholarships. 
Studying the efforts of the brief student anti-apartheid movement of the mid-1980s may 
provide some solace for the “mountain justice” students in terms of the initially negative 
administrative responses to divestiture requests – most universities took the same position 
(and employed the same rationale) as the Swarthmore Board of Managers – but also some 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
admissions policy (Perez-Pena 2012), and threats by two-thirds of the student body at 
Wilberforce University (OH) to transfer due to decaying infrastructure at the historically black 
institution (Johnston 2012). Although much has been written about the poor relations between 
organized labor and student movements during the Vietnam War period – in retrospect this 
animosity was often exaggerated (Lewis 2013) – the openly materialist concerns expressed by 
some students portends the possibility for a class-based politics in the era of economic necessity. 
The Student Labor Project (http://www.studentlabor.org/), for example, has been an advocate of 
this coalitional approach. 
602 “It’s surprising,” said one student involved in the project, “that Swarthmore, which prides 
itself on social justice, would be so hesitant when you try to involve the institution itself…It’s 
astounding to us to see the ways they continue to resist and won’t put their money where their 
mouth is” (Stewart 2014). On anti-fossil fuel campaigns at Columbia and Hampshire College, see 
Mogilyanskaya (2013). Within the past decade, the divestment strategy has also been effectively 
employed by the Sudan Divestment Movement, which began at Georgetown University, and has 
recruited dozens of member schools to pledge withdrawal of university investments from 
companies that have business ties with the Sudanese government because of that nation’s 
sponsorship of the genocide in Darfur. Students have been most successful in persuading 
administrators about the righteousness of their cause by asserting that divestment represents an 
“affirmation of our ideals” (Strout 2006). 
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pause considering what occurred after colleges eventually ceded to student demands. 
Within a year of the movement’s emergence in April 1985, students, who saw their 
efforts as a conscious rebuke to the market values of the Reagan era, had pressured 120 
colleges and universities in the United States to divest their stock holdings from 
companies working with the South African government, but since divestment was a 
tangible (and limited) goal that had been reached, the solidarity movement on campuses 
became a victim of its own success “while the apartheid regime continued its massive 
repression” of its own citizens for years to come.603 
Haverford students presented their opposition to Robert Birgeneau being chosen 
as graduation speaker in terms of a “lack of fit” with the Quaker roots of their college. 
Students argued that during his tenure at the University of California, Chancellor 
Birgeneau supported the use of “extreme force against nonviolent protestors” on the 
Berkeley campus and as he had yet to sufficiently atone for presiding over this November 
2011 action, honoring him at Haverford would be inappropriate given the college’s 
“expressed values of mutual trust, concern, and respect.” Extending an opportunity for 
dialogue was the immediate goal of the students, but Birgeneau chose not to respond to 
their letter outlining a possible path to reconciliation, and instead formally declined 
Haverford’s invitation to speak.604  
                                                             
603 Altbach and Cohen (1990: 44, 46). On the strategic constraints of divestment, see Countryman 
(1988) and Rottenberg (1986). In explaining the diffusion of the shantytown tactic, Soule (1997) 
also provides a fine overview of the anti-apartheid movement. 
604 Rushmore (2014). Voicing disapproval to divisive graduation speakers (or the process by 
which such speakers are chosen) has been a recurrent theme in U.S. higher education for several 
decades. One of the more high-profile instances occurred in 1990 at Wellesley College (MA), 
when students pressured administrators to rescind its offer to Barbara Bush to speak at 
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The Swarthmore and Haverford examples further substantiate the claim made by 
Piven and Cloward (1978: 20-21) that the features of institutional life determine the 
forms that civil resistance takes. Further instances during the era of economic necessity 
that demonstrate this point include: Mills College, an all-women’s college in Oakland 
(CA), planning to become coeducational in 1990 (due to declines in enrollment) but 
halting those plans largely due to student opposition; Gallaudet University (MD), the 
only 4-year college in the United States focused on the needs of deaf students, enduring 
student protest when trustees attempted in 1988 to continue its anachronistic practice of 
only hiring presidents who were not hearing-impaired; and the New School (NY) facing 
institutional turmoil in 2009 because its president, former U.S. Senator Bob Kerrey (D-
NE) had chosen, according to some students, “bureaucracy over books.” By letting fiscal 
considerations override academic ones and by firing a popular provost, Kerrey alienated 
himself students, who claimed that he had undermined the anti-establishment ethos of the 
institution through his actions.605 Politically-engaged students, in sum, are likely to find 
support for their causes when they are able to advance their concerns as responses to 
administrative (in)decisions that have compromised the integrity of their college’s stated 
mission. 
These contemporary examples of student politics demonstrate continuity with 
previous historical periods regarding where political engagement has been strongest and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Commencement. Student petitioners claimed that the first lady did not represent the progressive 
gender values of Wellesley and therefore should not be awarded an honorary degree (Hertz and 
Reverby 1995). 
605 See Rhoads (1998: chap. 4) on Mills College; Christiansen and Barnartt (1995) and Orlans 
(1989) on Gallaudet; and Foderaro and Santora (2008) and Senior (2009) on the New School. 
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who are expected to be involved on campus. The most politically active student 
populations have been present at the “cosmopolitan and prestigious universities on both 
coasts,” “a sprinkling of major public universities in between,” and “traditionally 
progressive liberal arts colleges” while political participation has been disproportionately 
concentrated among students in social science (and humanities) departments, not among 
those pursuing degrees in vocational training programs or the physical sciences.606 Given 
the institutional developments traced throughout this study, the combination of these two 
elements is increasingly rare in American higher education. Over time, there has been, 
moreover, a move away by incoming students from academic subjects that are closely 
linked to the development of political socialization (because they are perceived to have 
few professional uses) and the colleges and universities most associated with political 
activity – and the social values and curricular aims that underpin these institutional 
missions – represent a much smaller percentage of student enrollments due to the rise of 
the for-profit sector (and the choice by longer-established schools to adopt “efficiency” 
measures that mimic for-profit service providers). In addition, the increases in part-time 
and commuter students limit potential involvement, because as Munson (2010: 776-777) 
explains, students are more biographically available for student politics (or any other 
social network building activity on campus) when their preexisting daily routines are 
“disrupted,” a process which is more complicated in the contemporary era when more 
students are not living on campus and/or are still intimately connected to their pre-college 
lives.         
                                                             
606 Altbach and Cohen (1990: 48). 
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A recent survey of contemporary student life confirms that self-described 
politically active students major in the same disciplinary fields as the most engaged 
students of previous generations.607 When asked about the possible influence of their 
chosen academic pursuits on their political involvement on campus, students articulated a 
strong connection between the two, claiming that the analytical concepts and theoretical 
formulations they had been presented with in class had a significant impact on their 
political development. A student at an elite private liberal arts college in New England, 
who identifies as “first-generation and working-class,” for example, found personal 
meaning and political knowledge in sociology because of its “critical 
standpoint…specifically regarding social reproduction and education, forces you to see 
institutions and structures in a very political way. I’ve become very aware of how the 
capitalist system we live in shapes these institutions.” A political science student at a 
large university in a cosmopolitan northeastern city not only “credit[s] my courses…with 
helping to form my political ideas” but also recognizes that serious engagement with 
material on “human rights atrocities” led to him redirecting his post-college plans to a 
career in that field. Two respondents attending women’s colleges spoke about the 
influence of assigned reading on their flourishing social awareness; a geography major 
                                                             
607 The analysis in this chapter is informed, in part, by a pilot survey conducted in Fall 2011 
which explored contemporary student politics with those currently active on campus. Unless 
otherwise specified, the direct quotes in this section are taken from this survey. The electronic 
data collection occurred a month before the rise of the Occupy Wall Street movement, and while 
there are certainly signs of economic insecurity and antipathy toward political institutions in 
student responses, a collective consciousness was not yet apparent. While this generational 
snapshot is instructive in gauging the mood of a cross-section of politically engaged students – 
particularly when the results are situated within large-N data sources consulted throughout the 
study – the findings are still provisional given the small size of the survey. See Yesnowitz (2011) 
for further details.     
240 
 
    
 
remarked that the “ideas set forth by radical theorists [such as David Harvey and Karl 
Marx] have greatly affected my concept of what kind of actions people can take to 
change their society” and a gender studies major valued the intellectual foundations she 
received “in conflicts that affect me, like sexism and racism and homophobia” and the 
field’s emphasis on human agency. From her classes, she has discovered that “everything 
is affected by circumstances and history and the way we are raised and socialized…We 
perpetuate ideas, we give significance to certain things and downplay others.” 
Unlike some outspoken commentators who publicly bemoan a perceived 
ideological homogeneity on campus, several student respondents positively reflected on 
the exposure to thought-provoking ideas and appreciated how their liberal arts education 
was geared toward critical engagement not political indoctrination.608 A libertarian 
political science student at a mid-size university in the Upper South summed up this 
sentiment well stating that “by studying the arguments of politics I don’t agree with, I’ve 
learned how to carefully articulate exactly what I do believe, why, and defend it.” Amidst 
this sophisticated understanding of the aims of a particular kind of higher education, 
though, the politically engaged students surveyed realize that their experience is 
exceptional – indeed, a smaller percentage of college students benefit from a liberal arts 
education now than in any previous historical era in American higher education. A 
history student at a New England liberal arts college, deliberately echoing the preamble 
                                                             
608 Kenyon College’s Harry Clor, a political theorist and vocal skeptic of women’s studies, argues 
“there is a vital distinction to be made between a search for knowledge which happens to have 
political consequences and a political training for the sake of achieving them.” As quoted in Lilla 
(1986: 54). This key distinction eludes many politicians interested in disparaging (and defunding) 
the social sciences and humanities.    
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of the Port Huron Statement,609 offered an unsolicited generational diagnosis of her peers, 
which, in contrast to the hope and possibility found in the 1962 student manifesto, strikes 
a note of despair and indebtedness: “We are a cynical generation with a short attention 
span, with too [many] obligations and too little hope for following our ideals after 
graduating.”  
 
Conclusion: Period Effects, Institutional Purpose, and Political Socialization 
Everyone is nineteen, only at different times. 
James S. Kunen, The Strawberry Statement: Notes of a College Revolutionary (1969) 
 
Previous research on student politics has focused on many aspects of the 
phenomenon including the demographic characteristics of participants (who), the issues 
that motivate engagement (what), the campus settings that see the greatest number of 
students involved (where), and the precipitating factors to political action (when).610 
When seeking to explain variations in student politics over time, though, insufficient 
attention has been devoted to considering how the institutional location where social 
consciousness is potentially being cultivated (the higher education system) has, due to a 
range of cultural and economic forces, fluctuated in its commitment to functions which 
provide opportunities for political socialization. While suggesting that curricular 
exposure serves a priming effect for subsequent behavior is not a particularly novel 
                                                             
609 “We are people of this generation, bred in at least modest comfort, housed now in universities, 
looking uncomfortably to the world we inherit.” 
610 This sentence borrows its construction from the summary of previous research presented in 
Biddix (2006: 28). 
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insight,611 the longitudinal question associated with this mechanism – how shifts in 
emphasis among competing institutional identities impact the political development of 
emerging adults – has not been carefully examined. 
Mobilizing ideas can only serve their purpose if students are “accessible…to 
intervention.”612 Far from all students who are “subjected to the treatment” will respond, 
but exposure to certain academic fields of study (associated with the goals of liberal arts 
education and citizenship preparation) may create a stimulus for political action that is 
unlikely in other curricular contexts (pre-professional disciplines and other forms of 
occupational training).613 The more general point, though, is that due to self-selection 
and/or readjustments in institutional purpose, fewer students in economically-challenging 
periods like the present are acculturated within a higher education environment that 
promotes civic development.614 The effects of this “functional conversion” on student 
                                                             
611 See the landmark study by Feldman and Newcomb (1969) which synthesized previous 
scholarship on the persistent effects of curricular environment on political attitudes as well as 
Weidman’s (1989) conceptual model of undergraduate socialization.  
612 Vreeland and Bidwell (1965: 235), as quoted in Weidman (1989: 307). 
613 Reflecting on how the process of curricular socialization operates, Straumanis argues that by 
learning the tools of critical analysis in the field of women’s studies, students “begin to 
[naturally] analyze their own lives in political terms…which may lead to political commitment.” 
As quoted in Lilla (1986: 54). In a 2006 survey of students enrolled in the undergraduate core 
course in political science at Boston University, for example, 84% of respondents considered 
themselves “politically engaged/politically active” and 70% of students claimed to have attended 
a “political rally” or “demonstration” in the previous six months (N~150). More detailed results 
from the “PO 101 Fall 2006 Opinion Poll” are available from the author. Examining national data 
from the Higher Education Research Institute (HERI) at UCLA, Sax (2004: 70-71) also finds a 
relationship between field of study and political interest. Students majoring in the social sciences 
(especially political science and history) or the humanities discuss politics at a “significantly 
higher-than-average rate” than the “average college student.” The vocational and physical 
sciences (e.g. agriculture, health professions, biology) and business are the disciplinary fields 
with the most politically disengaged students. 
614 It must be stated that this response was not inevitable, but rather speaks to the cultural values 
of the era of economic necessity. As previously mentioned in Chapter 4, students and colleges 
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socialization have been both underappreciated by scholars interested in student politics 
and overlooked by institutional stakeholders (e.g. policymakers, mass publics) who are 
otherwise quick to express concern over declining learning outcomes. Disrupting this link 
not only calls into question who will be responsible for helping students construct 
political identities,615 but the unbundling of functions also illustrates how valuing 
economic returns on investment above all non-material aims has unintended 
consequences for institutional objectives formerly understood to be central to the mission 
of higher education. As described throughout this study, the reordering of institutional 
priorities represents a calculated response to market demands. The antecedent cause of 
this resource allocation – changing cultural expectations about the purpose of higher 
education – shapes student motivations for attendance because “all actors are positioned 
at the nexus of temporal [i.e. historically contingent] processes.”616 
Scholarship on generational politics posits that youth participation is explained by 
the confluence of (1) life-course effects; (2) cohort effects; and (3) period effects.617 
Advocates of the life-course model emphasize the “divergent psychosocial and biological 
orientations [of age groups]”618 as the primary causal factor. For proponents of cohort 
effects, generational identity is not defined by similarities in age but rather around shared 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
during the 1930s, finding themselves in a much worse economic period, argued that pursuing a 
broad education was vital to helping the country and oneself during these trying times.   
615 With their philanthropic focus, Kligler-Vilenchik and Shresthova (2012) claim that 
“participatory culture civics” (PCC) organizations like Invisible Children and the Harry Potter 
Alliance may potentially serve as alternative (non-curricular) venues for civic learning.  
616 Luecke (2013: 10). 
617 Regarding the convergence of life-course, cohort, and period effects, Luecke (2013: 10) 
elegantly states that “we experience the present (daily life) at a particular stage in our life that 
intersects with collective history, the time of social institutions, and practices.” 
618 Braungart and Braungart (1990: 83). 
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formative experiences that frame one’s worldview throughout the life-cycle. Karl 
Mannheim (1952: 306), the leading adherent of this approach, explains that “the problem 
of generations” is characterized by “a certain affinity in the way in which all [members] 
move with and are formed by their common experiences.” A generational unit – as 
Mannheim labels this collective spirit – is more a social than biological narrative.619 The 
period effects argument stipulates that the historical context in which students are situated 
will facilitate or encumber the development of a political consciousness and help to 
structure subsequent mobilization efforts.620 
The period effects explanation is most pertinent to an examination of 
contemporary student politics. The service aims of colleges and universities are 
influenced by the predominating cultural view that higher education is a private good for 
individual gain, not a public good for social benefit. This prevailing mindset is reflected 
not simply in who seeks post-secondary study, but also in the campus values that students 
encounter upon matriculation; these mutually reinforcing elements will tend to impact the 
form and content of student political engagement on campus. The life-course rationale, 
which emphasizes a coming-of-age narrative, does not easily apply to current 
circumstances because the changing (non-traditional) demographics of the population 
                                                             
619 By adopting this perspective, Mannheim suggests that there is not only a distinctive character 
to all generations but also a path dependency in its application. See also Rintala (1963, 1979) for 
a defense of this position. 
620 Braungart and Braungart (1990: 82). While the three explanatory models are presented here as 
“ideal types,” most analysts will acknowledge the overlap of some of the concepts and the 
attendant difficulty in isolating an individual variable that explains the (psychological/biological/ 
social/historical) phenomenon under discussion. For empirical consideration of the millennial 
generation, see Howe and Nadler (2009) and various reports issued by the Center for Information 
& Research on Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE), http://www.civicyouth.org/. 
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under examination are not sufficiently captured by this explanatory framework. Cohort 
analysis is also less instructive (for present purposes) because higher education is not 
necessarily seen by those pursuing degrees as a shared generational experience. Recent 
institutional developments that have been reviewed throughout this project – ranging 
from increases in part-time, commuter, and online registrants to declines in funding for 
and interest in the liberal arts – all speak to a “limited student involvement” which 
reduces higher education’s potential impact on student socialization. 
This institutional landscape requires revised taxonomies of student orientations 
and updated theories of student socialization that are informed by knowledge gained 
through historical case analysis.621 In considering how we change higher education 
affects how higher education changes us, institutional constituencies must take into 
                                                             
621 Brint (2011) is to be commended for beginning this ambitious task. Guided by Clark and 
Trow’s (1966) parsimonious typology of student subcultures, especially their “dimensions of 
student identity,” Brint’s revised categorization of student orientations provides greater precision 
and is informed by institutional developments (e.g. increased vocationalism; greater access to 
education for underrepresented groups; greater attention to institutional character) that were less 
germane to the historical period in which Clark and Trow were writing. (See Clark and Trow 
(1966) reprinted in Clark (2008: 104-117). Brint (2011: 8-9) finds affinities between the 
“activists” and “academics” since both groups are interested in the “world of ideas,” but his 
conception of “activists” as having similarities with the “anti-intellectuals” because both hold 
“ambivalent/hostile attitudes” toward higher education is less compelling. Rather, as 
demonstrated throughout our historical narrative, those students who have been most politically 
involved identify with the stated (liberal) values of the institution in such an idealized form that it 
offends them when their college or university violates those principles. Based on Brint’s 
conceptualization, there are certainly much fewer “activists” than “vocationals” in contemporary 
higher education (an assertion which is undoubtedly true regardless of operational definitions), 
but for greater clarity, Brint might revisit another classification scheme written during the late 
1960s in order to disaggregate variation within student political engagement. Block, Haan, and 
Smith (1968: 211-212) distinguish between “activist youth” who “have dedicated themselves to 
fight actively against policies that violate their ethic and sense of humane justice” and 
“constructivist youth” who “devote themselves to volunteer activities” and seek to “effect social 
change in ways that involve working within…existing framework[s] of society.” This more 
nuanced understanding of student politics is potentially more applicable to the service learning 
based political engagement discussed earlier in this chapter. 
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account whether proposed policies would unduly preference credentialization at the cost 
of learning. All interested parties will surely agree that (not uncommon) sentiments like 
those expressed by a survey respondent in Yesnowitz (2011) do not inspire confidence 
about the state of higher education. “I got my diploma,” remarked the economics 
graduate from a mid-size state college in the Upper Midwest, “but I definitely didn’t get 
an education from them.” 
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